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Editors’ Note
Criterion: A Journal of Literary Criticism, is a student run journal associated
with the English Department at Brigham Young University. As a journal we are
dedicated to bringing quality pieces of literary criticism from the undergraduate and graduate levels to our readers. Criterion functions entirely through the
exhaustive efforts of our volunteer editors. We would like to take this moment
to thank our staff for the wonderful work they have done for this issue. Our staff
devoted their time and energy to refining these articles and preparing them for
publication. We could not have done this without their extraordinary efforts,
and we appreciate the unique presence each and every one of them has contributed to the journal.
We would also like to thank Laura Dabundo, Professor Emerita at Kennesaw
State University, for her excellent and engaging forum prompt, “Faith at the
Crisis Point: Exploring the Intersection of Religion and Literature”. As a religiously affiliated university, we at BYU were interested in exploring the relationship between religion, literature, and literary criticism. Dr. Dabundo’s
contribution led to the submission of varied and interesting pieces that dealt
with the concept of religion over a wide spectrum of texts from Donne’s Holy
Sonnets to Flannery O’Connor.
We also received a plethora of interesting submissions through our open
call for papers. We are grateful for the authors who chose to share their work
with us and were willing to take the time to create quality pieces of literary
criticism. We have quite the interesting mix of papers in this issue, and we are
excited by the variety we are able to show our readers.
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It is always difficult to adequately express our appreciation to all of the
individuals involved in the development of a student journal. However, we
would like to extend our deepest gratitude for the guiding hand of our Faculty
Advisor, Emron Esplin, for his continued investment in this journal. We would
also like to thank Tressa Roberts who provided the design for our cover. Finally,
we would like to extend our thanks to the BYU Department of English for their
patronage and support.
As the Editors-in-Chief of this journal, we are both humbled and excited to
present our readers with the Winter 2016 issue of Criterion.

Chelsea Lee and Sarah Barlow
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Morality and Pleasure
in Tim O’Brien’s The
Things They Carried
Sarah Bonney

In Tim O’Brien’s The Things They Carried, O’Brien
tells of a group of soldiers’ experiences during and after the Vietnam War.
Throughout the novel, the soldiers are forced to construct a new morality as a
result of the violence required of them; however, the soldiers’ wartime moral
system conflicts with the civilian moral system, which they knew before the
war and which is still in place on the home front. The civilian moral system is
black-and-white with strong, simple standards to dictate acceptable behavior.
Aggressive behavior, such as assault and murder, is consistently condemned and
punished with fines, incarceration, and occasionally the death penalty. However,
because a soldier’s duty is comprised of immoral acts, this civilian moral code
is no longer applicable. Instead, killing other human beings becomes morally
upright, as long as those human beings are the enemy. In opposition to counterculture claims, the soldiers do not live without a code of ethics, as Jimmy
Cross demonstrates by his guilt about Lavender’s death and his commitment
to be a better military leader who “[performs] his duties firmly and without
negligence” (24). However, their understanding of what is ethical and what is
not shifts because their duty is inherently unethical. Consequently, the soldiers
must contrive a new moral system that includes violence as an honorable way
to fulfill their duty, allowing the soldiers to feel pleasure in combination with
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acts of violence. Unlike pleasure in civilian life, pleasure in war is no longer a
reward for good behavior or a byproduct of moral living. Instead, pleasure is an
emotional response to perceived benefits, such as increased safety and control.
Due to the soldiers’ construction of a new moral system and the resulting correlation of pleasure with violence, morality is redefined as the least harmful
way to resolve conflict, and in the battlefield, violence is that method of conflict
resolution.
As the soldiers sludge through the Vietnam jungle in Tim O’Brien’s The
Things They Carried, the comforts of home are restricted to a few handpicked
personal items each soldier carries in his rucksack (3). These mementos provide limited peace and little pleasure. Far from their civilian life and knee deep
in the muddy horrors of war, soldiers find pleasure in that which might have
repulsed their pre-war selves. Azar enjoys killing Lavender’s puppy (35). After
Lavender’s death, Kiowa feels “pleased to be alive,” denoting pleasure in his
comrade’s death (17). As the soldiers adapt to perform their service despite the
repulsive nature of war, they adjust to feel pleasure differently. Noticeably, they
feel pleasure honorably fulfilling their duty, which is to kill “gooks” (174). Socially
conditioned to feel pleasure when fulfilling their duty, the soldiers develop
to find pleasure in violence because it is their duty. Furthermore, the rise of
American counterculture in the 1960s and 70s catalyzed a moral reevaluation.
In the years following World War II, the popularity of war stories in both film
and print skyrocketed. These representations idealized war and reflected wide
acceptance of violence in a wartime context. American soldiers began deploying for Vietnam in the latter years of this cultural wave, but rising counterculture openly criticized all violence, regardless of context. Consequently, cultural
activists opposed the war and condemned the soldiers’ acts as immoral, invalidating the pleasure correlated with duty. For the soldiers, morality is already a
fluid concept; whereas they understood killing as wrong, they are now encouraged to kill their enemies because what was once wrong is now encouraged by
a new moral code which condones violence. However, because the Vietnam
War coincides with American counterculture, even a restructured military code
of ethics is chastisable. What is “good” or “right” is now uncertain, but this is
further complicated when the soldiers develop to find pleasure in violence.
In order to reevaluate the ethicality of wartime violence, wartime morality
must be reconciled to create a standard for honorable military service; violence
must be condoned for soldiers to feel pleasure fulfilling their duty. However,
this reconciliation is complicated by the soldiers’ pleasure in violence and
2
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death. This conflict of home front morality and wartime morality as manifested
through pleasure has yet to be addressed in war literature or ethics criticism
in the discussion of The Things They Carried. Addressing the most prominent
conflict between civilian and military ethics, Cheyney Ryan explains, “Soldiers
do no wrong even if their cause is unjust,” explicating the ethical pardon freely
granted to military men (11). As demonstrated through the soldiers’ experiences with pleasure, the soldiers’ moral code must change from that of their
civilian lives in order for them to find moral justification in the everyday violence war requires. Although “the resort to war” and “the conduct of war” have
been examined with an ethical lens, the adoption of a new moral code in the
battlefield, especially as manifested through pleasure, has not (McMahan 693).
In O’Brien’s The Things They Carried, the concept of morality is complicated
by the treatment of violence and a connection between violence and pleasure;
resultantly, morality must be defined on a spectrum rather than a binary scale.
Although the battlefield requires an adjusted moral system, counterculture’s condemnation of all violence prevents reconciliation between the military and civilian understandings of morality. On the home front, many began
to question whether military service was a moral duty, leading to inquiry as
to whether killing as encompassed in military service is ethical. As a result,
whether military men should receive the “ethical pardon” addressed by Ryan
is also put in a doubtful light (11). If military service is not ethical, violence and
killing performed to fulfill the soldiers’ duty is immoral and condemnable. This
cultural philosophy would condemn Cross’s renewed commitment to his soldiers and his role as a military leader because this becomes synonymous with a
renewed commitment to kill the enemy (23). In order to reconcile their military
duty and the anti-military sentiments growing back home, the soldiers of the
Vietnam War are pushed to construct a new moral code independent of military ethics established in previous wars. In previous conflicts, wartime violence
was condoned by the civilian public, and soldiers were able to depend wholly
on the “ethical pardon” granted in times of conflict (Ryan 11). However, the public’s condemnation of all violence during the Vietnam War requires soldiers to
establish a system to justify the violence war requires. Because military morality
is no longer justified by its context within the civilian moral code due to counterculture during the Vietnam War, a wartime moral code must be established.
American culture’s rejection of the military moral system requires the soldiers
to set new standards for acceptable and unacceptable behavior

3
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In contrast to the belief that moral acts hold positive consequences and
immoral acts hold negatives consequences, violence, immoral behavior according to the civilian moral system, holds great benefits for the soldiers. As a result,
violence becomes a pleasure trigger for the soldiers. Should a soldier kill an
enemy combatant, the soldier’s safety increases, and he feels greater control
over his environment. Additionally, subduing the enemy, which requires violence, is the core of successful military service. However, to fulfill their duty,
soldiers are required to kill “regardless of [their] inclinations,” countering the
moral foundation of their youth (Schumaker 84). Conditioned to feel pleasure
through fulfilling one’s duty honorably, the soldiers adapt to find pleasure in
violence. In response to the connection between duty and pleasure, the soldiers in The Things They Carried begin to find pleasure in violence, pain, and
death, which they did not feel before their enlistment. Mitchel Sanders “almost
affectionately” cuts off the thumb of an enemy’s corpse and “smiling” further
abuses the body (13). Voluntarily returning to the war, an unnamed soldier
explains, “All that peace, man, it felt so good it hurt. I want to hurt it back” (34).
Because killing fulfills their duty and increases safety and control, it brings the
soldiers pleasure in the forms of relief, comfort, amusement, and other positive
emotions.
As violence is a necessary element of war, a new definition of war morality requires a new definition of violence. The soldiers’ correlation of pleasure
and violence presents violence as an effective and ethical method of resolving
conflict rather than a definite immorality. Besides serving as punishment “for
the sins of the aggressor” and “defense of innocent others”, killing the enemy
eliminates the evil contained in the opposition, which is the higher moral purpose of war (Ryan 15). “[Wasting] gooks” serves as its own protection because
not only does it prevent future danger for the soldiers, but it makes the war end
faster (174). Violence against the enemy resolves the conflict behind the war.
Additionally, among the soldiers, violence becomes an act to restore balance, as
Lee Strunk and Dave Jensen demonstrate during their disagreement resolved
with violence and resulting in friendship (59; 62). Because the combat zone
is so distanced from the structured justice system of civilian society, the soldiers favor the method of conflict resolution that is accessible to them: violence.
They adopt violence as an acceptable form of conflict resolution among themselves as well, as the soldiers are trained to accept and carry out violence against
the enemy when addressing a moral dispute. As the duty of a soldier forces
regular men to forgo their civilian morality and accept violence as honorable
4
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behavior, it is recognized and sanctioned as an ethical way to address and settle
conflict between individual men as well as between themselves and the enemy.
Violence and killing becomes the justice system of choice, as other methods
of justice have little potency in the war zone. On the black-and-white morality
spectrum, violence moves from clearly unethical to morally ambiguous as it is
defined as an unavoidably harmful, but potent method of conflict resolution.
The soldiers are forced to construct a new ethical system accommodating
of the violence now required of them. Subsequently, the definition of moral
behavior changes from a system of set behavioral expectations, which consistently condemn violence, to the least harmful way of resolving a conflict, allowing violence in specific contexts. By this definition, a war can be moral if it is
the best and least destructive way to resolve a conflict or eradicate a greater
immorality. Furthermore, a war can be immoral if there was a less destructive
way to resolve the conflict addressed by the war. O’Brien and the other soldiers
struggle to accept that war can be moral because the violent acts required of
its participants are massive immoralities according to civilian moral standards.
O’Brien writes, “A true war story is never moral,” pushing the question of whether
any immorality can be eclipsed by good intentions (65). However, the soldiers
still strive to rectify perceived wrongs, indicating that they believe there can
be morality and goodness despite immorality. Their actions support the assertion that war does have a moral code, even though it must be reconstructed.
Edward E. Waldron claims that a moral system “might have its own codes of
acceptable behavior, often at odds with the larger value system,” indicating that
a morality established for a specific environment can stand in opposition to
the morality of another environment (170). Because civilian immorality is the
only path to fulfilling their duty, the standard for moral behavior as set by their
modified moral system is not defined as clearly as it is by civilian morality. In
war, violence is a means to an end: the end of the war and the end of a greater
immorality than that committed by the soldiers. Although it contradicts civilian immorality, wartime morality does involve stipulations of right and wrong.
As war requires a new system of morality in order to justify violence as
a vehicle to peace, a new standard for immorality must be established. Even
though some acts of violence are acceptable according to wartime morality, not
all violence is acceptable. Morality cannot exist without immorality; therefore,
a code must distinguish moral violence from immoral violence. Civilian morality can easily label all acts of violence as immoral, but war zone morality does
not allow for easy judgment. Although all violence is destructive and harmful,
5
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in war, the benefits and long term rewards of some violence outweigh the short
term damage. Consequently, in place of a right and a wrong, there are two
wrongs and the soldiers must choose the less offensive option. Tim O’Brien
must choose between killing other men and refusing his duty (40). Mitchell
Sanders must choose between offending a comrade and accepting a dead
man’s thumb (13). “There is no ‘right’ answer” because neither choice is ethical
(Wharton). However, despite the lack of clarity between right and wrong, a
distinct wrong must be established in order for a definite right to exist. By the
new definition of morality, immorality must be unreasonably destructive and
without a purpose. Such is Rat Kiley’s unprovoked killing of the baby water
buffalo. “‘Garden of Evil. Over here, man, every sin’s real fresh and original,’”
remarks Mitchell Sanders, condemning Kiley’s act (76). Just as new standards
for acceptable behavior are being established, so are standards for unacceptable
behavior. Because the soldiers’ modified morality establishes a new right, it also
establishes a new wrong.
Because violence in unavoidable in the warzone, a violent act’s moral
justification is measured by the act’s positive repercussions. Mirroring the
spectrum-nature of combat morality, there is a spectrum of violence in order
to establish “wrong” in wartime, but in place of “right” and “wrong,” as bookends the morality scale, the violence spectrum is marked with “beneficial” and
“destructive”. However, application of this new system is uncertain because it
results in a faint line between acceptable and unacceptable violence. When
Azar ties another soldier’s adopted puppy to an antipersonnel mine and blows
it up, he responds to the other soldiers’ disapproval, exclaiming, “‘What’s everybody so upset about?’” implying that he doesn’t understand why his action
is wrong, as their role as soldiers constantly mandates similar violence (35).
Because the soldiers spend their time and supplies killing the enemy, the death
of a dog seems inconsequential. The situation is similar to Kiley and the baby
water buffalo, but Azar expresses confusion over the ethicality of his behavior, because although killing the puppy brings him pleasure, the other soldiers
judge this violent act as unethical. The soldiers question the acceptability of
Azar’s act because their ethical pardon as defined by Cheney Ryan only extends
to inflicting violence on the enemy. The puppy is not the enemy and therefore
the soldiers do not benefit from its death; consequently, Azar’s act is unethical. However, since he is younger than most of the other men, the soldiers
assume that Azar has not yet made the distinction between violence against
the enemy and violence in general, so the soldiers do not condemn Azar like
6
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they do Kiley. The soldiers’ most significant conflict is distinguishing between
moral violence and immoral violence, when both are immoral within civilian
society. Ultimately, the deciding factor is feeling and personal understanding.
Bertrand Russell articulated this difficulty: “The fundamental facts in this as
in all ethical questions are feelings” (127). Azar was not outwardly condemned
by the soldiers because he didn’t understand the difference between moral and
immoral violence. Although soldiers can construct a modified morality, the
ability to discern between the moral and immoral varies by the individual’s
understanding of the spectrum of violence in conjunction with the spectrum
of wartime morality. Consequently, soldiers experience moral disorientation as
they seek to serve honorably, but they cannot establish an overarching morality system for the entire group. Nevertheless, the implication of a sliding scale
against which violence can be judged designates that war can be moral if its
violent acts benefit the majority; accordingly, should the harm caused by war
outweigh its positive consequences, it is an immoral war.
Pleasure is dependent on context because it is partially stimulated by predictability, “repetition and sameness”; for this reason, violence can stimulate
pleasure if it is a consistent element within a specific environment (Dale 257).
Subsequently, displeasure results when violence is removed. This complicates
the soldiers’ adjustment back to civilian life, as they are immediately unable
to feel pleasure once they return home. Removal of a moral system in place
of another will result in displeasure because of the lost “repetition and sameness” and resulting moral disorientation (Dale 257). The trauma of the harsh
transition back to civilian life accentuates this moral turbulence the soldiers
continue to experience causing further disorientation. Returning to a world
they cannot understand and that cannot understand them creates a conflict
the soldiers are unprepared to face. Soldiers are experienced in resolving issues
through violence, but, in the civilian world, their method of conflict resolution
is not condonable, further contributing to the loss of control they experience
upon returning home. Because their worldview has been altered by the moral
disassociation and horrors of war, they struggle readapting to a civilian worldview based in a black-and-white morality. The veterans can no longer accept
this system as they understand that violence can have beneficial consequences.
In a community that eschews the moral system that provides structure in the
war zone, the veterans are unable to face the conflicts that accompany their
transition from soldier to civilian. Although the soldiers are skilled in resolving
conflicts through violence, this ability is useless upon their return. The veterans’
7
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inability to alleviate the tension between them and their communities leads
to emotional and psychological isolation. Motivated by a sense of powerlessness, many veterans attempted to restore balance through violence, as Norman
Bowker does, “[hanging] himself in the locker room of a YMCA” after years of
attempting to assimilate into society (149). Unable to reconcile their war experiences with a civilian worldview, many veterans revert to the violence they
learned to trust in the jungles of Vietnam.
The correlation of violence and pleasure complicates the assumption that
pleasure accompanies positive behavior for those striving to live morally, and so
the soldiers’ return home turns emotionally traumatic because they are immediately unable to feel pleasure due to their sudden and antithetic change of
environment. As demonstrated by the soldiers’ experiences after the war, pleasure can be limited by context. The soldiers learned to correlate pleasure with
violence in the battlefield, but because violence is immoral in a civilian context,
the veterans are unable to perform the violent acts that previously held positive
emotion for them. Once the soldiers return home, pleasure derived from violence is no longer available to the upstanding civilian because upstanding civilians do not commit violence. Even though “participation in a war may be good,
honorable, even heroic,” the juxtaposition of conditioned civilian morality and
acquired wartime morality produces moral whiplash suffered by veterans as
they attempt to process why their previous duty is now wholly unethical (Ryan
11). Instead of correlating pleasure with good behavior and happy experiences,
the veterans correlate pleasure with Vietnam because of the violence available there. However, because of the violence there, the veterans also correlate
Vietnam with immorality. When O’Brien returns to Vietnam with his daughter,
he looks “for signs of forgiveness or personal grace” (173). He understands that
the violence he and the other soldiers committed is inherently immoral. He no
longer seeks pleasure through reminiscing violent memories because he has
returned to civilian life, and he is prevented from experiencing pleasure in that
capacity because violence is no longer acceptable. Ultimately, pleasure can be
restricted to specific acts in specific contexts; although pleasure can be defined
by its stimulants and the result of action, it is defined by its context as well.
Because of war’s violence and counterculture’s antagonism, morality gains
new meaning in the context of The Things They Carried, resulting in shifting
definitions of pleasure, morality, violence, and war, dependent on a spectrum
determined by context. However, the wartime spectrum of morality cannot be
easily reconciled with the civilian binary moral system. The soldiers experience
8

Winter 2016

a harsh transition, void of pleasure, as they return to a familiar community that
soon becomes foreign through moral disorientation and emotional alienation.
Because the soldiers restructured their understanding of right and wrong in
order to willingly carry out the immorality required of their duty, they recognize
violence as an efficient means of conflict resolution. As a result, upon returning home, the soldiers are stripped of the pleasure of duty and the pleasure of
violence by their new situation. Having endured attack in Vietnam and forced
to face opposition in the country they fought for, many Vietnam veterans, like
Norman Bowker, seek solace in the method of conflict resolution they learned
to trust in the battlefield: violence.

9
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Unmooring and
Anchoring Bigger
Thomas:

Ontological Confusion and Mercy in Richard
Wright’s Native Son
Davey Cox

As Richard Wright’s novel Native Son comes to
its courtroom conclusion, Bigger Thomas becomes disoriented after an interview with Max, his lawyer, and begins to wonder for the first time about how
other people feel. As he contemplates his imminent death, he thinks that “he
would not mind dying now if he could only find out what this meant, what he
was in relation to all the others that lived, and the earth upon which he stood”
(363). Ontological confusion, regarding that which exists and all of his relations to reality, grips him, and he begins to think that he will die suspended in
uncertainty. Only then does he abandon his previous fatalism and experience
an intense desire to live, to find out “what he was in relation to all the others
that lived.” The oppression Bigger experiences throughout the novel unmoors
him from reality by denying him the right to understand his relations to it—not
to places, not to people, not to nonhumans, not even to ideas—except as the
whites in charge deem appropriate. Bigger is, as Max describes in his courtroom
speech, like a tree “ripped from its native soil” (399). His participation in the
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ecosystem, broadly defined as a network of relations including human beings,
nature, artificial constructions, and social and political forces, is cripplingly
uncertain. Bigger’s attempts to determine his place among all these things constitute the story’s central struggle, and the degree to which he is or is not successful is a comment on the ecological consciousness of America.
Much of the scholarly discourse on Bigger’s sense of alienation has focused
on him as an individual, concluding that the conflict of the novel is his attempting to stitch together a coherent version of his own self (De Arman 87; Tremaine
104). In doing so, they either willfully discard the existing environment as an
important factor in producing or defining the self, or simply conclude that
Bigger’s self ultimately exists in isolation from the world and everyone and
everything in it. The novel, for such critics, takes on a solipsistic, expressionist flavor. Abdul JanMohamed goes so far as to argue that the novel must be
read as a dream (77). This angle may be useful in making sense of some of
the novel’s unlikely circumstances and unusual happenings, but only addresses
Bigger’s question of “what he was,” leaving “all the others that lived, and the
earth upon which he stood” out of the equation (363). Such critics would argue
that the novel does not say much about anyone or anything but Bigger. Scott
Hicks, however, reminds us that reading texts such as Native Son ecocritically,
focusing on relationships between humans and their environments, can help
radically reimagine the way that humans fit into the world, and thus assist in
solving problems of gender, racial, and economic inequality (218). By considering Bigger’s relations to others and to the earth, we are opening ourselves to
revelations about ontology, which informs ecology and environmental justice.
When whites restrict the spatial and behavioral aspects of black lives, the
impact is both environmental and ontological, and ultimately relevant to
the contemporary movement in environmental justice. The oppression-born
environment in Native Son is the South Side, a moldering, unhealthy ghetto,
and the resulting ontology is one in which blacks are isolated from the rest of
reality—a system to which black and white characters alike subscribe. It is this
failure to create a schema, or way of organizing experience, which integrates
blacks into reality that creates Bigger’s ontological confusion and blocks its
resolution. It is this failure that pushes Bigger to violence as a way of getting
a grip on the world, and that produces the excessively outraged response to
Bigger’s crime. Revising a worldview is a formidable task, but one of the solutions that the novel suggests is a type of genuine mercy. Mercy, in this case,
means intimate closeness and sincere connection, which results in traction
12
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on reality, the beginnings of new ways of understanding ontology, and new
hope for environmental justice. Though it predates both the environmental
and Civil Rights movements, Native Son blurs the lines between nature and
culture as well as the division between environmental degradation and racial
oppression, something the environmental justice movement, which focuses on
the right to a healthy environment and protests discrimination that results in
racial minorities living in areas with degraded environments, began doing in
the 1980s. Thinking about human beings and the environment separately is
not productive in the context of environmental justice because oppression is
both environmental and racial, and inequality has to do with relations among
humans as well as between humans and nonhumans and within ecosystems
that people do not directly participate. Thus, Native Son can be read through
the lens of environmental justice and, in turn, reveal the cultural roots of and
possible solutions to the problems that the environmental justice movement
seeks to address.
Bigger’s ontological confusion is by nature unclear and ultimately comes
down to his inability to construct a coherent schema of practice or, in other
words, to imagine his world. The height of Bigger’s confusion comes at a
moment when he feels unable to identify anyone or anything in the world
around him—when he discovers that he can’t tell “what he was in relation to all
the others that lived, and the earth upon which he stood” (363). “What he was”
and “in relation” are the two key phrases here. The doubt regards identity and
relation, the two components of schemas of practice, that are anthropologist
Phillipe Descola’s way of locating the source of ontology in some kind of mental
equipment that, at the very least, all human beings have (112). Identification is
the immediate act of comparison and contrast that an entity performs when
confronted with something other than itself; most particularly, this involves
determining whether an Other’s interiority, or all that makes up its mind and
soul, and physicality, or all its extrinsic properties, are like or unlike one’s own,
and relations consist of “external links between beings and things that are
detectable in typical behavior patterns and may be partially translatable into
concrete social norms” (113). These schemas let individuals order the world of
their experience quickly and behave regularly. Bigger, however, is unable to
adapt his behavior outside a narrow set of situations, pointing to some fault
in his schema of practice that prevents him from understanding his environment and its constituents. His world makes no ontological sense, and cannot,

13

Criterion

therefore, effectively be a world. Reflecting upon his participation in an ecosystem is, under such conditions, totally impossible.
A schema of practice is meant to enable human beings within a cultural
group to behave consistently and reasonably in a wide variety of circumstances
and should enable creativity in new contexts, but the schema constructed and
adopted by the society represented in Native Son only provides that privilege to
a limited, white subsection of the population. The rest, African Americans in
particular, have the possibilities for identification and relation restrictively prescribed for them. White dominion is a naturalized state of affairs in the novel,
most explicitly stated as such in the reflection that “white people were not really
people; they were a sort of great natural force” (Wright 114). The general mode
of identification in modern Western thought is defined by Descola as “naturalism,” where all things are made of the same kinds of physical matter, subject to
the same natural laws, but where human beings are special in that they have
an interiority, or mind/soul (174). In essence, this is the nature-culture divide.
Every character in the novel has this schema available to them, but interiority is
apparently denied along racial lines. Bigger does not view whites as people, but
as a “natural force,” allying them with universal laws, denying them any kind of
mind or soul. This sets him up for problems later when he is expected to deal
directly with white people, and warps his sense of himself as an agent.
Racism, of course, cuts the other way as well, where animalized African
Americans can also be denied this human interiority by white people. One of
the problems with naturalism, Descola points out, is that certain states of affairs
can be classified as “natural,” and therefore not open to argument (199). The
natural force of whites is indisputable and oppressive enough to make Bigger
exclaim: “They don’t let us do nothing” (19). This restriction of action may, from
the white point of view, be its own justification, as it lends itself to the idea
that blacks are not, in fact, agents capable of moral decision making, and may
therefore be precluded from any moral consideration, a view that Émilie Hache
and Bruno Latour explore when they write: “The paucity of scruples in a given
text seems bound up with the paucity of actors on the surface of its argument”
(315). To a certain sensibility, only those beings capable of intentional decision
making are worthy of ethical consideration; all other entities, not having the
ability to act consciously, may be treated with a “paucity of scruples,” or without
moral consideration. If the whites in power believe that blacks do not truly have
an interiority like theirs, thereby relegating them to a status other than human,
then inequality is only natural. Explicit racist rhetoric is justified by same logic
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that excuses violence to animals and ecosystems, because that which has no
mind is fair game for exploitation. Naturalism with a racist twist oppresses
Bigger, but the problems with the schema are even greater than this.
One of the difficulties of racism rooted in a particular schema of practice
is its ability to persist even when the racism is no longer overt. This is how
the Daltons can participate in oppressing Bigger even when their explicit emotions and intentions are charitable. This is one of the reasons why when Max
questions Mr. Dalton about his potential complicity in producing the circumstances that made Bigger, the capitalist and philanthropist is confused by the
possibility of having done anything but mitigate the unfortunate situations of
African Americans. To Max’s question about why properties on the South Side
are rented to blacks, Mr. Dalton is flustered and responds: “Well. . . . Er. . . .
I—I—I don’t think they’d like to live any other place” (327). His hesitance to
answer is either evidence of surprise at having his secret malice found out or of
lack of awareness of having done anything wrong. We have no particular reason
to suspect Mr. Dalton of being a closet white supremacist, but the invisible
mechanisms of his ignorance require some explication. Descola argues that the
psychological equipment necessary to identify and relate to an Other is somewhere “upstream” from the categorization of things and articulation of relations that is done consciously (96). This means that whatever the sentiments
Mr. Dalton verbally espouses or however many ping-pong tables he donates,
the chances are good that the schema of practice he has inherited from generations of white rule governs the way he ultimately treats African Americans. This
also explains why he has such difficulty articulating his reasons for discriminatory behavior. Responsibility for racial oppression is hard to pin on anyone,
especially those, like the Daltons, who see themselves as working to heal the rift
in equality, because schemas of practice can hide behind the scenes.
Although the Daltons attempt to mitigate inequality, the primary mode of
oppression in the novel is one in which they are complicit: the spatial isolation
of the ghetto. As Bigger prowls the streets of the South Side, searching for an
empty flat in which to hide from the army of police and vigilantes hunting for
him, he reflects on the nature of confinement to a certain geographical area:
“They keep us bottled up in here like wild animals, he thought. He knew that
black people could not go outside of the Black Belt to rent a flat; they had to live
on their side of the ‘line’” (249). The particular kind of “bottling up” that Bigger
refers to occurs because of long-standing institutional policies, the arbitrariness of which is signaled by quotes around the word “line.” The policies that
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produce the line constitute a kind of passive “policing” of the border between
the ghetto and the other parts of the city, which creates the effect of an internal colony, over which white authorities have full control (Bennett 170). Robert
Bullard and Beverly Wright have called such policies apartheid, arguing that
the resulting “limited mobility, reduced housing options, inadequate residential packages, and decreased environmental choices” are matters of environmental justice (166). At this particular moment in the text the policing has
become active and literal, with an army of eight thousand white men sent to
close off all possible exits from the South Side, but this is merely a dramatization of the constant historical restriction on black mobility (Wright 245). The
only importance that African Americans have is how they exist in relation to
their white neighbors. As such, all other possible relations can be written off
as unimportant, and residents of the Black Belt can be considered to exist in
complete seclusion from anything else in the world. Their environment, education, and economic aspirations can be disregarded; even relations among black
people are insignificant. The legitimation of such disregard is the message of
residential segregation.
White Chicagoans may implicitly believe that blacks are alone in space,
but even worse is that many blacks, in various ways, also buy into the white
concept of the world. The white stranglehold on space results in a “cramped
environment” that leads Bigger, in times of desperation, to “[close] his eyes and
[strike] out blindly, hitting what or whom he could, not looking or caring what
or who hit back” (240). By refusing to look around himself, Bigger relegates
himself to an isolation that is ontological as well as spatial, suspended in an
existential void. Wright refers to Bigger’s place as a No-Man’s Land, which is
a useful way of thinking about being caught outside of a coherent world (451).
Very few forms of relation are allowed for in Chicago, and the resulting place is
not one that gives Bigger any purchase on reality, such that we might say that
Bigger’s No-Man’s Land imbues him with a sense of what Desmond Harding
calls “placelessness” (370). Not everyone on the South Side lives with such existential angst; coping in the No-Man’s Land can be done, but only by somehow
ignoring the world. Bigger scorns such escapism, realizing that though it takes
many forms, its effects are the same: “What his mother had was Bessie’s whiskey,
and Bessie’s whiskey was his mother’s religion” (240). Whiskey deadens Bessie’s
sense of reality, permitting her to carry on from day to day, and religion relieves
Bigger’s mother through metaphysical assurances of salvation. These recourses
are available to them because they fit squarely within the white schema of
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practice that places blacks somewhere outside of reality. James Baldwin writes
that Bigger’s acceptance of white “theology” is the tragedy and failure of Native
Son, but Bigger is certainly not the only character who has fallen victim to white
cultural hegemony. Thus, not only do the whites perceive a severely limited
number of relationships with black people, but black people are only capable,
due to their isolation, of experiencing a small variety of relationships.
Even if most of the characters share a dysfunctional worldview, the text
supports the idea of a wider ecological reality, one in which there are more entities and relations than anyone imagines. Aside from the Daltons’ house cat, the
only animal to make a significant appearance in the text is the rat from the opening scene. The rat’s intrusion into the Thomas family’s domestic space produces
terror in Vera and Bigger’s mother and provokes reckless brutality in Bigger
(4–7). The most notable function of this scene might be to foreshadow Bigger’s
fate. The rat is black, after all, “[pulses] with fear,” and has its space restricted
in order to enable Bigger and Buddy to find and kill it (6). More importantly,
however, it shows that people, especially black people, are not alone. The rat
is an eruption of the city’s ecosystem into the lives of the same city’s most isolated inhabitants. Rats are a part of the urban landscape that most affects the
poor, since the wealthy have the means to shut out such undesirable elements
of the environment, much as they can shut out African Americans (Bullard and
Wright 170). The encounter with the rat is not enough to shake Bigger into a
realization of his place in the world, a phenomenon that will be repeated when
Bigger intrudes violently into the white world. Killing the rat with impunity, in
fact, enhances Bigger’s instability, since, as Christine Gerhardt argues, it places
him “at the margins and the center of two overlapping systems of power (i.e.,
racism and ecological exploitation)” (520). The rat is an early suggestion of reality beyond No-Man’s Land.
What the rat begins to imply is further developed in the way that characters, both black and white, use ecological metaphors to describe each other
and the city, demonstrating their unawareness of any sort of wider ecosystem.
The most important of these metaphors is that of the jungle. At various times,
Chicago itself is compared to a jungle. During one such occasion, Bigger tries
to convince Bessie that hiding in one of the abandoned buildings on the South
Side will be safe and says, “It’ll be like hiding in a jungle” (228). The reason
why hiding in a jungle is safe is because of the multiplicity of organisms, the
complex web of relations, and the chaos of entities acting and growing—never
mind that the jungle is also treacherous for the same reasons. This deployment
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of the term does not acknowledge relations and complexity so much as it points
to Bigger’s sense of anonymity. Rather than understanding the urban jungle as
the home of other organisms, he recognizes only that its expansiveness makes
him as an individual difficult to locate (perhaps, on a figurative level, even for
himself). Later, in one of the many newspaper articles concerning Bigger’s case,
the journalism refers to Bigger as a “jungle beast” (279). This comparison has
roots in the slave trade from Africa, where the association of blacks with wild
nature began and has been repeatedly deployed to justify their oppression
(Gerhardt 520). Aside from being twisted and bigoted, this metaphor also demonstrates the lack of “an intense consciousness of land,” of which Aldo Leopold
would write in 1948 (223). Whites think of blacks as existing in isolation, yet
compare them to jungle beasts, members of one of the most complex biotic
communities on the planet, betraying ignorance of what “jungle” truly means,
perhaps thinking of it only as corresponding to savagery, mystery, and other
abstractions.
Such distance between perception and reality creates a situation with
a high potential for moments of radical re-imagination and re-worlding. As
Bigger becomes aware of situations outside the purview of his schema of practice, beginning with his evening out with Mary and Jan, his behavior becomes
erratic, violent, and self-destructive. Wright asserts that Chicago’s jungle-like
environment of endless potential creates such “a taunting sense of possible
achievement that the segregation it did impose brought forth from Bigger a
reaction more obstreperous than in the South” (442). Ralph Ellison, similarly,
writes: “For despite Jim Crow, Negro life does not exist in a vacuum, but in the
seething vortex of those tensions generated by the most highly industrialized
of western nations” (271). The confusion that begins with violence eventually
settles into small revelations that shock Bigger into reconsidering the isolation
he previously took as self-evident, but his discoveries, instead of resolving his
perplexity, amplify it. One of these revelations occurs when Bigger’s family confronts him before the inquest, when he realizes that actions, performed “on the
assumption that he was alone,” have hurt and affected his family, each member
of which “was a part of him, not only in blood, but in spirit” (298). He begins in
this moment to understand that he doesn’t exist as a totally discrete entity, but
that his identity is tied up in other people, the beginning of a sense of self that
Catrin Gersdorf says consists of “who [one] is in relation to [his/her] environment” (30). Unfortunately for Bigger, this realization is not enough to anchor
him. Even if he has successfully located himself in relation to a few people, he
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lacks a wider context in which those relations make sense, and winds up cast
even further adrift by the realization that things are not as he thought they were.
If Bigger’s assumptions about his family are radically revised, then his
notions about white people are even more greatly challenged, opening the way
for the novel’s resolution. At various times, Bigger conceptualizes white people
as a mass, constituting a “white mountain looming behind him” (298). So ideated, white people can be dealt with not as individuals with whom some kind of
unique relationship might be possible, but as representative of a great, impersonal mass with such inertia that the thought of moving it is simply absurd.
This attitude is manifest in Bigger’s inability to understand Jan and Mary and is
certainly reinforced by the lynch mob surrounding the jail, but as a metaphor,
the white mountain moves Bigger from the concrete, the real people around
him, to the abstract, where no one is real. After talking with Max and expressing his feelings, he begins to entertain the alternative that the “white looming
mountain” might not be “a mountain at all, but people, people like himself, and
like Jan” (361). Significantly, Jan has moved into the realm of personhood, and
possibility of personhood has opened up for each human constituent of the
mountain that oppresses him. Once more, Bigger has no basis for evaluating
these newfound individuals, nor for choosing appropriate relations with them,
except the formerly utilized matrix of hate, so the confusion increases, but at
least his deep-seated schema of practice is open for change.
At the same time as Bigger’s suppositions about the world have been utterly
shaken, the white citizens of Chicago, rather than being awoken to their inadequate worldview, hastily patch the hole, thereby ensuring the perpetuation
of the ontological status quo. Bigger knows that by acting like any normal
black boy, he can easily rule himself out of the suspect pool (113). White society
doesn’t have an automatic protocol to deal with the murder of a white woman
by a black man, so Bigger believes himself to be safe from detection. When
Bigger’s crime is discovered, however, whites already have a number of ontological solutions to fall back on. The first and most important is rape. They know
how to deal with rape, and their built-in schema for such a relation is evident
when Buckley declares that, instead of murder, which would reflect true events,
“the central crime here is rape!” (413, italics in original). The appropriate course
of action with a black rapist is all too clear, but the fact remains that whites have
been shocked. Thus as Buckley’s italics and exclamation point indicate, a run
of the mill rapist would be fit for little but deliverance to the lynch mob, but a
murderer must have an example made of him. The precedent must be set that
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black men cannot get away with murder, but that they will be dispatched with
the same harshness as any sexual predator. Murder, which gives Bigger a sense
of power, will not be privileged over baser crimes.
Having collapsed murder onto rape and solved one aspect of Bigger’s world
shaking, whites move on from relational solutions to employing new schemas
of identification. Since it is inconceivable for a normal black boy to kill a white
girl, Bigger must not be a normal black boy. This redefinition is manifest in the
variety of nonhuman terms Buckley uses to refer to Bigger, from “half-human
black ape” to “black mad dog” to “ghoul” (408, 409, 413). But dehumanization of African Americans is commonplace in racist discourse, and a murder
trial certainly isn’t necessary to justify the use of these debasing terms to a
sufficiently prejudiced mind. More noteworthy may be the newspaper article
in which the editor of the Jackson Daily Star writes that Bigger, “despite his
dead-black complexion, may have a minor portion of white blood in his veins,
a mixture which generally makes for a criminal and intractable nature” (281).
What makes this newspaper editor such an expert on Bigger Thomas is unclear.
Resorting to his dubious authority indicates the widespread consternation at
discovering that Bigger, who appeared to be one thing, has turned out to be
another. A mild-mannered black man may not be capable of murder, but the
product of miscegenation certainly might. The horror with which white people
respond to Bigger has a touch of the uncanny to it—the familiar made unfamiliar, somewhere between self and Other. Bigger is thus recast into a new subset
of black people, even more contemptible than the rest.
If white Chicagoans can ride out the traumatic events of the novel with little to no change in their ways of organizing experience, then we might ask what
results in Bigger’s liberation from his isolating assumptions, or, indeed, how
anyone might overcome the reign of an oppressive ontological regime within.
Because of shared cultural contexts, everyone’s schemas of practice have the
same roots and are likely just as entrenched in the unconscious workings of one
mind as another. It would be easy to suppose that the different outcomes stem
from their relative positions of power, where Bigger, oppressed and disenfranchised, is more amenable to changing his worldview because he has more to
gain by doing so. This may be the case, but the mechanism of change still needs
to be explicated. That mechanism is mercy, which first occurs, curiously, when
Jan comes in on the black preacher’s sermon on the mercy of Christ and says
to Bigger: “And when I heard that you’d [killed Mary], I wanted to kill you. And
then I got to thinking. I saw if I killed, this thing would go on and on and never
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stop. I said, ‘I’m going to help that guy, if he lets me’” (288). This is mercy in the
traditional sense—forbearing from exact retribution even when it is apparently
deserved. Jan refuses to give in to the rhetoric of inflexible justice, which would
dictate that he had no choice but to make sure that Bigger died for his crime. He
breaks the cycle and offers his friendship to a man who had done him a personal
wrong, and in doing so, changes his fundamental way of understanding black
people. Lip service to their basic humanity goes deeper when he has mercy, and
the schema that leaves African Americans isolated is defeated.
Having mercy has certain benefits for the merciful one, but there are obvious advantages for the recipient of mercy as well. The effects of Jan’s mercy
on Bigger’s concept of the world are immediate: “a particle of white rock had
detached itself from that looming mountain of white hate and had rolled down
the slope, stopping still at his feet. The word had become flesh. For the first
time in his life a white man became a human being to him” (289). Here, Bigger’s
abstract metaphor for white people begins to work its way back into reality,
from a chip off the mountain of hate to a real human being, in three dimensions
and full of complexity. The reference to Christ in the Book of John in the phrase
“the word had become flesh” further emphasizes the mercy inherent in the act
that made Jan appear as a human being. Perhaps the most important aspect of
this moment of mercy is that, in order to receive it, Bigger must have mercy on
Jan as well. Bigger would be justified in persisting embittered, in denying personhood to Jan just as all white people who made him feel uncomfortable in his
black skin, but by so doing, he would be dooming himself to unchanging hate.
This reciprocal mercy redeems Bigger ontologically, forging a new relationship
with a new being that allows him to interpret the world in a new way. He has
to wade across some confusion first, falling apart completely before he can put
himself back together, but mercy helps him begin to heal.
The kind of mercy Jan has is, unfortunately, limited in scope because it
requires a specific wrong to be done by one particular entity to another in
order for it to have any occasion to become effective. It must be easy to draw
lines of blame. Racism and environmental degradation, as well as other large
systemic problems, do not work that way, which is part of what makes them
so difficult to deal with (Jenkins 1). Max’s mercy, though less clearly definable,
may be a better example of the kind of flexible mercy adequate for large-scale,
nebulous wrongs. After Max finishes his long speech, pleading for Bigger’s life,
Bigger is not so much concerned with the content of the speech, since he didn’t
understand it, nor whether or not it was successful, but sits “hugging the proud
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thought that Max had made the speech all for him, to save his life” (406). The
mercy inherent in Max’s act of trying to save Bigger’s life constitutes a type of
mercy that, instead of sparing its object a deserved wrong, bestows undeserved
blessings. Although Max cannot trace a direct line of obligation between himself and Bigger, he does his best to save Bigger’s life. The result is that Bigger
feels a “hugging” kind of closeness to Max, even if they do not actually embrace,
and has mercy in return.
Mercy is an admirable virtue, but not an easy one, because it demands
such so much from its disciples, but this arduous nature is what makes mercy
so effective in amending schemas of practice. Max, while he demonstrates an
exemplary kind of mercy, also gives us an illustration of the deep discomfort
that accompanies mercy. In the novel’s final scene, Bigger has finally healed to
a point where he can make some sense of himself in relation to others, and as
he haltingly explains himself, Max fills with terror and makes his exit, “keeping his face averted” (429). Critics have variously interpreted this gesture as
a denial of Bigger’s right to self-determination, the ultimate failure either of
the novel or of society (Baldwin 45, De Arman 87). But since Bigger has finally
given up what Tremaine notes as “his instinct . . . to dissemble,” Max’s terror
has more to do with the anxiety of intimacy than with rejection (92–93). True
mercy requires anyone who exercises it to consider his or her relation to another
in a radically new light; it demands openness, intimacy, and vulnerability, and
Bigger, at least, has complied. If Max recoils, it is because this final interaction
between Max and Bigger is an excellent example of Timothy Morton’s intimate
encounters with the “strange stranger,” which “goad us to greater levels of consciousness, which means more stress, more disappointment, less gratification
(though perhaps more satisfaction), and more bewilderment” (135). In other
words, there is a price to pay, but the reward is communion with some small
part of the universe, human or otherwise.
The awareness of relations with others that this communion generates
is necessary to dethrone a dominant ontological imaginary that perpetuates
racial oppression. The environmental justice movement’s platform demands
both self-determination for oppressed peoples and acknowledgement of the
“ecological unity and the interdependence of all species” (“Principles”). These
goals map nicely onto the overlap between racial and environmental issues
gestured to by Wright’s use of ecological metaphors. Although, addressing
both areas of oppression is without its problems, since accommodating both
the right to autonomy possessed by individuals and the complex network of
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relationships in which each individual finds him or herself entangled is part
of what makes matters of environmental degradation and racism into such
“wicked problems” (Rittel and Webber 160). It is often nearly impossible to say
definitively when to privilege the claims of an individual over those of the larger
collective, and the difficulty is only amplified when the collective is expanded to
include nonhuman members, including inanimate objects like buildings and
natural features. Despite the problems, however, environmental justice does
well to expand “ethics to an ecological membership” (Jenkins 202). Nature and
culture fold into one another and become indistinguishable. Quality of life for
the human species is connected to the quality of life of other organisms and the
health of ecosystems, and becoming aware of the ecological relations that tie
all of us together is a vital part of understanding this. Effective action is greatly
facilitated by this kind of knowledge about the world, knowledge accessible
through acts of mercy.
In the face of systemic problems like environmental racism, relying on
individuals to have mercy on one another may not be particularly promising as
a means of achieving drastic changes in culture, but mercy as I have described
it is at least one way of breaking deeply engrained patterns of oppression by
becoming more aware of our ecological interdependence. Indeed, the mercy
enacted between Max and Bigger is abortive and awkward, but results in
Bigger’s curiosity about his place in the world, including among its nonhuman
elements. True mercy is amenable to environmental justice because it is widely
practicable and demands extreme openness and consciousness from all those
involved. Individual acts of mercy may not be enough to enact change on a large
scale, but Native Son demonstrates its potential. Cultivated as a civic virtue,
mercy may be a feature of a better future—not just for human beings, but for
the entire biotic community of the earth.
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Reexamining Virtue in
Arthur Mervyn

Clarissa McIntire

Charles Brockden Brown wrote that the intent
of his novel, Arthur Mervyn, was to inspire sympathy for others. Brown claimed
that his portrayal of the enslaved, the poor, and the diseased would motivate
readers to aid those in need, since he reasoned that “men only require to be
made acquainted with distress for their compassion and their charity to be
awakened” (3). His treatment of women, though, calls into question the novel’s
purpose of inspiring universal compassion. His sole use of masculine pronouns
in his introduction (“men,” “he”) alone could indicate his possible sexism. More
conspicuously, Brown’s treatment of women illustrates what Bernard and Shapiro have called “the dominated status of women,” due to the “repeated linkage of seduction and exploitation” in the cases of Clemenza Lodi and Watson’s
and Arthur’s sisters (qtd. in Brown 69). Nearly every woman Arthur comes in
contact with experiences abuse to some degree (although not by Arthur himself); even Thetford’s wife, a fairly minor character, makes a brief appearance in
which she yields to her husband’s manipulation (31). The unusual and surprising coupling of a novel about compassion with subplots of the seduction and
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ruin of women appears to subvert the novel’s intent and limit to one gender the
sympathy Brown advocated for all.
Critics have extensively analyzed the role of charity in Arthur Mervyn,
though never in conjunction with the novel’s treatment of women. Most term
Brown’s work a purely “humanitarian novel,” since it “describes particular suffering and offers a model for precise action,” as Dietmar Schloss defines it (178).
The “model” Arthur Mervyn offers is Arthur’s own behavior as he encounters
each type of sufferer and forms a plan for how to help them, such as his sudden impulse to volunteer at the local hospital (135). These sudden desires to
help the less fortunate occur whenever Arthur sees anyone in need, as seen
in his response to Susan’s distress, Wallace’s illness, or the discovery of what
was possibly an Underground Railroad hideout, showing that Arthur does not
discriminate against sex or race in his attempts to give relief. On the other hand,
Arthur Mervyn follows all the “typical plot points of seduction-and-ruin narratives” that were established in the British novel Clarissa, according to Bernard
and Shapiro (qtd. in Brown 69). The conventions Clarissa provided, based on
British culture (from which American culture was derived, and was still very
similar to), dictated that women “seem sexually cold” and “maintain an attitude
of indifference or even of aversion” (Brophy 107). Further, British and American
culture condemned any women who gave in to seduction, making those women
outcasts. By narrating this process of seduction to rejection to ruin, the first
volume of Arthur Mervyn seems to align itself with these cultural beliefs and
condone poor treatment of seduced or fallen women.
However, I would like to suggest that by presenting a seduction narrative
in a humanitarian novel, Brown finds a way to logically disprove the idea that a
woman’s worth should be based on her sexual purity, as it was in the culture of
the time. Placing the situations of promiscuous women and those infected with
yellow fever side by side draws a parallel between society’s speedy judgment
and intense dislike of both, even though the infected, and possibly the women,
had fallen from social graces through no fault of their own. By drawing these
parallels, sexual virtue becomes defined as an unreliable standard—since it can
be taken from someone against their will—rather than a touchstone of morality.
The way Brown folds his critique of society’s treatment of fallen women into
an unreliably narrated coming-of-age story, when considered alongside the
restrictions both social and literary convention placed on women in the late
18th century, underscores the irrational nature of a society that judges based on
the criterion of sexual virtue. By exposing how chastity can be easily imitated
27

Criterion

or forcibly taken away, morality becomes associated with personal choice rather
than a status of chastity. Other more trustworthy aspects of a person become
more important when judging character, such as their civic, not sexual, virtue.
By portraying those infected with yellow fever alongside seduced women,
Brown draws a parallel between the two categories of people and reveals a
surprising number of similarities between the two situations. Arthur’s excursions into the city include several episodes during which he sees the bodies of
diseased individuals—some of “whose heart[s] still quivered”—roughly transported from the city to graveyards (133). The fear of the yellow fever consumes
the public to the point that people were buried alive in the hopes of reducing any transmission of the disease. Those untouched by the disease treat the
infected as lost causes without any hope—infection equated with death in the
public mind. Similarly, unchaste women also experience total rejection from
society. After being seduced by Colvill, Arthur’s sister kills herself to escape
“the upbraidings of her parents” and “the contumelies of the world” (143). The
popular and contemporary seduction novel The Coquette likewise portrays the
condemnation, “censure and reproach” experienced by women who had sex
before or outside of marriage, whether they were willing or forced (Foster 899).
Just as if they had been infected with a disease, they are uniformly scorned and
no longer welcomed in respectable society. Family and friends repulse them
with the same fearful, senseless rejection to which victims of yellow fever were
subjected. Seen as impure, contaminated with either a physical illness or a
socially unacceptable exploit, fever victims and seduced women face a miserable and probably very short future (members of both groups quickly succumb
to death in Arthur Mervyn).
Then again, one notable exception to the death toll of the yellow fever, if
extended to apply to the rejection of the unchaste, emphasizes the need to reassess society’s treatment of seduced women. The only character readers meet in
the first part of Arthur Mervyn who is able to contract and recover from yellow
fever is Arthur himself, and he only succeeds in recovering due to the treatment
he receives from Dr. Stevens. At great personal risk, Dr. Stevens takes Arthur
into the former’s own home and cares for him, despite the “fervent” and “wellmeant” advice he receives against it from his neighbors (Brown 7). He believes
there is hope for Arthur’s recuperation, and Arthur does regain his health. This
formula of kindness resulting in recovery frames Arthur’s narrative, allowing
him to live to tell his story and the stories of Clemenza, Watson’s sister, and
Arthur’s sister. Arthur’s acceptance into Dr. Stevens’ home and subsequent
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recovery, contrasted with the rejection and ruin of the women in the seduction subplots, allows us to question why acceptance was offered to one type
of social outcast but not the other. If extended to apply to the treatment of
women, Stevens’ formula of compassion would save women from ruin as successfully as it did Arthur from death. For example, even when Arthur discovers
that Welbeck seduced Clemenza, rather than rejecting her as society would,
Arthur feels even more concern and compassion for her. Further, in the second
part of Arthur Mervyn, Arthur even goes so far as to seek Clemenza out at a
brothel, eventually rescuing her from the life of a prostitute. Unfortunately, just
as Stevens’ neighbors consider his mercy for Arthur to be dangerous, Brown’s
contemporary society considered the idea of offering mercy to unchaste women
unwise and hazardous.
To challenge that common belief, Brown plainly linked his novel with the
contemporary debate on the treatment of yellow fever by giving his fictional
doctor the same name as a real and prominent doctor, Dr. Edward Stevens.
Doing so underscores the similarity between the yellow fever treatment debate
and the question Brown raises of how to treat seduced women, inviting readers
to reconsider the logic of punishing seduced women with rejection rather than
showing them mercy. Due to the rising number of cases of yellow fever in 1793,
doctors argued extensively about the best ways to treat it, but they were unable
to agree. One prominent doctor, Benjamin Rush, advocated for treating yellow
fever harshly with “heroic bleedings”; on the other hand, Dr. Edward Stevens
focused on “strengthening the body,” which later proved a much more effective method (Schloss 178). Rush's and Stevens’ methods parallel approaches
to treating unchaste women at the time. The counterpart of Edward Stevens’
gentle method of fever treatment is the fictional Dr. Stevens’ mercy, while that
of Rush’s is society’s condemnation. While Rush tried to help people regain
health and American society tried to help people retain righteousness, their
good intentions exhibited only “myopic, self-righteous humanitarianism that
debilitates more than cures” (Schloss 178). On the other hand, the methods of
the two Stevens resulted in successful recovery. Strengthening victims of yellow
fever caused them to heal; taking in a sick man and caring for him personally and kindly, as the fictional Dr. Stevens did, resulted in recovery; therefore,
forgiving and helping unchaste women can result in their reintegration into
society and, ultimately, their redemption.
Reading Arthur Mervyn as an argument in favor of the redemption of ruined
women could be problematic for many readers due to the submissiveness of the
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female characters in the novel. Brown portrays not only the seduced women as
weak and passive, but also Eliza and Susan (who aren’t seduced), so that all the
women are “unable to consult and to act for [themselves] on the most trivial
occasion” (Brown 153). Susan either cannot or will not go to the city to find
out the fate of her fiancé, Wallace, so Arthur goes for her; Clemenza subsists
at Welbeck’s mercy, and is unable to reclaim her fortune from him. Women
in Arthur Mervyn are passive, never active, and it seems that men both create
and solve their problems. The female characters are stationary while the males
move about, either seducing women or saving them, and women exist only to
“provide a crucial test of maturity and manhood” (Person 36). Brown’s female
characters behave only passively and incompetently, never assertively. Brown
appears to be overlooking women as far as humanitarianism and compassion
go since he chooses to put his characters under the same restrictions and imbue
them with the same submissiveness expected of women in his day. Brown’s
readership, from his contemporaries to the present, could easily mistake the
traditionally subservient roles of his female characters as supportive of society’s
conventionally demeaning treatment of women.
However, not only was his novel a reflection of the reality of the time, but
on top of that, Brown uses the adolescent Arthur’s unreliable narration to indirectly advocate for the rights of women by reflecting on Arthur’s continuing
attempts to figure out his own masculine identity in an unusual coming-of-age
story. Responding to Susan’s distress, Arthur spontaneously decides to return
to the city to find Wallace and leaves without telling anyone, thinking his journey a “heroic sacrifice” (Brown 104). The possibility exists, though, that Arthur
only interprets Susan’s anxiety as inert when that wasn’t actually the case.
Arthur may leave out some information in his narrative, choosing to read Susan
as immobile with anxiety because in giving her an identity of incapability, he
simultaneously gives himself a capable one. In order to view himself as strong
and authoritative, Arthur has to describe Susan as weak and helpless. Similarly,
Arthur never even considers the fact that Clemenza could recover her fortune
from Welbeck herself (154–155). This unreliability, which Patrick Brancaccio
recognized, “lies not in the literal truth of Arthur’s report of outward events,
but in Arthur’s interpretation of them” through the “interplay between [his]
conscious and unconscious” (20). Arthur doesn’t deliberately label Susan or
Clemenza or any of the other women as incompetent in his narrative. Rather,
he describes them as such in order to create a distinction between himself and
women in general; he defines his own identity against the identity he creates for
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the opposite gender. Descriptions of women, therefore, filter through Arthur’s
perception of reality and then surface in his narrative, resulting in the presentation of women as inactive and inept.
In addition to Arthur’s unreliable narration, the seduction subplots’ use
of contemporary conventions of narrative writing makes Arthur Mervyn more
successful in advocating for the rights of women than if those subplots had
been omitted, which explains the novel’s apparent degradation of women. On
several occasions, Arthur takes the opportunity to imbue his story with a moral,
such as when he claims that “to feel extraordinary indignation at vice, merely
because we have partaken an extraordinary degree, of its mischiefs, is unjustifiable” (Brown 144). Arthur is permitted to pass judgment on the moral correctness of the events of the story. Pronouncing morals and lecturing with such
boldness and authority occurs rarely in seduction novels of the time, though,
because women narrated most of them, and such pronouncements and lecturing was considered unfeminine. Female characters dominate the authorship
of letters in the epistolary novels Clarissa and The Coquette, and few of those
novels’ narrators proclaim moral correctness as confidently as Arthur does. The
conventions of writing from the perspective of female narrators prevented them
from pronouncing morals, since “female narration . . .[was] characterized by
the restriction of the female narrator to the role of narrative witness,” keeping
them from participating in the “active shaping of narrative form and meaning”
(Case 4, emphasis in original). According to these standards, had a woman narrated Arthur Mervyn, no direct or indirect condemnation of society’s behavior
towards seduced women could have been included in the text, since it would
not have been prudently feminine for a woman to suggest such a thing.
Female authors of the time were painfully aware of the restrictions placed
upon both them and their writing. Susanna Rowson, author of Charlotte Temple
(another of the “canonical representations of seduction novels by women”),
taught at the Young Ladies Academy in Boston, at which women were not
allowed to speak in their graduation ceremony. In a speech by one of Rowson’s
female students, which had to be read at the ceremony by a man, the student
declared, “We are called upon to use our influence to the honour of God and
the well-being of society, we are responsible for . . . our acknowledged power”
(Jarenski 60). Contemporary society limited the influence of that student, as
well as the influence of all women, to almost nothing more than existing, since
the only way this student could use her “acknowledged power” was to have a
man exercise it for her. Richardson’s Clarissa and Defoe’s Moll Flanders are both
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written by men but narrated by women, making it unacceptable for their narrators to preach about morals in any way. On the other hand, Arthur Mervyn is
unique because it is both narrated and authored by men while addressing society’s treatment of unfaithful women. It is this masculine presentation of the
plight of women that makes it most successful at subverting common perceptions of women at the time. Because it occurred so rarely, the combination of a
male author and a male narrator together highlighting the severity of woman’s
situation evidenced the gravity of the issue and encouraged society to more
seriously consider it.
Although it seems that Brown endorses the unjust treatment of women by
portraying the seduction and consequent ruin of three women, his inclusion
of seduction plots actually strengthens the case against punishing women for
unchaste behavior. The account of Clemenza Lodi particularly illustrates the
illogicality of condemning women for loss of sexual virtue since that virtue can
be taken from a woman against her will—it is a fallible standard of judgment.
Clemenza speaks no English and relies on Welbeck to act as a translator, so
when he begins to force himself on her, she doesn’t have the ability to go to
anyone for help. She relies on him so much, being “protectorless and indigent,”
that she remains entirely in his power (Brown 75). Welbeck gives her no other
alternative than to give in to his persistent solicitations. Richardson’s Clarissa
similarly depicts the powerlessness women could experience when seduced,
but contemporary readers criticized Clarissa, avowing that she “should have
loved [and married] her rapist” (Lee 34). No one spoke out to praise her for trying so determinedly to avoid having sex with Lovelace. This popular reading has
perplexed critics, inspiring in-depth analyses like The Clarissa Project (Stuber
and Doody) in order to reconcile the reception of Clarissa with Richardson’s
instructive intent. Tom Keymer defines this intent as “a heightened awareness
not only of the dangers represented in Lovelace but also of his own susceptibility to them” (qtd. Lee 37). The public’s reception of Clarissa set a precedent
for the interpretations of subsequent seduction novels, including The Coquette
and Charlotte Temple, even though the first widely successful seduction novel
intended to incriminate not the seduced woman but the libertine. The practice
of reading the manipulated woman as the guilty party in a seduction confuses
critics because they expect audiences to favor an alternative reading, considering women like Clemenza and Clarissa to be victims of the manipulations of
scheming men. Such a reading argues that it is impossible to pass judgment
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on the adulterous women of seduction novels since societal conventions and
scheming men are the perpetrators of the seduction.
Therefore, because sexual purity isn’t a reliable method of judging one’s
character, Brown advocates for a radical social change in which judgment of
character and worth is based on civic virtue, sacrifice, and charity rather than
abstinence and chastity. Had society based their judgment of Watson’s sister on
her “purest of human hearts” rather than the fact that she yielded to Welbeck,
she and the other persecuted female characters would have had the opportunity
to recover their reputations and reenter respectable society (Brown 68). The
same mercy that Dr. Stevens extended to Arthur could have reclaimed Watson’s
and Arthur’s sisters from ignominious deaths had judgment been based on
their character and not their circumstances. Clemenza’s eventual deliverance from the brothel also shows the power that mercy can have on the life of
seduced women when Arthur treats her like a human being rather than one
carrying a contagion of sexual corruption. Brown understood that, contrary to
the common thought of the time, one’s character cannot be understood when
based on one’s sexual purity. While society didn’t distinguish between the two
concepts, Brown’s “conception of virtue . . . was infinitely more complicated”
(Schloss 171). He understood that virtue includes not just chastity but qualities
such as integrity, charity, and ethics. Arthur Mervyn shows that focusing wholly
on only one aspect of virtue leads to faulty judgments and ruined lives, while
judging women (or men) by their civic virtue and integrity of character leads to
a much more sound and reliable understanding of the individual.
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The Weight of
“Glory”:

Emily Dickinson, George Eliot, and Women’s
Issues in Middlemarch
Megan Armknecht

“What do I think of Middlemarch? What do I
think of glory—except that in a few instances this ‘mortal has already put on
immortality.’ George Eliot is one.” (L254). So wrote Emily Dickinson in response
to a question posed by her Norcross cousins. Although we do not know exactly
what her Norcross cousins asked her, Dickinson’s response shows her strong
admiration of both Middlemarch and its author, George Eliot (the pseudonym
of the English writer Mary Ann Evans). Dickinson expressed her admiration in
more ways than writing. Not only did Dickinson equate Middlemarch to “glory”
and say that Eliot had put on “immortality,” but Dickinson also had a portrait of
Eliot in her room, considering Eliot a close friend, even though she had never
met her (Heginbotham 22). When Dickinson heard of Eliot’s death in December 1880, she wrote to her Norcross cousins that she was devastated by the loss
of “my George Eliot” (L260). Whereas Dickinson was unequivocal in her praise
of Eliot and Middlemarch, other Americans had mixed feelings about both Eliot
and her masterpiece. Some critics generously praised the novel, saying it was
“as nearly perfect as any novel can be,” whereas others felt the story “far too long.”
(Spaulding, 352 and Middlemarch The Literary World 131). For example, in the
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Old and New, H.G. Spaulding wrote that as “a work of art, ‘Middlemarch’ is as
nearly perfect as any novel can be. The reader rushes on untired, lays the book
down with a sigh, and always, as he does so, says, ‘How perfectly well done it is!’”
(352). Similarly, Middlemarch was described by other critics as “matchless”, and
Eliot as “more than simply a great writer (“‘Deronda’ and ‘Middlemarch’” 698).
She is a prime elemental literary power” (“Quality of George Eliot’s Novels” 685).
However, some reviewers felt the story was “far too long,” and that even though
the reader grew “richer for [the] toil” of reading Middlemarch, he or she also
would become “undeniably weary” from such an endeavor (“Middlemarch” The
Literary World 131). Other critics preferred Eliot’s earlier novels such as Adam
Bede and The Mill on the Floss, since they did not think that Middlemarch had
“the charm of plot” as these other novels (“Middlemarch” Scribner’s Monthly
648).
It is likely many reviewers responded negatively to Middlemarch because
they knew George Eliot was a woman. Contemporary male literary critics
downplayed George Eliot’s importance in literary history and patronized her
genius. They argued that “the remarkable thing about George Eliot’s genius
[was], that though there [was] nothing at all unfeminine in it,” and that she had
achieved the “highest point which, in a woman, [could reach] in our literature”
(“George Eliot” 256). This condescending observation suggests that Eliot’s writing was good—but only for a woman—thereby perpetuating the misogynistic
viewpoint that women were not as capable as men in thinking, writing, and
reasoning.
Dickinson, on the other hand, gloried in the fact that Eliot was a woman—
a thinking, interesting woman whom she could idolize. While other American
critics felt obligated to find fault in Middlemarch, Dickinson had no qualms
about equating the novel with sheer “glory” (L254). Although this might seem
like a sentimental reaction, it poignantly shows the strong connection Dickinson
had with British female writers—particularly George Eliot—and their need to
express the essence of their souls and their acquired knowledge. While it is
well-established that Emily Dickinson admired George Eliot and Middlemarch,
there has been debate as to why Dickinson compared Middlemarch to “glory.”
Although there is little remaining evidence from Dickinson as to why she
deeply admired Middlemarch, there are connections between the women’s
issues of Middlemarch and many of Dickinson’s poems. Resonances in both
Middlemarch and Dickinson’s poetry suggest that Dickinson’s admiration for
Middlemarch is deeply rooted in Eliot’s ability, as a successful female writer, to
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address prominent women’s issues of the time, especially surrounding the difficulties of finding love for intellectual, ambitious women in the nineteenth
century. Analyzing the character of Dorothea in Middlemarch alongside
Dickinson’s own poems about thwarted love allow for a deeper understanding
of why Dickinson may have related to Eliot’s novel.

Connections Between Eliot and
Dickinson

Modern scholars have said much about the relationship between Dickinson
and Eliot. For example, Karen Richardson Gee points out that Dickinson avidly
read everything by and about George Eliot—including contemporary Eliot
biographies—“to draw close to a writer whom she loved” (26). Dickinson most
likely came to love Eliot’s writing after reading The Mill on the Floss as “early as
November of 1862, when her first epistolary reference to The Mill on the Floss
occurs” (26). Interestingly, Dickinson often refers to Eliot as Marian Evans or
Mrs. Lewes in her letters, suggesting that Dickinson connected strongly with
the woman writing these novels as well as the novels themselves. For example,
in a November 1861 letter to Thomas Higginson, Dickinson writes: “Mrs. Hunt’s
Poems are stronger than any written by Women since Mrs. – Browning, with
the exception of Mrs. Lewes—but truth like Ancestor’s Brocades can stand
alone –” (L368). To Dickinson, “Mrs. Lewes” was a genius on the same (or even
on a higher plane) than Elizabeth Barrett Browning or Helen Hunt Jackson.
Gee also suggests that by calling Eliot “Mrs. Lewes,” Dickinson was simultaneously pitying and “personally blessing Evans’s unsanctified union with George
Henry Lewes. Unlike many members of Evans’ society, including many of her
friends and relatives, who rejected her for her unconventional life, Dickinson
insinuates here that she understands and approves of Evans’ marriage” (32). By
doing so, Dickinson demonstrates loyalty and friendship for one of her favorite
authors.
Not only have modern scholars noted Dickinson’s affinity for Eliot, but
also the similarities between Dickinson’s and Eliot’s writings. Eleanor Elson
Heginbotham suggests that Dickinson’s famous “Middlemarch letter” has
a polyvocality about it which mirrors the voices of the town in Middlemarch.
Heginbotham analyzes the way that Dickinson wrote the letter and compares it
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to Eliot’s “comic tone” which she uses on the sanctimonious citizens of her rural
English village” (21). For example, in the Middlemarch letter, Dickinson gently
mocks her pious neighbors of Amherst: “I know of no choicer ecstasy than to
see Mrs. [Sweetser] roll out in crape every morning, I suppose to intimidate
antichrist; at least it would have that effect on me” (L389). In the next paragraph, Dickinson abandons Amherst gossip and instead talks about the wonders of spring: “Spring is a happiness so beautiful, so unique, so unexpected,
that I don’t know what to do with my heart. I dare not take it, I dare not leave
it—what do you advise?” (L389). Heginbotham argues that this “polyvocality” is “reflective of Eliot’s own multiple voices: the social commentator, the
psychological prober of human hopes and disappointments, the literary critic,
and the seeker of whatever solace or encouragement may come from mortal or
immortal power” (20). Similarly, Margaret Freeman notes the “artistic kinship”
(37) between Dickinson and Eliot through their use of “play” within their prose,
and how this “play” was important to both women, specifically Dickinson’s
“aesthetic and world view” (38).
Although the similarities between Eliot’s and Dickinson’s writing styles are
important to understanding each woman’s art, it does not give a completely
satisfying answer as to why Dickinson admired Eliot so much. One of the more
intriguing possibilities for Dickinson’s admiration of Eliot and Middlemarch is
that Dickinson would have resonated with an intellectual woman who wrote
literature that highlighted women’s experiences (Showalter xxxiiii). Paula
Bennett contends that Dickinson “saw herself as part of a female literary tradition which she and [American female poets] shared. British in origin, this
tradition had found its richest, most complicated expression in the work of
Elizabeth Barrett Browning, the Brontë sisters, and George Eliot” (Woman Poet
1415, qtd. in Stonum 60). It was not simple to be a creative woman in nineteenth
century England and America. Indeed, “nineteenth-century, middle-class
femininity demanded self-abnegation, while the artistic life required egoism.
Domesticism demanded woman’s silence, while her artistic vocation required
that she believe enough in her opinions to express them” (Gee 33-34). This psychological and social struggle of the woman writer has been well presented
by Gilbert and Gubar, who argue that the woman who desired to be creative—
indeed, the woman who desired to rebel against the societal norm—was diagnosed as “diseased” (1536). Women writers of the nineteenth century struggled
to find their voice and express their stories in “an attempt to make [themselves]
whole” (1535). Both Eliot and Dickinson sought to express their experiences
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through writing—not only to make themselves whole, but to legitimize women’s experience in an extremely patriarchal society.

Women’s Issues in Middlemarch and in
Dickinson’s Poetry

One prominent woman’s issue in both Middlemarch and in many of
Dickinson’s poems is the idea of impossibility of happy love for an intellectual woman in the nineteenth century. Both Dickinson and Middlemarch’s
Dorothea are described as having intellectual ambitions. Dickinson was a
precocious child and learned to “read, write, and do simple arithmetic in a
common school, which she began attending by age five” (Habegger 96). After
her common school education, Dickinson attended Amherst Academy in the
1840s, where she studied many subjects including Latin, geology, and botany,
and had “freedom to be herself as well as competent instruction” (Habegger
140). Dickinson wrote about her self-awareness of her talents and intelligence
in many of her poems. Her poem “It was given to me by the Gods –” describes
her realization of her talent in poetry, and compares her talent to a “present” of
“gold” (3, 14). By saying that this gift was “given to [her] by the Gods –” Dickinson
recognizes that her creative talent is something special—sacred, even.
Unlike Dickinson, Dorothea never had a formal education. Even though
Dorothea might not have had a formal education, she still views herself as a
capable woman with desires to do good with her talents. Dorothea’s mind is
described as “theoretic and yearned by its nature after some lofty conception
of the world” (6). Furthermore, she has a great “soul-hunger” to “make her life
greatly effective” and attempts to do good in the world by being creative (51).
For example, she wants to design and build better cottages for poor estate tenets
(14). Although Dorothea’s pride and naivety get in the way of her happiness, she
never entirely gives up on her desire to do good and to be good. Indeed, one
reason she wants marry Casaubon is because she believes that he will educate
her. She thinks marrying him will be like “a neophyte about to enter on a higher
grade of initiation,” and believes that she would “have room for the energies
which stirred uneasily under the dimness and pressure of her own ignorance”
(45). Her decision to marry Casaubon results in disaster, but Dorothea’s reasons
for marrying him—although misguided—are sincere. Dickinson would likely
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have related to Dorothea’s character because both were intellectual, creative
women who were not fully appreciated by those closest to them.
One of the difficulties of being a misunderstood, creative, intelligent
woman during the nineteenth century was finding an equal, loving marriage
partner. This is especially evident in the case of Dorothea, who enters into a
terrible marriage at the beginning of Middlemarch, and then has to live with
the repercussions of that marriage throughout the rest of the novel. Dorothea
marries Casaubon, thinking that she will be able to use her creative talents to
help Casaubon write his Key to All Mythologies (525). However, Causabon does
not “delight in what [Dorothea is]” and rather “demands much interest and
labour from her” (385). Essentially, he makes her his research assistant without
any pay, let alone thanks. He certainly is not the “Saint Augustine” Dorothea
held him up to be, and her marriage begins and ends in disaster, leaving her
emotionally and spiritually broken (205).
Although Dickinson never married, she did realize the limitations marriage placed on nineteenth-century women. Dickinson critiques the ignorant
“Christian” housewives of her society in “What Soft – Cherubic Creatures - ”
(Fr675). In this poem, she satirizes the way society expects women to be: “soft,”
“Plush,” “Gentlewomen” (1-3). However, this expectation does not prepare
women for the “freckled Human Nature” everyone encounters in their lives
(7). By mocking these “Gentlewomen,” Dickinson also critiques the society
that demands them to be uneducated and sheltered. Furthermore, Dickinson’s
poem “She rose to His Requirement” (Fr857) describes the way women are
required to “drop” everything—their “playthings,” talents, and “Awe” in order to
take up the “honorable Work/Of Woman, and of Wife” (1,2, 5, 3-4). She laments
that women have to give away the things that make them unique and interesting in order to meet their husbands’ demands; they give up their own dreams in
order to fit their husbands’ dreams.
Another poem which talks about the potential terrors of matrimony is “I
had not minded – Walls” (Fr 554). In this poem, the speaker hears the “silver Call” (3) of her future husband, but instead of being rescued from “Walls”
(1), she finds the limitations of marriage: “A limit like the Vail/Unto the Lady’s
face” (13-14). To her, marriage is a prison that confines her soul. Furthermore,
instead of finding her archetypal “knight in shining armor,” the speaker finds
“Dragons – in the Crease –” (16), suggesting that some marriages can go horribly,
terribly wrong. This is certainly the case in Middlemarch; indeed, Causabon
is actually described as a “dragon” who has “carried [Dorothea] off to his lair”
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(223). It is significant that Dickinson wrote “I had not minded – Walls –” in
1863, eleven years before Middlemarch had been written. Dickinson would have
pitied Dorothea’s state as a woman who had given up her identity and desires to
conform to a man that was jealous of her talents and personality.
Indeed, happiness in marriage for an intellectual, creative woman seems
almost impossible in both Emily Dickinson’s poetry and in Middlemarch.
Although some of Dickinson’s poetry talks about the wonders of the possibility of love, a number of them talk about the exact opposite—how the speaker
will never experience love or has lost a great love. Many of Dickinson’s poems
about lost or impossible love were written from 1861-1863, which is also when
her “productivity climaxed” (Habegger 405). Most Dickinson scholars agree
that there was some sort of terror or pain that compelled Dickinson to write
these “pain poems” (409). It is possible that this pain was brought on by the
loss of someone she was very close to, however, the exact reason why Dickinson
wrote these pain poems “remains an unsolved problem” in Dickinson scholarship (Habegger 410). However, since many of the poems from 1861-1863 are
about hopeless love, it is quite possible that Dickinson lost someone whom she
loved deeply, but realized that they could never be together.
One of the poems Dickinson wrote during this time which fully captures
the despair of a woman thwarted in love is “I cannot live with You” (Fr706). In
this poem, the speaker laments the fact that she cannot be with the person she
loves, because “It would be Life –/And Life is over there –/Behind the shelf”
(2-4), suggesting that even though she does love him, “Life” is something that is
not allowed to her—it is beyond her reach; “Behind the shelf.” She cannot even
“die – with You –” (13), because she could not bear to die or live without him,
and knows that “Where You were not/That self – were Hell to me –” (43-44). In
short, she does not want to be separated from him, but it is impossible for them
to be together. The tone of the final stanza is full of longing and despair at the
hopeless situation:
So we must meet apart –
You there – I – here –
With just the Door ajar
That Oceans are – and Prayer –
And that White Sustenance –
Despair – (45-50)

The last word of this stanza underscores the theme and meaning of the
entire poem—despair. Even though the speaker has chosen her love, there is no
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possible way for them to be together happily, and so she gives him up. The pain
of this poem is echoed in Fr713, which states that her love “left me – Sire – two
Legacies –/A Legacy of Love” and “Boundaries of Pain” (1-2, 5), suggesting that
the vulnerability of falling in love is coupled with the certainty of pain. These
two “legacies” of love are inseparable.
Similar legacies of love, pain, and despair at hopeless love are easily seen
in Dorothea’s story, especially in her interactions with Will Ladislaw. After
Casaubon’s death, Dorothea is left broken, hurt, confused, but also liberated:
“Her world was in a state of convulsive change; the only thing she could say distinctly to herself was that she must wait and think anew” (522). However, even
as she contemplates her new life, she cannot explain the “sudden strange yearning of heart towards Will Ladislaw” (522). As this “yearning of heart” deepens
and as Dorothea continues to interact with Will, she realizes that she wishes to
know that he loves her and that he knew she loved him because “then we could
be quite happy in thinking of each other, though we are for ever parted” (587).
Still, she also feels the full weight of the world
In spite of her independent energy, that with this idea of Will as in need of
such help and at a disadvantage with the world, there came always the vision of
that unfittingness of any closer relation between them which lay in the opinion
of every one connected with her. . . . How could he dream of her defying the
barrier that her husband had placed between them – how could she ever say to
herself that she would defy it? [587-88]

Dorothea realizes that she loves Will, but she is also struck by the impossibility of them ever coming together, as she is inhibited by both her former
husband’s demands and societal norms. This “hopeless love” is illuminated in
the parlor scene at Lowick, where Dorothea and Will realize the hopelessness
of their situation. When Will mentions that they must “always be divided,” a
“vivid flash of lightning” lights “each of them up for the other, and the light
seem(s) to be the terror of a hopeless love” (860). Both Dorothea and Will realize the hopelessness of their situation, yet they are still drawn to each other.
Instead of letting these star-crossed lovers pass out of each other’s lives,
Eliot allows them to come together, thus giving some kind of hope to the
seemingly impossible situation of an intellectual woman falling and staying in
love. Even though Will is decidedly below Dorothea’s station and her intellect,
Dorothea “never repented that she had given up position and fortune” to marry
him (887). Indeed, “they were bound to each other by a love stronger than any
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impulses which could have marred it” (887). Dorothea chooses Will, and doing
so makes both of them incredibly happy.
Some believe that Dorothea’s choosing Ladislaw inhibits her agency and
exacerbates the problem of the intellectual woman marrying someone who
does not deserve her. However, as Jeanie Thomas argues, although this scene is
Objectionable to many feminists, this conventional movement of Dorothea’s
mind—towards the man who gratifies her emotional needs—actually clinches
the argument for George Eliot as a feminist. . . . In the careful, detailed narration of Dorothea’s movement towards that choice, George Eliot exposes and
critically ponders all the inner and outer forces that conspire to confound a
woman’s public aspirations and to steer her towards a private conclusion which
is at once a disappointment compromise and a sort of fulfillment [399-400]

In short, Dorothea does not blindly enter this marriage with Will as she
did with Casaubon. Her choice to love Will is precisely that—her choice. She
uses her agency to choose the man who loves her for her soul and her mind.
By having Dorothea choose Ladislaw, Eliot allows some kind of happiness for
Dorothea, even if it might not be entirely satisfactory to the modern reader.
It is hard to say exactly what Dickinson thought of the Dorothea-Ladislaw
match, but since Dickinson compared Middlemarch to “glory,” and since she
had such a high opinion of Eliot, it is possible that one reason Dickinson
enjoyed Middlemarch so much was because it gave hope to women in her circumstance—that there might be men who appreciated intellectual, creative
women. Of course, Middlemarch is fiction. However in many respects, the
match between Dorothea and Ladislaw matches Eliot’s own relationship with
Lewes—it might not have been sanctioned by society, but they were both very
happy together and viewed each other as intellectual equals (Powell 293-294).
Reading about an intellectual woman finding a happy match—both in the case
of George Eliot and Dorothea in Middlemarch—might have given hope to Emily
Dickinson. Certainly, reading about real women’s issues by a well-respected
woman writer would have appealed to Dickinson.
Eliot’s impact on Dickinson implies how deeply Dickinson engaged with
the intellectual world around her and shows her need for deep, loyal connection—not only in her personal life, but in the kinships she formed through
literature. Contrary to popular myth, Dickinson did not isolate herself from
the world around her, but rather was intellectually engaged in the transatlantic
literary world. She created her own networks, with Eliot as an important node
in this web of women authors. Dickinson not only “gloried” in the beauty of
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Middlemarch’s prose, but also in the fact that there were women writers like her
whom she could connect with. Neither Eliot nor Dickinson were trying to write
like men; they wrote like women and addressed important women’s issues—
particularly the difficulties of being an intelligent woman in the matters of love
and marriage. Like Dickinson wishing that she could “stop one Heart from
breaking” (Fr982), neither Eliot nor Dickinson “lived in vain,” because they
wrote their experiences as women writers, impacting future generations of
women poets and authors.
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The Art of Death:

Murder According to Poe, Hitchcock, and De
Quincey
Jeanine Bee

Edgar Allan Poe is baffling. He is an author who,
despite his immense talent, found himself unable to support his family. He
defies the recognized literary boundaries of Romanticism and Classicism, and
he wrote everything from poetry to literary criticism to satire. Not to mention
the fact that Poe’s work heralded the soon-to-become incredibly popular literary forms of the short story and the detective story. At a time when prose was
regarded as secondary to poetry, Poe elevated pandering magazine stories to
works of art.
Alfred Hitchcock is likewise baffling. Like Poe, Hitchcock’s works span
decades of change from silent films to “talkies,” from black-and-white to color
film, and through generations of expectation and taste changes. Also like Poe,
Hitchcock found himself working in an art form that was considered inferior
to other media. Despite these lowered expectations for the cinema, Hitchcock
never denied his artistic instinct, and, after a lifetime of inspired work, Hitchcock
will be forever remembered as an artist and his films as works of art.
Perhaps it is because of the low expectations these men encountered and
the derogatory glances cast at their chosen art forms that they were drawn to
the writings of a man named Thomas De Quincey. De Quincey, a contemporary of Poe’s, was well-known in his day for an autobiographical essay entitled
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“Confessions of an English Opium-Eater” which was published anonymously in
1821. More relevant to the works of both Poe and Hitchcock, however, is another
of De Quincey’s essays entitled “On Murder Considered as one of the Fine Arts.”
Published as two satirical essays and a lengthy postscript, these “Murder” papers
can be seen as a source of inspiration for both Poe and Hitchcock: all three of
these authors viewed murder as an artistic opportunity.1 Of course as creators
they crafted their murder stories as carefully as a sculptor would mold clay, but
this careful attention to artistic detail does not set these men apart from other
widely respected authors and film directors. Where Hitchcock’s, Poe’s, and De
Quincey’s veneration of murder as a fine art becomes most clear, rather, is in
the ways that their characters treat the subject of murder.
Because De Quincey’s two main “Murder” essays are presented as the minutes from a fictional fan club dedicated to the art of homicide, many of his characters are not murderers themselves, but are murder “amateurs”—or aficionados.
The first essay is written as a lecture given to the “Society of Connoisseurs in
Murder” following the history of murder from Cain to the nineteenth century.
The lecturer concludes his speech with some helpful tips on the “principles of
murder,” because, as he says, “the mob of newspaper readers, they are pleased
with anything, provided it is bloody enough. But the mind of sensibility requires
something more” (“On Murder” 31). These notes are not given as suggestions
for potential murderers but merely as criteria for judging future artistic presentations. The second essay is written about a celebratory dinner party hosted
by Toad-in-the-hole, a murder aficionado who had been sorely disappointed
by the lack of artistic quality in recent murders, but who is roused from his
discontent by a murder that is, by all accounts, “the most superb of the century
by many degrees” (“Second Paper” 86). At the dinner party, a round of toasts
is offered to various groups of assassins whom De Quincey’s characters greatly
admire for their contributions to the historical canon of remarkable murders.
These essays are usually read satirically, often with a Kantian philosophy of
aesthetics in mind, sometimes with an eye towards “Nietzche’s full-blown aesthetic critique of morality in general” (Black 16). I would argue, however, that
in his “Postscript” to the “Murder” papers, De Quincey reveals his true feelings
about murder. Contrary to his first two essays, the “Postscript” is written in
De Quincey’s own voice and begins as a defense of his “Murder” essays. Here,
he explores what he calls a “universal” fascination with the gruesome details
of murder. De Quincey compares this fascination to the irresistible draw of
a burning building; upon reaching a fire, “the first impulse is,” he claims, “to
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assist in putting it out. But that field of exertion is very limited, and…inevitably,
and without restraint, we go on to consider it as a stage spectacle” (“Postscript”
95). According to De Quincey, murders are treated in much the same way. “After
the first tribute of sorrow to those who have perished,” he writes, “inevitably the
scenical features…of the several murders are reviewed and valued” (“Postscript”
97). He then demonstrates the fact that this universal fascination exists within
his own being by writing a detailed, sensationalized account of a series of gruesome murders committed by a man named John Williams in 1811. De Quincey’s
“Murder” essays may be hilarious and satirical, “a foam-bubble of gaiety” as he
calls them, but lurking beneath the humorous tone is a real admiration for the
art of murder.
Once understood as a murder aficionado himself, De Quincey’s “Society of
Connoisseurs in Murder” becomes more than a satirical tool—it becomes almost
a hopeful dream, in which De Quincey himself might someday participate in
such a society of like-minded individuals. Of course, two of those like-minded
individuals might very well have been Edgar Allan Poe and Alfred Hitchcock.
Poe’s own admiration of murder follows the pattern of De Quincey’s
“Postscript,” in which De Quincey uses the clues left behind by Mr. Williams
to unravel the manner in which his murders occurred. Poe mirrors this behavior in his own brilliant detective, Dupin, who solves the murder of an elderly
woman and her child by reading the clues left behind at the scene of the killing in “The Murders in the Rue Morgue.”2 Poe also seems to agree with De
Quincey’s assessment that fascination with gruesome murders is a universal
feeling. However, rather than writing a long defense of the aesthetic virtues of
murder, Poe defends his viewpoint with his stories; indeed, several of Poe’s dark,
murder-centric stories are written as confessions (“The Cask of Amontillado,”
“The Tell-Tale Heart,” and “The Black Cat,” to name a few). When his audience
reads these pieces they are, in effect, receiving the confession of a murderer
and, just as a priest who would receive these confessions, the audience is then
required to make a judgement. If Poe’s murders are simply gruesome, horrible,
sinful acts, the audience will cast its judgement by simply not reading any more
of Poe’s stories. However, since Poe’s stories (and others like them) enjoy quite a
popular following, even to this day, Poe seems to have proven his theory: everyone is able to appreciate a well-crafted murder.
Hitchcock, likewise, respected a good murder. In fact, in an essay written for
the New York Times magazine in 1957, he claimed to belong to an actual murder
fan club, not unlike De Quincey’s “Society of Connoisseurs in Murder.” The
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group, which he says is called simply “Our society,” would meet after particularly
fascinating trials, and attendance included “journalists, novelists, playwrights,
and even actors,” not to mention the legal representation from the trials and
sometimes even the judge (“Murder” 137). In interviews, Hitchcock often ruminated on the best ways to kill a person (for a blonde woman, Hitchcock suggests
murder by poison with peroxide), and criticized those artists who fell short
in their work. In an article published in 1958, Hitchcock laments that “murder as a fine art…has declined in recent years” (Handman 87). And, of course,
Hitchcock’s appreciation for murder can be seen in his films, most notably in
his inclusion of characters who, like De Quincey’s murder “amateurs,” share
a love of homicide. These murder aficionados are most often ordinary—even
loveable—people like Joe and Herb who, through their philosophical exercise
of planning the perfect murder, serve to provide a lighthearted backdrop to
the much more sinister plotline of Shadow of a Doubt. Or the proper society
women in Strangers on a Train, who can only giggle in tacit agreement when
Bruno says almost accusingly, “Everyone’s interested in murder.”
The theme of the murder aficionado, however, comes to a dark pinnacle
in Hitchcock’s film, Rope. The two main characters in this film, Brandon and
Philip, are murder aficionados who decide to make the leap from enthusiast
to artist when they strangle their mutual friend, David. Then they hold a dinner party in celebration of their work, inviting a handful of guests, including
their old school teacher, Rupert Cadell. As Cadell speaks to the other guests, he
reveals his own appreciation for murder as a tool and as an art. He details the
proper ways to murder different types of people (like landlords, hotel employees, and tap-dancers), then specifies that “murder is—or should be—an art…
and as such the privilege of committing it should be reserved for those few
who are really superior individuals.” But, as Cadell explains his theories, a dark
truth about the other party guests is exposed; Cadell’s descriptions of the types
of murder elicit laughter from the guests, and after he suggests that one might
murder a landlord in order to acquire an apartment in New York City, the everso-proper Mrs. Atwater declares, “What a divine idea!” Brandon and Philip may
be cold-blooded murderers, and Cadell their unsuspecting muse, but it is the
ordinary, well-behaved party-goers who reveal that universal tendency of murder appreciation defended by both De Quincey and Poe. We, as the audience,
laugh along with Herb and Joe, Bruno’s society women, and the party guests
in Rope, and in so doing, we are implicated in much the same way that Poe
implicates his readers; we—the ordinary, well-mannered, educated people of
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the world—must appreciate a well-crafted murder. If we didn’t, we wouldn’t be
laughing along.
Not only do De Quincey, Hitchcock, and Poe use murderer enthusiasts as
characters in their works, but they accuse each and every one of their audience
members of belonging to the same society. Some might be offended at that
suggestion, but there is a difference between appreciating the artistry of a good
murder and actually committing one. De Quincey’s society lecturer in his first
“Murder” paper claims to have toyed with the idea of becoming an artist himself, testing his own mettle by stabbing a cat to death. After the deed however,
the lecturer admits that he has been turned off of the idea of murdering any
lifeform, and “for the higher departments of the art,” he says, “I confess myself
to be utterly unfit” (“On Murder” 34). This short rumination might just reveal
the greatest mystery in such works as De Quincey’s, Poe’s, and Hitchcock’s, for
none of these men can truly say what it is about a person’s soul that makes him
or her “fit” to commit murder. They can, however, identify what it is about a
person’s works that makes him or her “fit” to be considered an artist. Here, it
is helpful to refer to De Quincey’s critical essay about Shakespeare’s Macbeth,
entitled “On the Knocking at the Gate in Macbeth.” In this impressive critical
reading, De Quincey examines Act II scene iii, in which Lady Macbeth and
her husband have just murdered King Duncan and are startled afterwards by a
knocking at the castle gate. De Quincey uses this short critical essay to examine
his own emotional response to the scene, and to reveal the artistry behind those
emotions. The resulting composition reveals the great secret behind great art:
its purpose.
In his critical essay, De Quincey writes of Shakespeare’s work that it is “to
be studied with entire submission of our own faculties” (“Knocking” 7). At the
beginning of his essay, De Quincey introduces his motive for examining this
particular scene in Macbeth. He says, “it reflected back upon the murder a peculiar awfulness and a depth of solemnity: yet, however obstinately I endeavored
with my understanding to comprehend this, for many years I never could see
why it should produce such an effect” (“Knocking” 3). He then goes on to encourage readers to abandon their “understanding” when it stands opposed to other
faculties, like emotion. De Quincey felt “a peculiar awfulness and a depth of
solemnity” when he encountered this scene in Macbeth, but his understanding
told him there was no reason for those feelings. Instead of abandoning those
feelings, though, De Quincey abandoned his understanding. He “submitted his
own faculties” to Shakespeare’s art and listened instead to the feelings the play
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was producing in him. According to De Quincey, then, art does not exist to create understanding, knowledge, or morality. When an artist works in his or her
medium, the artist is really working to create emotions.
Both Poe and Hitchcock agree with this assessment. In his “Philosophy of
Composition,” Poe writes, “A poem is such, only inasmuch as it intensely excites,
by elevating, the soul” (667). Hitchcock, likewise, asks in an interview “What is
art?” then goes on to answer himself with, “Art is an experience, isn’t it?” (“On
Style” 293). For both of these men, every other aspect of the art is secondary
to creating emotion. In terms of Kantian philosophy, Poe identifies Beauty as
the proper way to evoke an emotional response in an audience, as opposed to
either Truth (morality) or Reason (intelligence). Truth and Reason, he says,
may indeed play a part in a work of art, but “the true artist will always contrive
to tone them down in proper subjection to that Beauty which is the atmosphere
and the real essence of the poem (“The Poetic Principle” 703). Hitchcock uses
different words, but presents the same ideas. “I put first and foremost cinematic
style before content,” he says. “I don’t care what the film is about…so long as
that audience goes through that emotion!” (“On Style” 292) For Hitchcock,
then, Beauty is found in style, and it is the stylistic choices that create emotion
in an audience, not the Truth or Reason of the film’s content.
In light of this revelation, murder can only be a true art form if its purpose
is to create emotion. De Quincey agrees, saying “The final purpose of murder,
considered as a fine art, is precisely the same as that of Tragedy, in Aristotle’s
account of it, viz., ‘to cleanse the heart by means of pity and terror’” (“On
Murder” 32). He later expands Aristotle’s description, saying that the purpose
of murder as an art is “to improve and humanize the heart” (“On Murder” 32).
An example of this “improvement” can be seen in De Quincey’s first murder
essay, when the speaker gives an account of a friend who planned to make his
debut as an artist by murdering a baker. When he confronts the baker, however,
the baker refuses to be killed, and instead challenges the would-be-murderer
to a boxing match. The baker is fifty years old and out of shape, but, remarkably,
he is able to hold his own for twenty-seven rounds against his assailant. De
Quincey writes,
“What an astonishing stimulus to latent talent is contained in any reasonable
prospect of being murdered. A pursy, unwieldy, half cataleptic baker…had absolutely fought six-and-twenty rounds with an accomplished English boxer…so
greatly was natural genius exalted and sublimed by the genial presence of his
murderer” (“On Murder” 29).
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In De Quincey’s account, the art of murder reveals in the baker a “natural genius”
which is awakened by the emotions present at the prospect of being murdered,
and which otherwise might have remained undiscovered.
Like De Quincey, Hitchcock’s works often allow his murderers to “improve
and humanize the heart.” For example, in his 1959 thriller, North by Northwest,
Roger O. Thornhill is the victim of several artistic murder attempts. These
attempts culminate in the most iconic scene of the movie: Thornhill is conned
into waiting by the side of the road in the middle of a dusty field, where he is
attacked by a crop-duster with a mounted machine gun. Why did Thornhill’s
would-be-murderers make such an effort to craft an artistic murder when they
could have much more easily shot him from a passing car? Hitchcock explains
his motivation to create this scene as a director, saying, “The sequence is very
carefully designed step by step both visually and to some extent in its menace…
the menace of its content” (“On Style” 286–287). Hitchcock, as the director of
the film, created this scene with his audience’s experience in mind. Likewise,
Thornhill’s creative assailants designed this murder attempt for their audience:
Roger Thornhill. The experience of being attacked by a rogue biplane would,
of course, effect Thornhill in much the same way that it effects Hitchcock’s
audience by creating a feeling of menace that works to “humanize” Thornhill’s
heart. This process of humanization is not complete until Thornhill stages
his own death; it is only after this last, “successful” murder that Thornhill is
revealed to be a changed man. The menace that builds through a series of artistically attempted murders has a lasting effect on Thornhill’s character, finally
allowing his heart to be “improved.” In the beginning of the film, Thornhill is
a simple advertising executive, unsuccessful in love and inordinately attached
to his mother. However, after his exposure to the menace of attempted murder
Thornhill is improved and humanized. He becomes a brave, take-charge kind
of man, finally capable of committing himself not only to save the world, but
also to the woman he loves.
Many of Hitchcock’s films use murder as a method of “improving” the art’s
intended audience. For example, Hitchcock’s Psycho sets up an interesting situation in which the murderer is a subset of the audience’s subconscious; when
Norman dresses in his mother’s clothing and prepares for a murder, his subconscious is creating a kind of artistic performance. And since, as Norman’s
psychiatrist says, “If [Norman] felt a strong attraction to any other woman, the
Mother side of him would go wild,” the murders are obviously intended as a
kind of chastisement for any feelings of attraction or arousal that Norman feels.
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In terms of improving Norman’s heart, then, these murders are a kind of performance art that atones for Norman’s original sin of killing his own mother.
By murdering the girls to whom he was attracted, Norman not only keeps his
mother alive, but also improves his own heart in order to become a better, more
attentive son, without any distractions from pretty blonde girls.
Rope offers a more complicated version of the situation presented in Psycho.
In Rope, three main characters are implicated in a murder: Brandon, Philip, and
Rupert Cadell. Of the three murderers, however, Brandon is the only murdererartist. Cadell is a philosopher who understands the aesthetics of murder, while
Philip is a musician who is much more suited to his piano performances than to
the act of murder. But Brandon is the true artist, saying immediately after the
murder, “I’ve always wished for more artistic talent. Well, murder can be an art,
too. The power to kill can be just as satisfying as the power to create.” Brandon
plans the entire murder, including the party afterwards, while Philip tags along
as a nervous and, at times, unwilling accomplice.
After understanding that Brandon is the murderer-artist, the question
arises: who is his intended audience? Whose heart is to be “improved and
humanized” by this encounter? I would posit that Brandon plans the murder
in order to improve the hearts of Cadell, Philip, and himself. Brandon meticulously plans every aspect of his art down to the smallest of details. However
the artistry of his murder is not complete until a party has been thrown. “The
party,” he says, “is…the signature of the artist.” And since the party stands as a
“signature” to his murderous artwork, he has planned it just as thoroughly as
he planned the actual deed of killing their friend. Cadell mentions Brandon’s
fastidious attention to detail when he asks, “Something gone wrong, Brandon?
. . . You always plan your parties so well; it’s odd to have anything go wrong.”
Of course, since Brandon did plan this particular party so thoroughly, nothing
did go wrong; every detail was planned, including Cadell’s return afterwards.
Cadell returns to the apartment under the guise of a lost cigarette case, then
asks if he might stay for a drink. Brandon and Philip have a reasonable excuse
to say no: they are supposed to be leaving for the country that night, so it would
have been acceptable to politely refuse Cadell’s request because they must start
driving immediately. Brandon, however, not only invites Cadell to stay for a
drink, but then plays a game of deduction with Cadell, asking a series of leading
questions and finally revealing the murder. This revelation is no accident. Philip
understands this fact when he stands opposed to Brandon at the end of the film,
saying “This is what you wanted, isn’t it? Somebody else to know. Somebody
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else to see how brilliant you are.” Indeed, Brandon intended for his crime to
be discovered so that it would reach its entire audience: Brandon, Philip, and
Rupert Cadell. Once the murder had spoken to its intended audience, it could
begin to affect that audience in a way that would improve their characters, at
least, according to Brandon. He explains his philosophical understanding of the
art of murder during his dinner party, saying, “The few [who should be allowed
to commit murder] are those of such intellectual and moral superiority that
they’re above traditional moral concepts.” Brandon believes, then, that he is
one of the few superior allowed to commit murder. But somehow, he is not confident in that fact until after he has actually carried out the deed. Immediately
after the murder, Brandon states how “exhilarated” and “alive” he feels, as if he
was less human before the murder than he is after. So it is only by actually committing the perfect murder that Brandon can prove that he deserves to be one
of “the few.” By sharing the experience with Philip and revealing Cadell’s part
in the plan as an inspiring muse, Brandon hopes to share the improving effect
of his art with his friends, inducting them, along with himself, into the society
of the superior few.
Poe’s murderers tend toward a slightly different audience than Hitchcock’s.
For example, in Poe’s “The Cask of Amontillado,” Montresor tells the story
of a murder that he committed fifty years earlier. He plans his murder carefully and waits patiently for just the right time to quietly lead his victim—the
drunken Fortunato—down to his family crypt under the pretense of sharing some fine Amontillado wine. Unfortunately for Fortunato, though, there
is no Amontillado. Instead, Montresor chains Fortunato to a wall and erects
a new stone wall, trapping his victim and condemning him to death. In this
case, Montresor plans his murder to be a secret to all, except for his victim. For
Fortunato, the murder is planned to be “a spectacle of execution so that the
victim knows who kills him” (Barban 56). Likewise, every minute detail of this
murder is planned to coordinate with the wrongs that Fortunato has committed, creating an artistic quality that Poe termed “Unity” (Moldenhauer, 290).
In “Amontillado,” Montresor creates unity in his artistic murder through parallels: since Fortunato treated Montresor as an inferior man, Montresor would
force Fortunato to tour his family’s crypt, reminding him of the family’s storied
history. Since Montresor sees Fortunato as a fool, he chooses to murder him
during Carnival, at which time Fortunato and other people of high class would
traditionally be dressed as “peasants, servants, or fools” (Barban 54). Even the
Amontillado plays a role in Montresor’s unified artwork: “Amontillado” is, of
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course, a kind of wine, but it can also be rendered to mean “collected in a pile,”
which, according to Elena Barban, can refer to either the pile of stones that
Montresor uses to trap Fortunato inside the wall or to the “pile of bones” that
Fortunato would soon become (56).
Montresor’s detailed planning allows him to construct an artistic murder
that is meaningful for his victim and audience, Fortunato. Since the murder is
planned as a revenge killing, Montresor no doubt hopes to see Fortunato’s heart
“improved and humanized” by feelings of remorse and contrition. Although no
indication of remorse is given by Fortunato except for “a jingling of the bells [on
his fool’s cap],” Montresor finishes his story with the words “In pace requiescat!” (“Amontillado” 421), a Latin phrase (meaning “May he rest in peace”). This
phrase is normally used by a priest to absolve a dying person of his or her sins.
In this case though, Barban asserts (and I agree) that these words are spoken
by Montresor in regards to Fortunato, and that they prove that Montresor feels
“that he has merely avenged himself for the wrong that Fortunato afflicted upon
him fifty years ago” (Barban 57). I would also assert that these final words show
that Montresor believes that his art has been successful; all of his work to create unity and originality has inflicted terror in Fortunato’s heart and, thereby,
humanized his heart. The emotional artwork that Montresor creates leaves
Fortunato a changed person, worthy of Montresor’s forgiveness.
Poe’s final short story, written the same year that he died, is another examination of a murderer-artist, this one named Hop-Frog. In “Hop-Frog; or, The
Eight Chained Ourang-Outangs,” Poe tells the story of a king who is quite fond
of parties and practical jokes. The king keeps in his employment a disabled
dwarf who he calls “Hop-Frog,” because the dwarf’s disfigured legs only allow
him to get around by “something between a leap and a wiggle” (“Hop-Frog” 422).
The king also employs as a dancer a dwarf girl named Trippetta. Trippetta and
Hop-Frog become close friends, and trusted entertainers of the king. So when
the king decides to hold a masquerade, he summons Hop-Frog and Trippetta
to help him make plans. Hop-Frog and Trippetta arrive at the king’s court and
find their king to be upset and a little drunk. He forces Hop-Frog to drink some
wine, despite Hop-Frog’s insistence wine makes him feel ill. When Hop-Frog,
delirious with wine, cannot think of a good costume for the king to wear to his
masquerade, the king forces him to drink more wine. Finally, Trippetta falls
in front of the king and begs him to stop. The king pushes Trippetta down
and throws a goblet of wine in her face. At this point, Hop-Frog presents a
plan for the king’s masquerade—the king and his advisers will dress as escaped
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orangutans, and when they enter the ballroom, the guests will be thrown into a
panic. The king loves this idea and allows Hop-Frog to dress him and his advisers in furs and feathers then chain them together to make the illusion more
realistic. On the night of the party, the king and his counsellors rush into the
ballroom, frightening his guests with their wild behavior. Hop-Frog, a torch in
hand, rushes around the orangutans, playing as a narrator for the crowd. “I shall
soon find out who they are!” he shouts, hopping about the room (“Hop-Frog”
427). Then, in one quick movement, Hop-Frog attaches a chandelier chain to
the chain that is holding the men together, hoists them into the air, and uses
his torch to light their costumes on fire. He then climbs the chain to the ceiling
and out the skylight, where Trippetta waits for him, and the two disappear into
the night.
Because Hop-Frog intends for his homicide to be a revenge killing, it might
make sense that, like Montresor, his intended audience is his victim. Many of
the details of the murder even work to support this idea. For example, the king
spends much of his time making a joke out of poor Hop-Frog, so in terms of
revenge, it is only right that he dies as the punch line to one of Hop-Frog’s own
jokes. And, just like Montresor luring Fortunato into his crypt with the promise
of fine wine, Hop-Frog uses situations with which the king is comfortable—the
promise of a party and a cruel practical joke—to lure the king into his trap.
However, after all of this planning and detail, the costumes that Hop-Frog had
designed “instantly burst into a sheet of vivid flame,” and his victims are dead
in less than thirty seconds. If Hop-Frog had intended for his victims to benefit
from his art, he certainly did not leave them enough time to do so. However,
after the murder, I believe that the true audience is revealed: Hop-Frog himself.
He uses his artistic murder as a way of “improving” his own heart, and lifting
himself above his station. Just as Poe sees his own art as a way of “elevating” the
soul and exposing it to “brief and indeterminate glimpses” of god-like ecstasy
(Moldenhauer 288), Hop-Frog uses his art as a way of escaping the painful
world in which he is trapped. He climbs the chain in the “domed ballroom (an
architectural symbol of the arts)” (Bryant 45), elevating his own soul to a place
of art and beauty. While Hop-Frog begins his story as a court jester, he finishes
it as a changed artist.
This brief survey of their narrative works shows that both Hitchcock and
Poe depict murder as an art in much the same way that De Quincey does in
his “Murder” essays. All three men demonstrate ways in which murder might
be used to evoke emotions and change characters. Additionally, they create
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murder aficionados in their characters while, at the same time, accusing their
audiences of harboring a like fascination. However, despite De Quincey’s best
efforts, not to mention Poe’s long list of highly-esteemed stories and Hitchcock’s
lasting impression on pop and sophisticated culture, murder is still not universally respected as an art form. Still, artists and aficionados should take heart;
after all, Poe’s gothic tales were, for many years, seen as the ravings of a mind
addled by alcohol and tragedy. Similarly, Hitchcock’s films have only relatively
recently garnered serious critical attention. Not only did Poe and Hitchcock
demonstrate the artistic side of murder, but they were able to use De Quincey’s
ideas about the aesthetics of murder to elevate their chosen art forms. They
used the emotions inherent in an artistic murder to inspire emotions in their
own audiences, through their own mediums. Without the murder, there would
be no Poe stories or Hitchcock films. No Montresor or Norman Bates or “TellTale Heart” or Vertigo. Without the murder, there would be no art.

Endnotes
1.

Jan Olsson contends that Hitchcock does not care for De Quincey’s artistic view
of murder, saying, “The aesthetic approach to the art of murder was, however, not
at the core of Hitchcock’s macabre spiels. His murder advocacy was rather on the
cozy side, homely acts of kindness and consideration as opposed to De Quincey’s
theatrical slitting of throats. Hitchcock’s preferred methods for homicide were
strangulation and poisoning.” While Hitchcock’s fascination with strangulation
and poisoning cannot be denied in light of his films, I disagree with the idea that
strangulation and poisoning cannot be an artistic means of murder, and I will show
that in the remainder of my analysis.

2.

De Quincey’s “Confessions” has also been connected to Poe’s Dupin and his short
story, “The Masque of the Red Death.” For a more thorough examination of either
of these connections, see “Poe’s De Quincey, Poe’s Dupin,” by Robert Morrison, or
“A De Quinceyan Source for Poe’s ‘The Masque of the Red Death,’” by Robert Lance
Snyder.
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“Life is a Solid
Substance”:

Materialism and the Use of Objects in
Virginia Woolf’s The Waves
Madeline Thatcher

“It is only in the world of objects that we have time and space and selves.”
—T.S. Eliot

Because of its lack of a cohesive plot, Virginia
Woolf’s The Waves is extremely well-suited for examining the development of
character, of place, and of objects. The novel, which relies heavily on a “stream
of consciousness” style of writing, uses these elements as footholds for the
reader by grounding the novel in something tangible. This paper proposes that
although the characters that Woolf depicts within her work may vary in their
relationship to solid objects, she herself is writing a novel where objects are at
the very center. It is true that the term “objects” is fraught with multiple interpretations in scholarship over the past few years, but Jane Bennett succinctly
explains how Woolf uses these items in her recent publication, Vibrant Matter.
Bennett classifies “objects” as materials “that appear as they are to a subject,”
only able to be engaged with by humans, as compared to “things,” which are
considered such “the moment when the object becomes the Other” or when
a “thing” gains the ability to think and act of its own accord (2). In The Waves,
materialism—objects—has the power to draw human beings toward one

Criterion

another and foster a sense of connection between characters, and as such, Bennett’s definition seems most fitting; these objects are controlled by the humans
who interact with them, rather than the other way around.
Douglas Mao examines a similar vein of materialist research in his text,
Solid Objects: Modernism and the Test of Production. Mao attempts to unravel
the experiment that is The Waves, finding that this literary trial delves into the
lack of life’s substantive material and comes on the cusp of a larger modernist
movement later described by Mao himself. He considers the true “modernist
vision” as one of the “predicament of the object, a vision of the modern age as
one in which the particular, the concrete, and the auratic were threatened as
never before by habits of generalization and abstraction serving a newly triumphant science” (6-7). Mao summarizes Woolf’s project in his assertion that
modernism, “touches directly upon the question of whether art serves aesthetic
experience or vice versa, whether value at last resides in the beautiful perception or the beautiful thing, in the passing moment or the enduring object” (36).
While this explanation is not directly applied to The Waves, it certainly fits,
as each of the six principle characters grapple within themselves to determine
which experience—the perception or the object—should be taken as reality.
This dichotomy seems to be at the very center of modernist studies—is it
an age dominated by objects, by machinery, by a lack of human connection?
Or is it an era that flourishes on the abstract, on the ethereal, on the unattainable, in an attempt to “only connect?”1 Woolf herself engages with Mao’s proposed “predicament” in her short story, “Solid Objects,” from which Mao’s work
draws its title. The story details the relationship between two friends, John and
Charles, where the former, after discovering a “large, irregular lump” of sea glass
at the beach, becomes obsessed with “possessing objects” in order to add to his
collection; and the latter, who cannot understand “the truth of it,” eventually
leaves his friend “for ever,” alone with his “pretty stones” (Dick 107). While Mao
asserts that there is “danger [in] allowing the aesthetic vision to completely
overcome the practical vision,” it seems this is only true in Charles’ case. When
he asks John, “What was the truth of it? What made you give it up like that all
in a second?” John replies, “I’ve not given it up,” and upon further protests from
Charles, declares, “I don’t agree with you” (106). If we are to consider the ineffable “truth” both John and Charles seem to seek as true relationships with fellow humans, it is therefore obvious that no single “truth” exists. Rather, “truth”
is relative, for while one considers truth to be lost among “the lump of glass and
the star-shaped china,” the other considers it to be found by means of the same
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methods (105). Essentially, the purpose of objects in creating meaningful relations with other people differs between humans—some may find them useful,
while others still may see them as hindrances to true understanding.
Mao dubs this focus on objects and their subsequent effects on their owners as “making,” a deliberate act that effectively removes human influence in the
process of creating and using an object. In relation to The Waves, he declares,
“[The novel] confirms that Woolf was intensely, if not continuously, concerned
about the element of domination [over the human] in making,” in short stating
Woolf was suspicious of any sort of “material reality” seeing as objects supposedly rejected any need for human connection (76). To say so implies Woolf
favored arguments against “making,” or against objects (and therefore experiences) that appear manufactured. Even in implication, it seems much too
arbitrary a claim, too simplified, seeing as “the truth of it all” in “Solid Objects”
can—and does—exist within both the rejection and acceptance of “making.”
Ultimately, then, it is possible for Woolf to be ascribing to both interpretive
meanings in “Solid Objects”; that connection is relative to each individual, and
that while some may see objects as detrimental to forming fulfilling and legitimate connections, others still find that physical manifestations of their innermost thoughts bring about a clearer understanding of the transcendent “truth”
her characters seem to be seeking.
It is therefore imperative that The Waves be examined for evidence of both
“truths”—as those who discover a sense of self through objects and those who
cannot do so, in order to be compared to Woolf’s overarching use of objects
in order to create relationships between her characters. To do so, this paper
will examine Bernard, Louis, and Rhoda, as they each display distinct attitudes
towards objects and materialism.2 This idea of relative connection would naturally be examined through character development, especially in The Waves
where there is little to be said of plot and much to be said of the internal life
of each of the main protagonists. Whereas Mao depicts Woolf’s novel as one
where human interaction is considered a “a strange and disturbing imposition
on an innocent landscape,” it seems that some characters and Woolf herself
believe otherwise due to a definitive reliance on objects within the novel to
instigate such interactions (Mao 192). However, it is also necessary to determine which school of thought Woolf herself falls into, for it seems impossible
that a writer as experimental as Woolf would fail to establish her own definitive
views on the subject. Although perhaps inadvertently, Woolf seems to demonstrate the intrinsic power of objects in fostering connection, displayed in the
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few but forceful interactions where all six of the main characters interact with
one another.
Much of the scholarship regarding The Waves seems to revolve around
Bernard, and rightly so, given that his narrative voice constructs much of the
novel’s contents. 3 His role as unofficial leader of the group adds an overarching
framework for The Waves, a much-needed semblance of structure in a novel
that lacks a plot to perform such an act. Bernard’s portions of the book are
driven by his inner quest to create a legacy for himself that will remain long
after he is gone, and he often finds himself thinking of his future biographer
who will diligently record his achievements for future generations. He quotes
extensively from this imaginary figure, who he imagines will write of his subject as one “possessed [of] a logical sobriety,” a man “abnormally aware of [his]
circumstances” (76). The way in which Bernard intends to find this “logical
sobriety” is by transforming abstract concepts—which are much larger than
human experience—into objects that he can manipulate. He converses with
the reader (or is it his biographer?), suggesting, “Let us again pretend that life
is a solid substance, shaped like a globe, which we can turn about in our fingers. Let us pretend that we can make out a plain and logical story” (251). Life,
something that cannot be touched, becomes an object that can be moved about
by Bernard, making him a ruler and organizer over what is usually construed
as eternal chaos. Bernard is compelled to do this, seeing as he cannot fathom
comprehending life itself without any sort of physical framework. At one point
he states, “How to describe the world seen without a self? There are no words”
(287). In this manner, Bernard seeks to oversee both his fate and those of his
friends, as one who can see the end from the beginning—the “Alpha and Omega”
of The Waves.
But this changes; Bernard undergoes a “gradual transformation” as he
attempts to understand how things can exist without being grounded in something solid, or can be experienced in a way to which words cannot do justice. He
finds there are seemingly physical manifestations of human relationships that
may feel tangible but are in fact intangible—such as the birth of his son—and
as a writer, Bernard eventually learns that when describing feelings or experiences, it is foolish to use words or to use objects. His desires to be remembered,
to be celebrated, to be worshipped—these are things that can be understood
only through intuition and feeling because these desires stem from the very
depths of man’s heart, a place “immeasurably receptive, holding everything,
trembling with fullness” due to its capacity to feel both joy and pain. There
64

Winter 2016

exists an eternal paradox within Bernard, because of the infinite possibilities
that exist within his own imagination. Mao contends that in the final passages
of The Waves, Bernard experiences “a yearning not for airy ghostliness but for
solidity of self and in things,” thus proving to the reader that Woolf, like Bernard,
desires to “oppose flux. . . with a fixing figured as an actual solidification of the
evanescent” (71). However, this seems an inaccurate reading of Bernard’s final
expressions of self; he proclaims he longs to be “a whole universe, unconfined
and capable of being everywhere on the verge of things,” but is impeded by
objects, reminded of his solidity as he “leans one elbow on the table, and holds
in his left hand a glass of old brandy” (Waves 292). The enemy is not “death”
as Bernard believes it to be, but rather “eyes meeting ours; the effort waiting”
the immutable force that requires humanity to “call the waiter” and “pay the
bill,” after which they must “find [their] coats” (293). Bernard has no reason to
desire for “solidity of self and in things,” for such solidity is already within his
possession.
Bernard’s metamorphosis is a replica of a similar change that exists as a
bridge between Woolf’s earlier novel, To the Lighthouse, and The Waves. In
the former, Mrs. Ramsay portrays the central and formative character, a matriarchal figure dedicated to bringing her family and her guests together as they
spend the summer months on holiday. Her husband, Mr. Ramsay, seems a cold
and detached partner and father in comparison to Mrs. Ramsay’s distinctive
communicative powers, a scholar determined to publish a novel that will be
remembered long after he himself has passed away. However, it is later revealed
that Mr. Ramsay is struggling to come to term with his own mortality; while he
was assured he had “a splendid mind. . . he had not genius” (34). Despite his
attempts to grasp the whole of human understanding—a process he compares
to the ordering of the alphabet—he cannot do so. He remains staunchly at “Q,”
realizing he can never reach “Z.” He will not be remembered as the one man “in
a thousand million” to “reach Z after all” (35).
Then comes The Waves, and Bernard, much like Mr. Ramsay, is obsessed
with finding something that will stand the test of time, in this case his biography. His fellow characters also recognize his constructed lifestyle. Neville notes,
“Bernard is posing as a literary man; Bernard is thinking of his biographer”
(79). In other words, Bernard is posing as one who is obsessed with and able
to comprehend the purpose behind objects. However, Bernard comes to desire
something much greater for himself than simply being a permanent fixture in
modern history—his desire to “be a whole universe”—to be infinite—speaks to
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an aspiration not described nor contained by objects, one that must be experienced without the use of things.
Such is not the case with Louis, who instead seeks to use objects to elevate
himself above his peers. Louis is the literal outsider of the group, the son of a
banker in Brisbane, Australia, and therefore not properly “English.” Because
of his foreign background, Louis uses materialism to his advantage and sees
objects as literal stepping stones on which he might climb in order to appear
superior to his friends. Much like Bernard, he seeks to obtain something
long lasting, but unlike Bernard, he finds such a legacy in objects, regardless
of whether or not he himself feels successful. This begins during his days at
school; one afternoon, he lags behind to show one of his instructors his work.
“I show my essay to Mr. Barker,” says Louis. “This will endure” (39).
After school, Louis again sets himself apart from his peers as he desires to
obtain objects in an effort to set himself apart. While Bernard and Neville “go
to Oxford or Cambridge,” evidently to obtain knowledge or prestige, things that
cannot be held or displayed, Louis instead goes “to make money,” preferring to
obtain physical representations of his worth rather than an aura of success (65).
His desire for objects eventually escalates until it has consumed him. This is evident during an interaction with the group as a whole, in which Louis declares,
I beg you also to notice my cane and my waistcoat. I have inherited a desk of
solid mahogany in a room hung with maps. Our steamers have won an enviable reputation for the cabins replete with luxury. We supply swimming-baths
and gymnasiums. I wear a white waistcoat now and consult a little book before
I make an engagement. (219)

This statement is almost entirely overcome with objects—the desk, the maps,
the steamers, the gymnasiums, the expensive waistcoat, the little book—and
as such there is little to be said of Louis as a character. Rather, he seems to be
a compilation of his desk, his maps, his swimming-baths—a solid object that
merely appears to be human.
This “cyborg” seems entirely separate and apart from Rhoda, who, it seems
in direct opposition to Louis, offers perhaps the most forceful rejection of the
world of materialism, but certainly not in any orthodox manner. Rhoda feels
that objects prevent her from properly connecting to the physical reality she
finds herself attempting to understand. And unlike Bernard, this rejection is
not in any attempt to reach something more ethereal. Rather than advocating
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that others realize the difficulty in human connection and therefore shun the
use of objects, Rhoda longs for an emotional attachment to the world of things.
This is noted most overtly in Rhoda’s self-deprecating title “No Face,” which
is repeated in almost every section of the novel. We first are introduced to
Rhoda’s perception of herself in the first portion of The Waves when Rhoda
arrives at boarding school. After finding herself alone and isolated in a world of
objects and of people who understand them, she declares, “Here I am nobody.
I have no face” (33). Her first identifying label, “nobody” is interesting when
dissected into the words that create the compound: “no” and “body.” When
examined in isolation, these words seem to indicate that Rhoda does not in
fact have any physical form, rather than a mere feeling of separateness. She
is unable to be anyone, to have any sort of “face” without a physical frame on
which to place it. It is imperative for Rhoda to gain access to objects in order to
completely exist.
Rhoda also acknowledges her lack of connection to others as a result of her
insubstantial state. Later in the same section, she tells the reader, “I have no
face. Other people have faces; Susan and Jinny have faces. . . Their world is the
real world. The things they lift are heavy” (43). This particular line works well
with Jinny’s clothing-dependent character, seeing as the dresses so central to
Jinny’s power of connection can only be laid upon a physical form. The reference to “lift[ing heavy] things” could also be seen as an allusion to Susan and
her children, where Susan finds life heavy under “wrinkled thighs and sagging
breasts” (131). Such is a welcome weight, one that brings about a “bestial and
beautiful passion,” of which Rhoda can only dream. Rhoda is desperate for this
kind of connection, and the others notice. During the scene where the characters join together to celebrate Percival’s departure for India, Louis spots Rhoda
in the crowd approaching their table and perceives how unsettling interaction
with others is to her. “We wake her. We torture her,” he notes. “She dreads, us,
despises us, yet comes cringing to our sides because for all our cruelty there
is always some name, some face, which sheds a radiance, which lights up her
pavements, and makes it possible for her to replenish her dreams” (117). In light
of her desire to “replenish her dreams,” Rhoda’s suicide is seen as a direct result
of her failure to connect with the physical world.
Her foreshadowed death by objects—or lack thereof—is described when
she states, “I hate looking-glasses which show me my real face. Alone I often
fall down into nothingness. I must push my foot stealthily lest I should fall off
the edge of the world into nothingness. I have to bang my head against some
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hard door to call myself back to my body” (44). Here, Rhoda associates physical
pain with reality; her desire to touch and to be touched is achieved through
solitary efforts to bring about some kind of sensation that physically resonates
within her. Further foreshadowing occurs when she states, “All palpable forms
of life have failed me. Unless I can stretch and touch something hard, I shall be
blown down the eternal corridors forever. What then can I touch? What brick,
what stone? and so draw myself across the enormous gulf into my body safely”
(159). Here it seems that Rhoda has at last accepted the lack of success reality
attempts to offer her. It seems fitting therefore that in her ultimate attempt
to retrieve her “forgotten face” as a result of “flutter[ing] unattached, without
anchorage anywhere, unconsolidated, incapable of composing any blankness
of continuity or wall against which these bodies move” would be death, a primal, physical act through which Rhoda might enter another world devoid of
objects, one where she might invariably find her place.
However, there are a few key moments of connection in which all six of the
characters interact with one another, and it is here where Woolf’s true opinions
on materialism shine through. While these characters might find themselves
divided on how they view the purpose of objects in their world, Woolf clearly
sees materials as a means by which her creations can interact with one another.
The Waves is in this way a physical manifestation of Woolf’s ideal novel, where
“At first it seems as if there were no emphasis at all; and then, as the eyes accustom themselves to twilight and discern the shapes of things in a room we see
how complete the story is” (The Essays 162). This is evident from the first page
of The Waves.
In the initial lines, we are introduced to the group of six, and it is by their
observation of their surroundings (literally “discerning shapes”) that we understand both the relationship between the characters and the setting in which
they find themselves. Two thirds of the characters describe their setting in ways
that objectify their placement; the sun becomes “a ring,” “a slab of pale yellow,”
and “a globe hanging down in a drop against the. . . hill” (9). After interpreting these varied interpretations of the sunrise, the reader is able to gather that
these six characters are close to one another, both physically as they are describing the same phenomenon at the same time, and in a more personal manner,
as they seem to feel comfortable vocalizing their inner thoughts to one another.
While this “vocalizing” eventually is recognized as soliloquies only the principle
character at that time can know, this introduction, written in such a way that it
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imitates a conversation, implies that objects are necessary in cultivating a sense
of understanding and fellowship.
Soon after this first section, the characters part ways, only to reconvene
years later when their mutual friend Percival is set to depart for India. Neville
arrives first, and after being seated, notes, “This table, these chairs, this metal
vase with its three red flowers are about to undergo an extraordinary transformation” (118). Neville is able to foresee the table filled with friends, during
which the objects that construct their gathering spot will no longer be simply objects, but a part of the larger group. Although “things quiver as if not
yet in being,” once all are seated, they may “say, brutally and directly, what is
in [their] minds” (119). It is after this that the soliloquies cease to be isolated
statements of feeling and instead are transformed into dialogue. The “I”s of
the characters disappear and are replaced with the communal “we.” Individuals
do not stand alone, do not remain as Bernard, or Jinny, or Rhoda, but instead
become an “us,” a conglomerate party that simultaneously “drove through the
streets,” where “our names [were] painted in white letters on our boxes” as “we
clasped the flowers with their green leaves rustling in garlands” (120, emphasis
added). Bernard summarizes this collective experience most succinctly when
he declares, “We have come together, at a particular time, to this particular spot.
. . [by] red carnation in that vase. A single flower as we sat here waiting, but now
a seven-sided flower, many petalled. . . a whole flower to which every eye brings
its own contribution” (127). It is the flower—an object—that stands literally at
the center of group, and to which each individual adds a petal to make this
object, in its vase, something beautiful and whole. Together as one, they agree
“our senses have widened. Membranes, webs of nerve that lay white and limp,
have filled and spread themselves and float round us like filaments, making the
air tangible” (135).
In the final scenes of the novel, the characters once more come together at
Hampton Court, and it is here that objects seem to foster the most complete of
connections. Bernard, again acting as the narrative leader of the group, offers
the most inclusive picture of the six and the objects that bring them together.
He asks, “How many telephone calls, how many post cards, are now needed to
cut this hole through which we come together, united, at Hampton Court? . . .
We are all swept on by the torrent of things grown so familiar they cast no shade
. . . I am wedged into my place in the puzzle” (216). The group becomes an object,
a puzzle, in which each individual plays a distinct and shapely role. The “torrent
of things,” the objects that make up life, have brought them together once again.
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In their final moments together as a group, Bernard urges, “Let us stay for
a moment. . . before we go. Let us pace the terrace by the river almost alone.
. . What a sense of the tolerableness of life the lights in the bedrooms of the
small shopkeepers give us! . . . How we worship the sound like the knocking
together of trucks in a siding!” (234). This is profoundly significant; before the
friends part for the last time, Bernard, again using the all encompassing “we,”
finds solace and purpose in objects, in the sounds they make in their togetherness. Life most certainly becomes a solid substance, a substance with the power
to draw individuals together. This section, the last of The Waves to include
all of the characters, leaves the reader and the characters both gazing at the
“many-sided substance cut out of [the] dark; a many-faceted flower” as Bernard
tells his audience, “Stop for a moment; let us behold what we have made’” (229,
emphasis added).
It may seem strange to engage with Woolf as an author (at least in part) in
support of materialism when she so adamantly opposed other writers who were
regarded as such.4 To the authors she dubs as “materialists,” she considers their
only value to be in demonstrating “what they might have done but have not
done; what we certainly could not do, but as certainly, perhaps, we do not wish
to do” (“Modern” 158). However, my argument places Woolf within the camp
she so detested, as a writer who “writes of unimportant things; that they should
make the trivial and transitory appear the true and enduring”; but such is not
the case (159). There is evidence to support this, despite Woolf’s personal claim
against such a label. Woolf inadvertently challenged her own stance on what
is “true and enduring” when she wrote both “Solid Objects” and The Waves, in
which she clearly demonstrates that the things she considered “trivial” are in
fact the driving factors behind the connections between her characters. Woolf,
therefore, deserves to be judged perhaps more heavily on her fiction than her
nonfiction, as this genre of work appropriately responds both in form and in
function to her forbearers and contemporaries against whom she took up figurative arms.
Mr. Bennett, Mr. Wells, and Mr. Galsworthy, whom she criticizes so harshly
in both “Modern Fiction” and “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown,” wrote in a style
that depicted merely the “outer life,” whereas Woolf adamantly supports the
drafting of the “inner life,” making the biased nature of the importance of
objects something impossible to describe. In the latter essay, she writes, “[Mr.
Bennett] is trying to make us imagine for him; he is trying to hypnotize us into
the belief that, because he has made a house, there must be a person living
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there” (16). Essentially, Mr. Bennett and his colleagues expected objects to create their own meaning; while humans might use them or live within them, they
contained their own entity, a soul of sorts that existed in some higher plane
than human consciousness could comprehend. For Woolf, objects are akin to
the atom she so fondly describes as the matter of life. Simultaneously solid but
empty, atoms—and by extension objects—construct the framework for existence but cannot lend meaning to it.5 Rather, they provide a canvas upon which
humans may impose their desires and their dreams, lending meaning to their
relationships in ways that can be represented or interpreted by objects.
As such, Woolf herself is in fact the materialist; Mr. Bennett and those
like him should instead be considered “vital materialists,” or those who expect
objects to act for themselves, and in turn affect their agency on human subjects.
Coined by Jane Bennett, these kinds of objects are separate and apart, a higher
form of matter than humans, unable to be imposed upon by the former. The
objects in Woolf’s work, and especially in The Waves, contain no such power.
They are wholly and completely dependent on the humans who use them, and
therefore gain their meaning and their purpose from the same. The characters depicted by the likes of Mr. Bennett find connection despite the ideology
of materialism that interferes with their existence—Woolf’s come together
because of it. Woolf’s friend and fellow writer E. M. Forster describes her writing style best when he writes:
Like most novelists worth reading, she strays from the fictional norm. She
dreams, designs, jokes, invokes, observes details, but she does not tell a story or
weave a plot, and—can she create character? That is her problem’s centre. . . Plot
and story could be set aside in favour of some other unity, but if one is writing
about human beings, one does want them to seem alive. Did she get her people
to live? (Forster 16, emphasis added)

Forster’s question lies at the very heart of Woolf’s attempts at fiction, and what
I believe finds an affirmative answer in The Waves, because of her reliance on
objects. If “living” within novels can be defined as realistic interactions between
characters, Woolf certainly succeeds, despite the personalized views of individualized characters that may suggest otherwise.
But in this declarative stance on materialism, there lies the possibility
for didacticism that seems so out of tune with modernism as a whole. Mao
argues for such a reading; in one instance, Mao approaches “Solid Objects” as a
short story with a purposeful and a direct agenda when he says, “‘Solid Objects’
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might be read as a projection of the Victorian childhood onto a modern adulthood, a discreet subversion that takes the nineteenth century at its word (to
children) while deploying that word against it. A standard piece of Victorian
advice on child-rearing was to make one’s child a collector. . .” (29). To read
“Solid Objects”—and therefore The Waves—as a “projection” of an adolescent
Victorian mind frame fits, at least in part, with the idea of modernism as a
movement. Most scholars see modernism as a rejection of Victorian ideals;
Mao’s reading of “Solid Objects” therefore works well in this vein.
However, if we are then to read the works of Woolf in this light—as an
unabashed rebellion against the production of her predecessors—her writings
would be just as hypocritical as they are groundbreaking. But because of her
subtle nod to the subjective nature of truth in relation to objects as exhibited
by the characters in The Waves, as well as her overt reliance on objects to foster
connection between her characters, Woolf is able to be lauded as an extremely
mature writer. She is one who understands the nuances of human connection, and one of profound conviction, solidified in her views regarding the use
of objects in daily life. Essentially, this paper is offering a reclassification of
Woolf, and an opportunity to examine her work in a light previously considered
impossible, due in part to scholars as well as Woolf herself. The Waves is a perfect example of Woolf’s work in relation to materialism, and therefore deserves
careful additional study. In this, the critic, alongside Neville, can say in unison,
“The light falls upon real objects now” (127).

Endnotes
1

“Only connect…” stands as the epigraph for E.M. Forster’s novel Howards End.
This theme has played a large role in determining the role of objects in modernist
literature, as described by Melanie Williams in her article, “Only Connect: Howards
End and Theories of Justice,” where she claims, “Forster, through [Howards End],
produces a developed examination of the necessary linkage between the words of
the abstract and the contingent.” This argument can be extrapolated to include the
representation of the people themselves within Howards End; the struggle between
the Wilcox and the Schlegel families as physical manifestations of the outer life of
objects and the inner life of emotions respectively is key to the novel as a whole.

2

For the sake of space, this paper excludes the study of Ginny, Neville, and Susan.
However, they are each represented in the group gatherings in the latter portion of this
publication.
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3

Bernard’s narrative comprises 45.1% of The Waves; Neville comes in second, with
13.9% of the text as his own.

4

Her “quarrel” was specifically directed to a “Mr. Wells, Mr. Bennet, and Mr.
Galsworthy” as addressed in her essay, “Modern Fiction.”

5

This concept is explored in Sam Mitchell’s University of Richmond’s honor’s thesis,
“‘The Stuff of Thought’: Virginia Woolf’s Object Lessons” (2011).
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Ernest Hemingway:

The Modern Transcendentalist
Camryn Scott

The childhood of Ernest Hemingway was one of
opposites. Growing up in Oak Park, Illinois, the “genteel, strait-laced, rigidly
Protestant” suburb of Chicago, he was poked and prodded by his parents to
adhere to the strict, respectable, and elite expectations of town residents (Meyers 4). This atmosphere existed because of the church, which was “the dominant
influence” both “in the town and in the Hemingway household” (5). Yet each
summer of his youth, beginning when he was seven weeks old, Hemingway left
“the stuffy culture” of his hometown by going to stay at the family cottage on
Walloon Lake in northern Michigan (17). These trips into the wilderness were
liberating for the boy, who found great pleasure in learning to fish, hunt, and
explore the natural world, far removed from the town that seemed so stifling.
Perhaps because of the atmosphere of Oak Park, Hemingway developed a deep
love of nature. I believe he would echo Ralph Waldo Emerson’s claim that “In
the wilderness, I find something more dear and connate than in streets or villages” (5). It became his escape from expectation, from the stormy relationship
he had with his mother, and the place he would return to again and again in
his writing. Because of this dichotomy of place he experienced in his childhood,
the settings he later created in his writing, and especially those of nature, are
incredibly rich and full of meaning.
“Place-centered criticism,” as scholar Laura Godfrey calls it, forms a longstanding discussion in Hemingway scholarship that continues to draw wide
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opinions and interpretations of the landscapes he created. I believe his landscapes continue to captivate us because, as Godfrey says, “Geography and place
lie at the heart of Hemingway’s art, as they did in his life” (48). But most critics,
like Godfrey, are more interested in talking about setting generally. They narrow
in on the specific setting of a particular work and discuss its meaning and function. And while nature inevitably forms a part of their arguments, as it shows up
in so many of Hemingway’s major works, it is never the focus. This leaves a hole
in “place-centered” Hemingway scholarship that needs to be filled, specifically
regarding his treatment of nature across multiple texts. For many of his characters, the wilderness is the place for healing, reflection, and peace, much like
it was for the nineteenth-century transcendentalists of New England. I propose
that Hemingway created a modern version of transcendentalism, at least in
terms of his portrayal of wilderness in his works, which pointed to nature as the
only place where solace and the hope of rejuvenation could be found amidst the
war, disillusionment, and depression of the early twentieth century.
In order to understand Hemingway’s transcendental revival, we must first
comprehend the transcendental ideal of nature. No better text exists for this
endeavor than Emerson’s essay “Nature,” where he, as the voice of the original
movement, articulates the ideas that formed the foundation of transcendentalism. Published in 1836, “Nature” was written during a tumultuous time in
American history. With increasingly violent tensions mounting over slavery,
as well as the encroaching influence of the industrial revolution on the land,
Emerson retreated ideologically to the woods. And there he found a place
“unchanged by man,” where his senses could be “truly adjusted to each other,”
and he could be healed by nature’s “medicinal” power (2, 4, 9). Shielded by the
outstretched arms of noble trees, Emerson says, “I feel that nothing can befall
me in life . . . which nature cannot repair” (4). But not only is nature a place of
healing and rejuvenation for Emerson, it is also a place where understanding
can be found and ultimately, where spiritual, emotional, and intellectual transcendence can occur. He refers to nature as “the vehicle of thought” and “the
symbol of the spirit,” where one can come and be “gradually restored to perfect
sight” (14, 46). It is not strange then that Hemingway, who as a young man saw
death and destruction as an ambulance truck driver in World War I, left the
front lines with legs full of shrapnel, and lived in a world scarred not once, but
twice by war, also turned to nature both in his life and in his writing. And the
two best examples of Hemingway’s transcendentalism come from characters
who also seek solace in the wilderness after traumatic experiences in the war.
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While on a trip to Spain with a dysfunctional group of friends in the novel
The Sun Also Rises, former soldier Jake Barnes decides to leave the city and go
fishing in the wilderness. Hemingway gives us clues that this place will be a
transcendent landscape even before Jake gets there, by describing the land he
is leaving behind as “brown” and “barren,” where there “was no grass beside
the road” (113–114). He also uses the word “up” repeatedly in these passages.
Jake explains to a man in a bar that he is going “Up to Burguete to fish” (113).
Their bus goes “up the road” several times and, if it wasn’t obvious enough, Jake
then remarks that the place he is going is “high” and “must be twelve hundred
metres” (114). The closer Jake gets to his fishing spot, the greater the incline is,
and the thicker and greener the woods become (122). By employing this language, Hemingway suggests that Jake’s natural destination will help him to rise
above his physical and emotional wounds obtained in the war.
He stays for a week, fishing and relaxing and enjoying himself in the wilderness, until telegrams from his friends inform him of their arrival in Pamplona
and compel him to leave the beautiful, green landscapes of Burguete and accompany them to the fiesta. Like Emerson, it appears Jake could agree that “To the
body and mind which have been cramped by noxious work or company, nature
is medicinal,” as he is surrounded by very noxious company indeed (9). Each
damaged in some way by the war, they all drink relentlessly and seek fulfillment
in sexual encounters, chasing after things that will not bring them the peace
they desire. Though Jake drinks heavily as well, he also chooses to seek healing
and solace in the wilderness. He chases the “nobler want of man...served by
nature,” which Emerson says is “the love of Beauty,” while his friends pursue
the base, carnal desires of man (8). Hemingway juxtaposes the violent, pitiful,
and self-destructive actions of Jake’s associates, which make up the rest of the
novel, with the small, tranquil passage of him going fishing in the mountains
to show us that spending time in the wilderness is the only way that a sort of
peace can be obtained after such destruction. But Jake is not the only character
of Hemingway’s who comes home from the war and finds himself drawn to the
forest, and in the short story “Big Two-Hearted River,” the transcendental message is more noticeable, and therefore more powerful.
One of the reasons this story is the best example of Hemingway’s new transcendentalism is because the action of the story both begins and ends with the
shell-shocked Nick Adams alone in nature. With the entire focus of the story
on Nick Adams and his experiences in the wilderness, unlike The Sun Also Rises
where many other settings and issues are emphasized over Jake’s brief vignette
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in the mountains, Hemingway is able to provide a greater amount of detail,
pointing more directly to transcendentalism and offering closer evidence of
Nick’s inner turmoil. And with this detail, we see that the similarities between
Nick’s actions and the pioneers of the original transcendental movement are
striking.
Like a modern-day Emerson or Henry David Thoreau, Nick wanders
through the wilderness carrying all the necessities for survival upon his back. He
reverts to the simpler state, stripped of the irrelevant possessions that the transcendentalists shunned. “He felt he had left everything behind” (Hemingway
164). Nick feels comfortable in his natural setting, not needing “to get his map
out,” for “he [knows] where he [is] from the position of the river” and keeps
“his direction by the sun” (165). But this is no ordinary leisure trip through the
woods—Nick has been wounded emotionally in the war and is seeking healing
and rejuvenation. While Hemingway does not explicitly say this, he provides
many references to the damage Nick has suffered.
First, the land he walks on, that he used to know as a child, is “burned over
and changed” (164). Like this land, Nick was literally burned and scarred in
the war, causing him to be a different man. He is like the grasshoppers along
the trails that “had all turned black from living in the burnt-over land” (165).
Nick can also be compared to the trout he studies so carefully in the water who
are “keeping themselves steady in the current with wavering fins,” and “holding
steady in the fast water” (163). He, too, is wavering in a current of pain and terrifying memory, struggling desperately to swim normally among those around
him who cannot comprehend the damage he has suffered. Because of his dreadful experience in the war, he has become a broken shell of a man in the grasp
of society’s problems. He has lost himself—lost what makes him an individual.
But despite this ongoing struggle, shown in the short, repetitive sentences
Hemingway uses when giving us glimpses into Nick’s suppressed mind (167),
the important part is that he is still there, still existing, just like the grasshoppers.
Though they are forever changed by traumatic experiences, both Nick and
the blackened insects are still alive and able to find their place within nature.
Hemingway does not gloss over the individual side-effects caused by the atrocities of war—he never fails to remind us of them—but a feeling of hope pervades
the narrative, and we are drawn to the conclusion that Nick’s time in the wilderness will help, for “He was there, in the good place” (167), the “medicinal”
place Emerson prescribes for “the body and mind which have been cramped
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by noxious work or company,” or, in Nick’s case, shattered by the horror of the
trenches and rampant death in World War I (9). At the end of the day, while
observing his modest camp neatly arranged between the trees, he notes that
the pack which was once “much too heavy” as he hiked into the wilderness now
looks “much smaller,” showing that nature is a place where his perspectives can
change and his burdens can be lifted (Hemingway 164, 167). Hemingway, in
writing this story, seems to agree with Emerson’s belief that when “embosomed
for a season in nature . . . why should we grope among the dry bones of the
past?” (1). Sure, Nick is scarred and changed by his traumatic past, but like the
land destroyed by fire, “It could not all be burned. He knew that” (Hemingway
164). His time spent in nature in “Big Two-Hearted River” gives him hope, and
therefore gives us further evidence that Hemingway was creating a new form
of transcendentalism in his writing. But though there are obviously many similarities to the movement described by Emerson, Hemingway’s is revised in one
important way: with the exclusion of a connection to a higher power.
A large part of Emerson’s essay “Nature” discusses the experience of being
in nature as a means to connect with God in a state of transcendence. Near
the beginning of the essay, he famously writes, “Standing on the bare ground—
my head bathed by the blithe air, and uplifted into infinite space—all mean
egotism vanishes. I become a transparent eyeball. I am nothing. I see all. The
currents of the Universal Being circulate through me; I am a part or particle of
God” (4). Emerson sees nature not only as a pure, healing, or rejuvenating space,
but one wherein a person can even become a part of God, transcending his or
her mortal state. He also connects nature to morality, saying that an “ethical
character so penetrates the bone and marrow of nature, as to seem the end
for which it was made,” that “the moral law lies at the center of nature,” and
that nature “shall hint or thunder to man the laws of right and wrong” (24).
But this religious element of original transcendentalism does not show up in
Hemingway’s writing.
Though Hemingway grew up in the staunchly conservative community
of Oak Park, in a “religious family,” he later “attempted to eradicate in himself every vestige” of his upbringing (Meyers 5). His stories do not reinforce
traditional morals of right and wrong, and his characters rarely speak about
a higher power in any terms other than sarcasm and incredulity. While Jake
does visit a cathedral later in the novel, no reference to religion or a higher
power appears during his week in the woods, and we have no indication in “Big
Two-Hearted River” that Nick is religious at all. We can safely assume that their
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desires to enter the wilderness do not involve wanting to have the “currents of
the Universal Being circulate” through them or to become a “particle of God”
(Emerson 4–5). Instead of connecting to God in nature, they seek to come to
themselves, to gain a sort of balance and renewal and feel at peace. Their journeys are spiritual in a transcendent sense, but not in a religious one, and that is
perhaps because Hemingway is, first and foremost, a modernist writer.
The modernists, heavily affected by the tragedy and destruction of the early
twentieth century, sought to deviate completely from tradition—meaning traditional literary forms, traditional themes, and traditional morality—in order
to properly convey the senselessness of their war-torn world. And Hemingway’s
writing, overall, embodies these modern attitudes. He writes about war, depression, dysfunctional relationships, and former soldiers whose horrifying, in
some cases life-damaging experiences continue to haunt them for a lifetime. In
this context, then, it is simple to see how transcendentalism could resurface at
this time, and why it would not be the same as it was originally.
Emerson’s claim that “the reason why the world lacks unity, and lies broken
and in heaps, is because man is disunited with himself,” seems to have struck a
chord with Hemingway (44). He saw a world falling apart just as Emerson saw
a nation falling apart, and believed, like him, that there was only one way for
people to come to their senses and transcend, only one place where rebirth and
renewal could occur after what had happened in the world. And the answer was
nature. Like Nick, war-torn and traumatized, the world could go back to the
forests, back to the wilderness and heal. Though it would be forever changed,
Hemingway believed, as Emerson did, that those who sought out nature would
“enter without more wonder than the blind man feels who is gradually restored
to perfect sight” (46). The realities of the changing world were frightening, but
through his neo-transcendentalism Hemingway shows he believed that healing was possible, balance could be restored, and hope still flowed from the
same springs where his forefathers had found it.
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Forum Prompt

Faith at the Crisis
Point:

Exploring the Intersection of Religion and
Literature
Laura Dabundo
Kennesaw State University

Now faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen.
Hebrews 11.1

Religion and literature frequently intersect,
whether a scripture is scrutinized as a literary text or a seemingly secular work
suddenly reveals religious undertones or currents coursing through it. In either
case, the connections can be profound and consequential for the interpretation of the work. In consideration of the second instance, let us look at three
examples from contemporary short fiction in which a character’s turn to faith
at the story’s climax inflects the story’s meaning.
First, we look at Philip Roth’s “The Conversion of the Jews”: “Ozzie made
everybody say it. And then he made them all say they believed in Jesus Christ—
first one at a time, then all together” (204). What is astonishing about this event,
coming very near the end of this story, is that Ozzie is an adolescent Jew, speaking from a rooftop to a largely Jewish crowd assembled several stories beneath
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him. Ozzie has fled to the roof of a synagogue after he and the rabbi have had
one too many quarrels in Hebrew class concerning the divine. On the ground
below, firemen, the rabbi, Ozzie’s mother, and his friends try desperately to
persuade the boy to jump safely into a net rather than directly to the pavement. Ozzie makes his demands, and the largely Jewish assembly beneath him
complies.
Second, we compare the experience in Roth’s story to this extract from
Wendell Berry’s “Pray without Ceasing”: A woman, inexplicably widowed as a
result of a murder in broad daylight in the middle of a busy village street, suddenly says to someone who does not know what to say to her, “‘It’ll come by
surprise, . . . It’s a time appointed, but we’ll not be notified. . . . So we must
always be ready, . . . Pray without ceasing’” (69). Her grief, if not assuaged, is
nonetheless on some level subsumed into a powerful faith, which the author
then assigns as the title of the story, in the same way that the singular event at
the close of Roth’s story provides its designation.
And last, for now at least, we can add to the mix a passage from “God’s
World” by Egyptian Nobel laureate Najib Mahfuz in which a fifty-five-year-old
messenger, Ibrahim, absconds from his dismal life and job with the monthly
payroll and heads for the beach and a sultry mistress. She tries to steal from him.
In despair and without forethought, he enters a mosque and prays, “‘The world
is after me merely because I love you; does that please you? Among millions of
people, I feel so alone, it almost kills me; does that please you?’” Interrupted
by a detective who demands the reason for his actions: “‘God. . .’ he muttered
with a smile and then raised his finger up to the sky” (160). God has not been an
evident actor in this story up until now. However, Ibrahim’s call to God seems
to transform everything—Ibrahim himself, his world, and his story. We shall
return to this point.
What do these three short stories share? In the second and third examples,
there have been no issues, motifs, discussions, or topics of religion until the
stories’ conclusions. In the first, the talk in the Hebrew School has been purely
intellectual without emotional content up until the rooftop experience. Thus,
in all three stories, at moments of crisis or points of climax driven by violence,
death, or judgment, in three different religious cultures, the characters claim
faith as they find themselves poised on a brink.
The Letter to the Hebrews in the Christian New Testament is the only book
of the Judeo-Christian canon that defines faith. But that definition, quoted as
the epigraph above, takes away as much as it gives with its language of assurance
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and conviction yoked to concepts of anticipation and absence, rather than evidence and presence. It challenges belief in what is not at hand while literature,
generally understood, depends upon the tangible, the substantial, and the
extant. Literature may stray into fantasy, approach the supernatural, or enter
the future, but readers will stay with it, suspending their native disbelief, as
long as the anchors to their worlds have been established and can be returned
to. So what is it in literary presentations that might enable, might underpin,
might warrant what has come to be called a leap of faith? What explains this
jump across the abyss of nothingness to find meaning via a belief, an acceptance in the divine, which these three stories so unexpectedly reveal? And if
the literature does make that leap, then what does that do to the text? Finding
faith and discovering belief in secular texts has become an increasingly topical
enterprise in contemporary scholarship. For instance, a reviewer in Christianity
and Literature made this comment about a newly published book called The
Gospel According to Shakespeare (U of Notre Dame P, 2013) by Piero Boitani:
“Boitani . . . sees in Lear’s story a resurrection when he wakes from a healing
sleep and realizes he has been reunited with Cordelia; Shakespeare has brought
‘Lear back to life, purified and accepting his newfound existence’” (289). Here,
as with the short fiction, the end of the play proves a religious turning point for
the protagonist and suddenly becomes redemptive.
Similarly, with respect to Region, Religion and English Renaissance Literature
(Ashgate, 2013), edited by David Coleman, another Christianity and Literature
reviewer observes that “what emerges is a view of culture that does not overlook
the simultaneously binding and separating influences of geology, and presents
to our understanding an archipelago of identities held centripetally together
by lines of continuity between cultures, religions, and histories, even as differences threaten to whirl them centrifugally apart” (136). Here, authors such
as Spenser, Middleton, Webster, and others illustrate crises following religious
conflicts between Protestants and Roman Catholics in Ireland, Calvinists and
Anglicans in England. And, once again, faith follows these challenges.
Finally, let me bring forth another recent example of this trend: William
Wordsworth and the Theology of Poverty, which I reviewed for Christianity and
Literature. In this book, Heidi Snow illuminates Wordsworth’s poetry through
lenses tinted by contemporary Evangelical, Methodist, and Quaker beliefs
not previously identified in the poems under consideration but for which
Snow argues that indigence becomes the crucible of faith. Via destitution, the
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meaning of the poetry, according to Snow, is made clear in ways influenced by
one of these dissenting Protestant denominations of the poet’s time.
The redemption and the transformation that I noted above is what these
conversions or acknowledgments of faith do to the characters and to the
texts, by this line of interpretation. That is, according to this way of reading
literature, a religious epiphany changes the seemingly secular drift of the narrative. In other words, Roth’s, Berry’s, and Mahfuz’s stories, like the works of
Wordsworth, Shakespeare, and other Early Modern writers, find and show their
meanings from a religious angle which suddenly becomes the hinge of the narrative. Thus, it may be possible to go back to the opening of the texts and read
closely throughout to find anticipations and foreshadowings of this motif of
transformation that we might have largely overlooked in our first readings.
We invite readers of Criterion to submit papers to this forum that deal with
literature and religion in a broad and in a specific sense. That is, considering
this topic broadly, writers might reflect the ways that scriptural texts can be
considered as literature; how does religion therefore become literary? What
does looking at a religious text as literature tell readers about its meaning? Are
there specific points in the chosen text of scripture that function according
to literary principles—theme, characterization, plot, setting, and so on—that
significantly affect the way the text is read religiously? Or, more specifically,
readers might also locate similar watershed moments in works of literature
that are not necessarily religiously oriented, at least to begin with, and consider
what it means for the characters and for the works themselves when a character
experiences a crisis that becomes a moment of faith. How does that change the
nature of the work? How does that become its meaning? How does the writer
accomplish these transactions? Are they unexpected? Are they credible? What
do they mean? How do they differ with different varieties of religion? And if
these characters find belief, then their worlds find their meaning. Do readers
of Criterion agree?

86

Winter 2016

Works Cited

Berry, Wendell. “Pray without Ceasing.” Listening for God, vol. 3. Ed. Paula J. Carlson and
Peter S. Hawkins. Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 2000. 40–71. Print.

The Holy Bible. NRSV. New York: Oxford UP, 1989. Print.
Johnson, Kimberly. “Rev. of Region, Religion and English Renaissance Literature,” ed.
David Coleman. Christianity and Literature 64.1 (2014): 133–36. Print.
Mahfuz, Najib. “God’s World.” A Celestial Omnibus: Short Fiction on Faith. Ed. J. P.
Maney and Tom Hazuka. Boston: Beacon P, 1997. 150–60. Print.
Roth, Philip. “The Conversion of the Jews.” The Penguin Book of Jewish Short Stories. Ed.
Emanuel Litvinoff. New York: Penguin, 1979. 189–205. Print.
Snow, Heidi J. William Wordsworth and the Theology of Poverty. Burlington: Ashgate,
2013. Print.
Stephenson, Mimosa. “Rev. of The Gospel According to Shakespeare by Piero
Boitani.”Christianity and Literature 63.2 (2014): 288–91. Print.

87

Conflicting Roles of
the Speaker and the
Divine in the Holy
Sonnets
Annette Challis

But swear by thyself, that at my death thy Son
Shall shine as he shines now, and heretofore;
And, having done that, thou hast done;
I fear no more.
—John Donne, “A Hymn to God the Father”

Scholars argue that this poem was written
either in 1623 when Donne contracted a dangerous fever or in 1630 on his deathbed. With Judgment imminent, Donne portrays himself as a humble son calling out to a divine Father for reassurance that grace will absolve him of his sins.
The final line “I fear no more” expresses that he does receive reassurance (18).
However, such confidence is not present in the Holy Sonnets. In two of these
sonnets, “Since she whom I loved” and “Oh, to vex me,” Donne portrays himself
as the secular lover of God, rather than a son. Likely written around the time of
his wife’s death in 1617, these sonnets do not have assurance and absolution but
rather confusion and frustration. They compare the speaker’s insincere desire
for God to a Lover’s narcissistic desire, which is typical in Petrarchan sonnets.
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Scholars typically place the speaker in the role of Lover, with God as the
unattainable Beloved. While the speaker’s musings in the Holy Sonnets align
with some Petrarchan conventions, they deviate in crucial ways that transform
the role of the speaker. Because of the speaker’s infidelity, he proves to be no
Lover at all; in reality, God’s complete devotion makes Him the true Lover, and
the speaker becomes the adulterous, unattainable Beloved. Reversing the traditional role of the speaker reveals his fallen nature and his need for God’s grace,
demonstrating the interdependency of human and divine love; God needs the
speaker’s sin and adultery because only with sin and adultery will the speaker
need God’s grace. While this relationship establishes a need for Christ’s grace,
it falls short of cultivating true repentance because the role of the speaker as
the unattainable Beloved inherently denies union with God and misplaces God
as an equal partner rather than the Creator. The sins and adulteries preventing
contrition established in these sonnets can only be resolved when Donne takes
his rightful place as son of God in “Hymn to God the Father.” While the sonnets
embody the fallen nature necessary to create a need for Christ, Donne’s deathbed poem embodies the transcendence of that nature as he fills his role as son
to a Divine Father.

I. Petrarchan Love in the Holy Sonnets

The Holy Sonnets are connected to the Petrarchan lyrical tradition through
their rhyme scheme and fourteen-line structure composed of an octave and
sestet. Petrarchan conventions mandate that the speaker of a sonnet be the
Lover; however, Donne reverses this expectation in “Since she whom I loved”
and “Oh, to vex me.” In these sonnets, the speaker’s infidelity makes him the
unattainable Beloved of God, and God’s devotion makes Him the true Lover.
The speaker’s secular view of Divinity reveals his fallen nature and his profound
need for God’s grace.
In “Since she whom I loved,” the speaker views God in an erotic lens by
literalizing the biblical metaphor of Christ as husband and the church or
individual as the bride. The sonnet begins with an apostrophe as the speaker
laments the death of his Beloved, who is often interpreted to be Donne’s wife,
Anne More (1–4). Desiring a woman who is made unattainable by death is traditional in Petrarchan sonnets, but this desire is unconventionally transferred
to God in line six as the speaker “seek[s] thee God.” Even though the structures
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and metaphors of Petrarchan poetry are present, the speaker fails to express
the musings of devotion that characterize the role of Lover, and he ultimately
becomes the Beloved. The speaker expresses his adulteries, exposing his need
for Christ and the mutual dependency of human and divine love.
Donne deviates from Petrarchan conventions because the unattainable lady
(God) reciprocates and transcends the speaker’s love and ultimately becomes a
more appropriate Lover than the speaker. God is unlike the Petrarchan Beloved
because He offers His “all” (“Since she” 10). He is more accurately the Lover
because of the “tender jealousy” He develops when His Beloved is unfaithful to
Him (13). God is responding to the Beloved’s adultery not in anger or abandonment but in jealousy that is “tender” and loving. It is God, not the speaker, who
is jealously trying to woo the Beloved. God unsuccessfully “woos [the speaker’s]
soul” just as a Petrarchan Lover tries to woo the Beloved (10). By reversing
Petrarchan expectations, Donne affirms the sharp contrast between conventional Petrarchan love and the complete, perfect love of God. The speaker is
certain that God offers His “all,” and it is the speaker’s lack of devotion that is
preventing their union. God even surpasses Petrarchan love as He offers true
devotion. He is not just a secular Petrarchan Lover, but the true, perfect Lover
who will never abandon His unreachable Beloved.
The speaker proves to be an inadequate Lover as he takes on the role as
Christ’s adulterous bride. His adultery ultimately makes him the unattainable
Beloved. While the church is metaphorically depicted as the bride of Christ in
the New Testament, Donne “disregard[s] the corporate bridal church in favor
of the individual bridal soul” (Johnson 35). Donne views each individual as
Christ’s spouse, married through communion. In the sestet of “Since she whom
I loved” the speaker becomes the bride, though an adulterous one. The Lover
should be captivated with his Beloved, but he is completely unsatisfied and
adulterous to his spouse. The speaker laments that though his God has given
His “all” (“Since she” 10), he continues to have a “thirsty dropsy” (8) and to “beg
more love” (9), suggesting infidelity as the speaker thirsts for love outside of his
relationship with God. He tries to satisfy his thirst through his “love to saints
and angels” (12). He is seeking for love in other places and repeatedly expresses
his infidelity. He even warns God of the possibility that the “devil put thee out”
(14). The speaker is not only unfaithful to God but is cavorting with His enemy.
His love for the devil, or sin, has the potential to extinguish his love of God.
Donne goes beyond insincerity by making the speaker entirely doubtful and
adulterous. The speaker is not just insincere or reluctant but betrays his spouse,
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undermining his role as Lover. Because of his lack of devotion and adultery, the
speaker is not the Lover but actually the Beloved of the true Lover, God.
This adultery against God is turned specifically to Donne’s wife, revealing
the communion of human and divine love. Although “Since she whom I loved”
offers a sharp contrast between human and divine love, the speaker ironically
claims that these two kinds of love are derived from the same source. As Donne
laments his wife’s death, he claims that his secular love for her set his mind on
“heavenly things” (4). He claims, “Here the admiring her my mind did whet / To
seek thee God; so streams do show the head” (5–6). His love for his wife has led
him to search for God, proving that both streams of love have the same source.
His secular love for Anne has actually inspired his love for the divine. Line two
contains a pun where the speaker states that his “good is dead,” similar in sound
to “God is dead.” The death of his wife is entwined with the death of goodness
and the death of God. Donne’s love for God derives from and is dependent on
the secular love for his wife as God dies along with her. However, it also can be
interpreted to indicate that his wife actually was his goodness and his God. As
she dies, the speaker’s “good” and “God” dies, making her an idol of worship.
The speaker laments that he “beg[s] more love,” which is likely a pun on his
wife’s name, reinforcing that his love for Anne More is adultery against God (9).
Donne’s love for his wife is simultaneously necessary for devotion to God and
adultery against God. Secular love at the same time inspires and hinders divine
love, forming a paradox.
This paradox that human love simultaneously hinders and enables divine
love can be resolved through examining the interdependency of human and
divine love. Lindsay Mann argues that Donne’s expression of the corruption of
natural and physical is “simply an insistence on the effects of the Fall and sin;
but the point of this insistence is that these effects can and must be offset to
a degree by grace” (535). Donne employs Petrarchan conventions not to suggest that love of God is like erotic love, but rather to acknowledge the fallen
nature of humankind, he embodies in verse the need for redemption. Because
of the Fall, man cannot embrace divine love; therefore, he must understand
God through secular love. The speaker’s “human love can realistically lead to
and participate in divine love, despite human limits and fallings” (Mann 546).
Thus human love is not in opposition to divine love, but rather is a preparatory love. The Holy Sonnets do not offer a speaker who has overcome his fallen
nature; they expose that fallen nature. God uses “men’s imperfections to draw
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them to him” (Mann 537). Human love hinders divine love because it leads to
the adulteries, yet it is those adulteries that create a need for atonement.
The fallen nature of man and need for grace is also prevalent in “Oh, to
vex me,” as the speaker again uses the secular love of Petrarchism to frame his
relationship with God. In this sonnet, his adultery is described as “inconstancy,”
and he himself becomes another person who is in competition with God; he
loves himself too much to recognize his nothingness and dependence on the
Divine. This sonnet affirms the complete selfless love of God and the perpetual
unattainability of the selfish Beloved. The secular relationship fails to inspire
true repentance in the speaker, revealing its inadequacies.
The speaker in “Oh, to vex me” tries to resolve the paradox in which his
inconstancy inspires constancy in God, and this inconstancy ultimately shows
that he is not the devoted Lover, but the adulterous Beloved. In the octave,
Donne presents inconstancy as the Beloved’s defining characteristic as he
expresses repeatedly the “contraries” that “meet in one” (“vex me” 1). His devotion, love, temperature, and voice are all described as conflicting. His contrition and his love are “humorous” (5), which in Donne’s time meant “changing”
(“humorous,” def. 3a). The speaker is repeatedly described as inconstant until
it becomes his sole characteristic. This list of contradictions conclude with “as
infinite, as none” demonstrating how his entire being is a paradox (8). The
speaker does not express devotion to God but rather inconstancy. The Beloved
is obsessed with his own paradoxes and is enamored with his own image.
Donne intensifies the narcissism that is conventional to Petrarchan poetry
to undo the speaker’s role as Lover and reveal his true role as Beloved. Rather
than declaring an adulterous affair with his wife, angels, and the devil as he
does in “Since she whom I loved,” Donne suggests that love of self competes
with love of God. There is no mention of God in the octave, and there is little
characterization of Him other than how He affects the speaker throughout the
rest of the poem. A Petrarchan Lover should be “wholly enamored with the
image of the Beloved,” yet the speaker offers little description of God (Kuchar
543). The image he is enamored with is his own. Gary Kuchar rightly points out
that narcissism is typical to Petrarchan sonnets (537); however, Donne goes
beyond narcissism. He is not narcissistically expressing devotion to the Beloved
but rather narcissistically expressing his own unattainability.
The switch in focus indicates that he is not the conventional Lover but
rather the Beloved. His narcissism prevents him from repenting and makes
him unattainable to God, as the Petrarchan Beloved should be. Kuchar argues,
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“The speaker wants to express full contrition for his sins . . . at the same time
as he experiences terror over the narcissistically traumatic insight that such
contrition entails” (537). He is willing to admit that he is inadequate but is
reluctant to admit that he is nothing without God. The speaker tries to make
himself equal with God by viewing God as a secular lover and cannot admit his
dependency on God; consequentially, he cannot transcend his fallen nature.
Donne emphasizes this reluctance with the phrase “as infinite, as none” (“vex
me” 8). He is as infinite as he is nothing. The Beloved wants to repent and fully
love God, but he does not want to recognize that he is nothing. God responds to
this reluctance with constancy as the speaker struggles to understand how the
Lover can accept such infidelity.
Petrarchan lovesickness is traditionally caused by a woman’s refusal or
inability to reciprocate love; however, in “Oh, to vex me” it is caused by God’s
constant love. The first phrase, “oh, to vex me,” initiates this tone of lamentation and suffering. “Oh” connotes a sort of dejected sigh, while “vex” indicates
that the speaker is frustrated or worried. The speaker immediately makes it very
clear that he is deeply concerned with his lack of faith: his fallen nature causes
him to suffer.
The personification of inconstancy that follows suggests that he is even
disturbed. “Inconstancy unnaturally hath begot / A constant habit” (2–3). This
personification of inconstancy indicates that the speaker is constantly inconstant, and his habit of inconstancy is a disturbing, unnatural child born out of
paradox. This emphasizes the disturbing effects of the speaker’s fallen nature.
The personification also insinuates that the speaker’s inconstancy has born
constancy in God. Because the speaker has a fallen, inconstant nature, he has
a constant need for God’s grace. In God’s selflessness, He consistently offers it.
Just as Petrarchan sonnets demand, the speaker suffers greatly because of his
love affair; however, it is the speaker’s unattainability that causes the suffering.
Despite the narcissism, adultery and insincerity, God still loves His Beloved.
Further, Kimberly Johnson claims that God loves the Beloved because of his
inadequacies (37). God’s constancy is born out of the speaker’s inconstancy,
implying that the speaker’s sins and adulteries are actually the mother or creator of God’s perfect devotion. God’s divine love is dependent on the imperfect
secular love of the speaker. The final two lines of “Oh, to vex me” portray this
paradoxical need for inconstancy. The Beloved claims, “Those are my best days,
when I shake with fear” (14). Initially, it appears ironic that his best days would
be those where his “fantastic ague” is so severe that he shakes (13). However, this
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shaking is connected to the earlier phrase in line eleven where he “quakes with
true fear of his rod,” alluding to Isaiah 11:4, where God in His wrath will “smite
the earth with the rod of His mouth . . . and slay the wicked.” The shaking with
fear means that the speaker is sick with inconstancy, creating a need for God,
and he is shaking with fear of His rod, suggesting the potential for repentance.
This process of repentance confirms that human and divine nature “depend
mutually on each other for their ultimate fulfillment” (Mann 536). God needs
the speaker’s inconstancy because it will require His constant outpouring of
grace. While this inconstancy serves to create a need for God, it ultimately fails
to inspire true repentance.
The process of repentance is compared to a process of refining steel
that has gone awry, showing how elusive the Beloved’s repentance is. The
speaker describes his love as “riddlingly distempered, cold and hot” (“vex me”
7). “Distempered” refers to an illness, paralleling the “fantastic ague” simile
(13). In addition, it alludes to the tempering process used to strengthen steel.
Tempering is when steel is subjected to extreme heat followed by extreme cold,
increasing the toughness. Distemper would be when this process goes awry
(“distempered,” def. 6). This alternate meaning is reinforced as the word “distempered” is immediately followed by “cold and hot” (“vex me,” 7). The hot and
cold caused by the fever is compared with the hot and cold process of strengthening steel. This process of inconstancy and repentance is meant to strengthen
the Beloved like a tempering process strengthens steel, but it has gone amiss,
and he is left “distempered.” He is not strengthened but is sick. The final line
declares that his best days are the days in which he is the most sick because it
is that sickness that strengthens his relationship with God. However, because
this strengthening process is awry, this resolution fails, and the Beloved continues to be unattainable to God. The Beloved remains in a perpetual cycle of
insincerity and adultery where he attempts full contrition, refuses to admit his
dependency on God, and fails.
The adulterous bridal trope and Petrarchan structures in “Since she whom
I loved” and “Oh, to vex me” express the interdependency of human and divine
love. It is the adultery of the bride that makes her an ideal spouse for Christ
because without that uncleanness, “the soul would have no need of the marriage”
(Johnson 38). This marriage shows a sharp comparison between the speaker’s
secular love and God’s divine love, though both kinds of love ultimately need
each other for their fulfillment. The speaker’s love is selfish because he loves
God only because God can provide him salvation. God is merely a mistress he
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needs for redemption. This is why he is wholly enamored with his own image
rather than God’s. God—the true Lover—takes no thought for His own advantages but loves so that His Beloved can achieve salvation. God marries the
speaker not because He benefits, but solely because the speaker benefits. He
views His Beloved as a cherished bride that He will never abandon. Donne presents us with a God whose love is completely selfless and incomprehensible to
the speaker. The Lover offers devotion and love as he tries to refine his Beloved
like a blacksmith refines steel; however, the Beloved refuses to submit. The
Beloved remains the unattainable desire of a jealous God.
In these two sonnets, the failure of the speaker to fully repent is the result
of a fundamental flaw in his view of God. His fallen nature limits him to viewing God in a secular relationship. This relationship places the speaker and God
on equal footing. He tries to fit God into the role of a secular lover, but God’s
selflessness makes it impossible. God does not behave the way a secular lover
should, making the marriage metaphor an inaccurate representation of His
relationship with the speaker. This misrepresentation results is a string of confusing paradoxes as the speaker tries to fit God into his secular frame, calling
attention to the absurdity of viewing God as a secular lover. While the secular
view of God does create a need for His grace, ultimately, such a view prevents
the speaker from recognizing his nothingness and repenting. The speaker cannot reconcile himself with God until he abandons this mindset and recognizes
his dependency.
The mixed metaphors and convoluted nature of the speaker’s relationship with God show how human love and divine love have continuity. He fills
the role of Lover because of Petrarchan structures but proves to actually be
the Beloved because of his unattainable contrition. This interchangeability
between the speaker and God shows continuity between their two kinds of
Love. The speaker’s adulteries with his wife, the devil, and himself both hinder
and enable divine love. The sonnets embody mankind’s fallen nature and the
profound need for grace. The speaker’s relationship with God is not resolved in
the Holy Sonnets because of the crucial flaw in viewing God as a secular lover.
God is not an equal partner to the speaker but rather the Divine Creator on
which the speaker is dependent. Only in completely reimagining the role of
God can this relationship be resolved. In “A Hymn to God the Father,” Donne
takes on his justified role as the son of the Divine Father.
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II. Filial Dependence Replaces the
Adulterous Marriage

In “A Hymn to God the Father,” Donne finally reconciles his relationship
with God as he takes his rightful place as son. The poem was written years after
the Holy Sonnets, likely in a time when Donne believed he was nearing death
and would soon meet God the Father (Pebworth 19). In this poem, the speaker
is no longer equal to God as an erotic lover but rather is dependent and subordinate to God as His son. The selfless nature of parenthood accurately parallels
the selfless love God has for the speaker. Donne’s view of God develops over
time until he expresses his role as son, a role that can foster true repentance.
Unlike the Holy Sonnets, each line is endstopped, creating a tone of absolution
and finality. Further, the Petrarchan sonnet structure is abandoned, suggesting
that the speaker is no longer limited to a secular view of God. Donne is finally
assured of his salvation and has true faith in God and His grace.
As a son, the speaker is no longer trying to make himself an equal, secular
lover of God but rather a son who is helpless without his Father. In this new
relationship, there is no room for the narcissism that prevented repentance in
the Holy Sonnets. The speaker has recognized that he is nothing without his
Father but everything to his Father. The paradoxes that vexed him in the sonnets now enable him to be redeemed. The Holy Sonnets reveal the speaker’s
fallen nature, and the speaker finally transcends his fallen nature in “A Hymn

to God the Father.” Donne is no longer unattainable in this new role because he
is willing to admit his nothingness.
Portraying himself as a son resolves the adulteries established in the Holy
Sonnets. Though he expresses that he still has sins, he no longer refers to them
as “adulteries” or “inconstancies” as he did in the sonnets. This new view of sin
expels its power to prevent devotion to God and instead allows repentance. As
an adulterous bride, the speaker was betraying his spouse. The adultery caused
a divide between the speaker and God. As a son, the speaker is now repentant and pleading for forgiveness. This sin will not cause a divide between the
speaker and God but ultimately bring them closer as God selflessly offers grace
to His son.
As a son, Donne’s love for his wife is not in competition with God. He ends
the first two stanzas saying that God “hast not done, / For, I have more,” a
phrase with dual meanings: it expresses that God’s grace is not done because
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he has “more” sins, and David Leigh argues that it is a pun on his and his wife’s
name, More (Leigh 90). In other words, God does not have Donne because he
has his wife, “more.” Just as “She whom I loved” insinuated, Donne’s wife seems
to be preventing Donne’s full devotion to God. However, in the final stanza the
speaker says “thou hast done; / I fear no more.” Donne does not repeat that
he “has no more”; this would mean that he has let go of Anne More in order
to devote himself to God. Rather, he no longer fears that his love for Anne will
compete with God. As a son rather than Lover, he can reconcile his love for
his wife with his love for God. He does not fear sin because he is now humble
enough to repent and does not fear Anne because his new role as son removes
competition. Donne no longer has the “fear” that shook him in his sonnet “Oh,
to vex me.” He has overcome his inconstancy and now is confident in the grace
of God.
This confidence is expressed in line sixteen when the speaker states, “Thy
son / Shall shine as he shines now.” This phrase also has duality in meaning:
it conveys that he wants Christ’s grace to continue to absolve him in the next
life just as it does now; in addition, Donne is also implicitly a son because this
poem is an apostrophe to the “Father.” Donne is pleading that he himself will
shine in the next life as he does in this life. He does not fear sin, for he will shine
in repentance in the next life, and he will not fear Anne More, for his love for
her will shine in coexistence with divine love. The speaker’s final role as a son
calling out for forgiveness from his Father allows him to finally transcend his
fallen nature and realize the true potential of secular love, as it is fulfilled in
unity with the divine.
“A Hymn to God the Father” and the two Holy Sonnets show that overcoming the Fall is a process of recognition and repentance. “Since she whom
I loved” and “Oh, to vex me” use Petrarchan conventions and the adulterous
bride metaphor to expose the speaker’s fallen nature. The two Holy Sonnets call
attention to the absurdity in viewing God as a spouse and its failure to inspire
repentance. They establish the speaker’s need for grace and his nothingness
without God. The speaker’s repentance is finally attained as he abandons the
Petrarchan approach to God and accepts his rightful place as son.
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Appendix
Holy Sonnets
17.
Since she whom I loved hath paid her last debt
To nature, and to hers, and my good is dead,
And her soul early into heaven ravished,
Wholly in heavenly things my mind is set.
Here the admiring her my mind did whet
To seek thee God; so streams do show the head;
But though I have found thee’and thou my thirst hast fed,
A holy thirsty dropsy melts me yet.
But why should I beg more love, when as thou
Dost woo my soul, for hers off’ring all thine,
And dost not only fear lest I allow
My love to saints and angels, things divine,
But in thy tender jealousy dost doubt
Lest the world, flesh, yea, devil put thee out.

19.
Oh, to vex me, contraries meet in one:
Inconstancy unnaturally hath begot
A constant habit; that when I would not
I change in vows, and in devotion.
As humorous is my contrition
As my profane love, and as soon forgot:
As riddlingly distempered, cold and hot,
As praying, as mute; as infinite, as none.
I durst not view heaven yesterday; and today
In prayers, and flattering speeches I court God:
Tomorrow I quake with true fear of his rod.
So my devout fits come and go away
Like a fantastic ague: save that here
Those are my best days, when I shake with fear.
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A Hymn to God the Father
Wilt Thou forgive that sin where I begun,
Which was my sin, though it were done before?
Wilt Thou forgive that sin, through which I run,
And do run still: though still I do deplore?
When Thou hast done, Thou hast not done,
For, I have more.
Wilt Thou forgive that sin which I have won
Others to sin? and, made my sin their door?
Wilt Thou forgive that sin which I did shun
A year or two: but wallowed in a score?
When Thou hast done, Thou hast not done,
For I have more.
I have a sin of fear, that when I have spun
My last thread, I shall perish on the shore;
But swear by Thyself, that at my death thy Son
Shall shine as He shines now, and heretofore;
And, having done that, Thou hast done;
I fear no more.
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Flannery O’Connor’s
Protestant Grace
Emily Strong

The fact that Flannery O’Connor was a Catholic
is obvious. Although she lived in a predominately Protestant society, she made
her faith and intentions clear, and very few scholars have dared to question it.
“Flannery O’Connor was something of an anomaly,” writes critic Jessica Riedmueller from The Philological Review, explaining O’Connor’s unique religious
situation, “a Catholic, living in Georgia and writing about her Fundamentalist Protestant neighbors. Writing mostly during the 1950s, when Catholicism
struggled to survive among the Southern Protestant denominations, O’Connor
formed her fiction and her characters according to the teachings and dogmas of the Church” (23). However, the topic of debate that has been tossed
around by many scholars is her concept of grace. Even outside of the context
of O’Connor’s fiction, there exist numerous debates on how to define it, how it
works, and how it affects one’s personal life. While O’Connor professes to be a
stalwart Roman Catholic, some elements of the Protestant view of grace seem
to have seeped, perhaps intentionally, into her fiction, implying that she may
actually be less concerned with the exact doctrine than the general concept of
conversion itself.
In order to fully analyze O’Connor’s works from these perspectives, it is
necessary to understand the theology behind how Catholics and Protestants
understand grace, beginning with the Catholic’s individualistic version. Grace
is defined by the Catechisms of the Catholic Church as “the free and undeserved
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help that God gives us to respond to his call to become children of God, adoptive sons, partakers of the divine nature and of eternal life." Catholics view
grace as a favor from God offered freely to all men to save them from their fallen
state of sinful human nature. The Catechisms go on to say:
The fatherly action of God is first on his own initiative, and then follows man’s
free acting through his collaboration, so that the merit of good works is to be
attributed in the first place to the grace of God, then to the faithful. . . . Moved
by the Holy Spirit and by charity, we can then merit for ourselves and for others
the graces needed for our sanctification, for the increase of grace and charity,
and for the attainment of eternal life.

This states that, although any merit that man has is given from and attributed
to God, one still must act in “collaboration” with him to become one of the
“faithful” and to attain salvation. While the ability for anyone to attain grace is
a gift from God, effort to be righteous in this life—including ordinances such
as the sacraments—is required in order to receive grace’s full power. Both Protestants and Catholics believe that grace was made possible through the Atonement of Jesus Christ. However, they differ in their ideas of how or if we gain
spiritual merit to obtain grace and become saved.
According to Protestantism, the relationship between grace and man’s
merits on earth works more subjectively. While there are varying denominations within Protestantism itself—including Lutheran, Calvinist, and Arminian
interpretations—their core teachings insist that grace is a gift given from God to
those he sees fit to bestow it upon. Whether it be the predetermined “elect” or all
mankind, depending on which theological perspective one holds, man’s mortal
merits are inconsequential and even unnecessary when held in contrast to the
grace provided by Christ’s Atonement. Because people are unworthy creatures
compared to the divinity of God, nothing they do can truly earn them a spot in
Heaven; they can only attain eternal life through God’s will and mercy. All one
must do is have faith, believe in him, and hope that he is merciful (Robinson). A
simple explanation of this concept is provided by Dewey Wallace Jr. in his essay
on the history of predestination in Protestantism: “Redemption is entirely a
gift of God quite apart from human merit. . . . [T]he elect were chosen before
they did good works in order that they might do them” (203–204). In short, “the
elect” according to the Calvinist terminology—in modern Protestantism this
more often applies to all mankind—are already saved because of grace; mortals
only do good works as a form of gratitude for this salvation, not because those
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works would help them earn it. Interpretations from the Arminian denomination suggest that one can fall from grace if horrendous sins are committed, but
it is God alone who can save them, not their works here on earth. This concept
of grace being given and not earned is a foundational principle of all Protestant
denominations.
After considering these varying perspectives, one must ask: Where does
Flannery O’Connor’s concept of grace fit into all of this? Of course, generally
our first thoughts turn to the most common answer: Catholic—and this is not
an erroneous response. In fact, she would more than likely agree wholeheartedly. We see this spelled out by many O’Connor scholars, including Thelma
Shinn, who writes, “Man needs to be ‘struck’ by mercy; God must overpower
him. And man must reach God through an equal violence: ‘In a corrupt world,’
Miss O’Connor is saying, ‘redemption is possible only through an extreme act,
an act of absolute, irrevocable sacrifice’” (58). While she toys with the concept of grace through violence—an element of O’Connor’s fiction that is often
examined in academia—Shinn also illustrates O’Connor’s belief that man must
“sacrifice” (a form of worldly merit) in order to fully receive God’s grace. This
implies that the Lord requires effort on man’s part in order to be redeemed. A
violent act of God may first elicit this response, but it is up to the individual
person to respond to that act with their own righteous sacrifice.
This explanation of sudden conversion, however, becomes complicated
upon further doctrinal study. The very idea of being “struck” by grace can be
interpreted as distinctly Protestant. Grace through the lens of Protestantism
is seen as more of a one-time event. You either are saved or you are damned,
there is no gray area between the two. Catholicism, on the other hand, often
views grace as more of an ongoing process of conversion. In a critical article
published in the Flannery O’Connor Review, Critic Lorna Wiedmann points out
this discrepancy, explaining, “Such features as . . . the suddenness of conversion
are operative Protestant, rather than Catholic, norms, for the Catholic stance
features successive gradualism, rationalism, and cooperation in grace.” To be
“struck” by God’s mercy is almost like forcing that grace upon an individual
who has shown no signs of cooperation until that point. Granted, O’Connor
adds that “man must reach God through an equal violence,” implying that the
person must make a grand sacrifice in return in order for the working of grace
toward redemption to be complete. This, however, is cancelled out by the fact
that the very act of being struck by grace already takes away their agency to
make that necessary sacrifice; the sacrifice is already made for them, whether
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they like it or not. Is it truly a sacrifice worthy of salvation then? Or is it God
selectively choosing them to be saved by His own will, regardless of what they
have done to deserve it?
In O’Connor’s story “Greenleaf” we see this point illustrated through the
goring of Mrs. May by the bull, which symbolizes Christ seeking her out in
order to bring her to true conversion, according to most O’Connor scholars.
The bull continually shows up in her life, trespassing on her property, no matter how hard she tries to avoid it. Eventually the bull kills her, which O’Connor
uses as a symbol of Christ giving her a rude awakening to the wrongness of her
pretended worship. Her very life was sacrificed for the sake of being saved by
grace, and although there is debate as to whether or not she realized her mistakes and accepted that gift, one would venture to wonder if her choice even
mattered at that point. After all, she did not choose to die and willingly come to
Christ. From the Catholic viewpoint, she would have needed to perform an act
of true conversion in return before her time had come. If she actually was saved
it would have been simply because of her newfound moment of truth, demonstrating the Protestant “suddenness of conversion,” as Wiedmann puts it. The
fact that Christ had to come after her and strike her like a bull in order for grace
to save her suggests that all of her former good works she had previously performed, however superficial, would have meant nothing. In essence, that would
mean that God simply chose her to be saved regardless of her previous actions,
echoing the Protestant understanding of grace.
O’Connor’s “Revelation” also presents some notable Protestant themes
through Mrs. Turpin’s vision, which seemingly contradict the traditional
Catholic view. When she sees the vision of “a vast horde of souls [that] were
rumbling toward heaven,” she sees people from every class and type, including
“battalions of freaks and lunatics” (508). This image gives us the idea that all
who are believers will be saved, not just those who live in a certain way or do
certain things. In fact, those who Mrs. Turpin describes as having “always had
a little of everything and the God-given wit to use it right” (508), or in other
words those who had dedicated their lives and resources to attaining earthly
merit, bring up the rear in the procession toward heaven. In a Catholic view,
those people should have been leading the march. But this is not the case in
“Revelation”: all those who have faith in Christ no matter who they are or what
they did have been saved by grace.
Many of O’Connor’s works present this issue of how grace and merit correlate, shown through her archetypal “grotesque” characters (Drake). “The
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Lame Shall Enter First” is a great example of this. Sheppard dedicates his whole
life to being a good person and serving others, and Johnson is a selfish and
manipulative child who trashes people’s homes and wreaks havoc wherever he
goes. Ironically, the story ends with Johnson calling Sheppard a “big tin Jesus,”
claiming that “[t]he Devil has him in his power” (480), effectively leading to
Sheppard’s moment of striking truth and conversion. O’Connor often uses
unlikely characters such as Johnson, the Greenleafs, Mary Grace, etc., to bring
the main character to this point of spiritual realization. Flannery O’Connor
critic Robert Drake noticed this as well, stating, “Yet it is often those whom the
‘upright’ and ‘wholesome’ regard as grotesque become chosen vessels indeed.
. . . The real grotesques are the self-justified, the apparent grotesques may be
the blessed." Although Sheppard seemed to have been the better man initially,
it is soon apparent that he is intended to be the “real grotesque.” He attempts
to justify himself, like Drake suggests, by telling himself, “I have nothing to
reproach myself with” (481) repeatedly after Johnson’s accusations. Johnson
plays the part of the blessed “apparent grotesque,” which character-type Drake
goes on to describe as “a whole lot nearer the truth than the more ‘enlightened’
but godless intellectuals” (Drake) such a Sheppard.
Interestingly enough, while Johnson is supposed to be the character “nearer
to the truth,” his form of worship is far more comparable to the Protestant faith
than the Catholic faith that O’Connor supposedly intended Sheppard to convert to. Wiedmann highlights this problem by pointing out that “when Norton
insists that his (Norton’s) father is ‘good’ because he helps people, Johnson
retorts, ‘Good! . . . I don’t care if he’s good or not. He ain’t right!’ This is a
Protestant, not a Catholic, pronouncement: Luther, for example, had insisted
that ‘. . . asses would make it to heaven if good works were the key’ to salvation”
(Wiedmann). Clearly Johnson is more concerned with Sheppard’s faith than
with his works. Sheppard himself comes to the realization that “he had stuffed
his own emptiness with good works like a glutton” (O’Connor 461), implying
that all of his good works had profited him nothing because he didn’t have
faith in Christ. None of his earthly merits could save him. In another instance,
when Norton asks if his mother is in hell, Johnson promptly asks, “Did she
believe in Jesus?,” to which Norton responds that she did, and from this information Johnson concludes that “She’s saved” (462). He didn’t ask what Norton’s
mother had accomplished to deserve salvation. According to both Johnson and
the Protestant faith, all his mother needed to do was believe and she would
be saved. While it is doubtful that Johnson was intended to be a role model
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for Christians to take notes on, his character is used to bring Sheppard to the
Christian faith—but through Protestant principles, not Catholic.
If all of this evidence is there, then one must wonder: Why did O’Connor
allow Protestant themes to infiltrate her Catholic writing? Was it intentional
or accidental? O’Connor herself admits, “I won’t ever be able entirely to understand my own work or even my own motivations” (qtd. by Popova). However,
for someone who evidently is very knowledgeable about both Catholic and
Protestant doctrine, it seems improbable that she would have overlooked these
overlapping elements in her writing. Perhaps she wanted to appeal to diverse
audiences, highlight the discrepancies she sees in Protestantism, or even go
beyond the particularities of doctrine to address the deeper issue of false
conversion.
It is possible that she chose to use Protestant characters and teachings to
break past a barrier between her and her intended audience—namely Southern
Protestants. Because her message is supposed to be stalwartly Catholic, which
she was very outspoken about, many Protestant readers could potentially resist
her message. However, if she were to make subtle compromises in her theology,
she might be more successful in capturing their attention and helping them
relate to her writing. O’Connor is, in essence,
blending Southern Protestant culture with her Catholic faith. In the South,
‘A Catholic can’t write about a Catholic world because none exists so he has
to write about a Protestant one’ (qtd. in CW, “Letters 1954,” 921). O’Connor
shapes her fiction according to Catholic principles, but she populates it with
Protestant characters—a mixture that can be rather confusing to a reader unfamiliar with either Southern culture or Catholic theology. (Riedmueller 22)

Perhaps she blurred the lines between the Southern Protestant culture and her
Catholic theology, creating Protestant characters like Johnson, in order to bring
her fellow Southerners one step closer to her idea of true conversion.
Additionally, while it may seem apparent that O’Connor disapproved of
her Protestant neighbors’ religion, she could have been using foundational
Protestant themes to point out the wrongness and superficiality of their present-day worship. In a letter to Dr. T. R. Spivey, O’Connor writes, “The Catholic
finds it easier to understand the atheist than the Protestant, but easier to
love the Protestant than the atheist. The fact is though that the fundamental
Protestants, as far as doctrine goes, are closer to their traditional enemy, the
Church of Rome, than they are to the advanced elements of Protestantism”
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(qtd. in Heschman). She clearly is sympathetic toward the founding principles
of Protestantism. It is the modern form of Protestant worship that she detests,
which she expresses in another letter:
One of the effects of modern liberal Protestantism has been gradually to turn
religion into poetry and therapy, to make truth vaguer and vaguer and more
and more relative, to banish intellectual distinctions, to depend on feeling instead of thought, and gradually to come to believe that God has no power, that
he cannot communicate with us, cannot reveal himself to us, indeed has not
done so, and that religion is our own sweet invention. (qtd. in Niederauer)

The worshippers she truly condemns are those who are lukewarm in any religion, not just Protestants. While she may not have agreed with their doctrines,
most early Protestants were at least strong and active in their faith. The problem, according to O’Connor, is that many modern-day Protestants have abandoned their belief and made religion into “our own sweet invention.”
This idea of false or lukewarm conversion is presented in her literature
through her characters Mrs. May, Mrs. Turpin, and Sheppard. Mrs. May looks
down on Mrs. Greenleaf for rolling around in the dirt yelling Jesus’s name, but
in the end it is Mrs. May who needs grace because her faith was nonexistent.
She even describes herself as “a good Christian woman with a large respect for
religion, though she did not, of course, believe any of it was true” (O’Connor
316). Mrs. Turpin, although allegedly a pious Catholic woman, is in actuality a
hypocrite who cares more about worldly possessions than following Christ’s
example of love and compassion. Her judging attitude is distinctly anti-Christian, when one looks at it from the Bible’s description of a true, charitable disciple’s perspective. Sheppard blatantly refuses to believe in religion altogether,
even going as far as heatedly commanding Johnson to stop teaching Norton
about it at the dinner table. Johnson may not have been a devout Catholic, but
he was at least devout in his own belief in God, and that fact alone made him
superior to Sheppard, who didn’t believe at all. All three of these characters fit
the mold of those described in O’Connor’s letters who are lax in their faith, and
whom she expressly disapproved of.
As we see from these characters, the themes in O’Connor’s works are not
simply Protestant versus Catholic; the religious tension exists more accurately
between the converted and the faithless, no matter what faith that may be. In
Critical Essays on Flannery O’Connor, critic Marvin Friedman writes concerning O’Connor’s literature:
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For in each work, it is the impulse toward secular autonomy, the smug confidence that human nature is perfectible by its own efforts, that she sets out to
destroy . . . Again and again she creates a fiction in which a character attempts
to live autonomously, to define himself and his values, only to be jarred back to
what she calls “reality”—the recognition of helplessness in the face of contingency, and the need for absolute submission to the power of Christ. (120)

Friedman points out that O’Connor doesn’t limit her religious criticism to Protestants alone, she writes about all those who value secularism over God. Perhaps O’Connor included Protestant perspectives of grace because she was less
concerned with the exact doctrine as she was with the conversion itself. It may
not have mattered to her what idea of grace was used, as long as it brought the
unbeliever to the realization of their mistakes so they could accept Christ as
their Savior and live accordingly.
Flannery O’Connor may have been an outspoken and devout Roman
Catholic, which is undoubtedly true, but her writing is not completely onesided in its religious teachings. As we see from texts such as “Greenleaf,”
“Revelation,” and “The Lame Shall Enter First,” Protestant beliefs have crept into
her Catholic message, thus complicating the rigidly didactic purposes of her
literature. However, we must consider the idea that these inconsistencies in
doctrine were not accidental. Perhaps she wrote these texts to appeal to her
Protestant readers, recognizing that they would be more prone to persuasion
toward Catholicism if she made some subtle compromises between faiths in
her writing. It is also possible that O’Connor wasn’t quite as concerned with
the Catholic version of grace as she was with conversion through any means.
We cannot know for sure, but these questions must be considered when we talk
of her unique portrayal of grace. If we only interpret O’Connor through a strictly
Catholic lens, we may be limiting ourselves from seeing the bigger and more
complete picture of her grace.
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Carson’s Christianity
and Environmental
Crises
Andrew Wadsworth

In her book, Silent Spring, Rachel Carson masterfully address the urgent matter of “man’s assaults upon the environment”
through the “contamination of air, earth, rivers, and sea with dangerous and
even lethal materials” (20). Today, climate change and pollution are generally
seen as political issues. And although Carson does mention the government’s
neglect to properly monitor and regulate pollutants and poisons, she attempts
to paint environmental crises as more than just politics. Carson reminds readers that “man, however much he may like to pretend the contrary, is part of
nature” (231). Environmental crises transcend any single political party’s ideology. They are human crises. The apocalyptic consequences of pollution and
environmental neglect reach far beyond the scope of political debate. If man
destroys nature, he destroys himself. And while Carson’s ecology may appear
entirely secular, much of her writing resonates with Christian beliefs regarding
the sacred nature of life, man’s stewardship over the earth, and man’s relationship with his fellowman.
However, despite Carson’s attempts to depoliticize environmental issues,
crises such as climate change continue to be politically divisive today. Democrats
contest that they are “committed to curbing the effects of climate change,
protecting America’s natural resources, and ensuring the quality of our air,
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water, and land for future generations,” saying that “republicans, for the most
part, don’t believe climate change is man-made, or even exists” (Democratic).
Although Carson attempts to depoliticize the issue, her idea of nature appears
to be restricted to a solely secular view. That is to say, Carson primarily sees
nature through a scientific lens of cause and effect. She does not directly link
her claims with Christian beliefs. But why does linking environmentalism to
Christianity matter? It matters because “the United States remains home to
more Christians than any other country in the world” with “roughly seven-inten” Americans identifying “with some branch of the Christian faith” (Ritchey).
But the Christian community is more than simply a community of faith; it is
also a politically conservative community. In fact, “59 percent of self-identified
conservative Republicans” said they “don’t believe that climate change is happening,” and “70 percent” said “they don’t believe humans are responsible for
it”—verifying what democrats have claimed (Sola). As a result of secularizing
nature, the environmental movement remains victim to political debate, and
conservative Christians fail to see their duty in relation to the earth.
Many critics have analyzed Carson’s work, recognizing that “not only does
Silent Spring [mark] the moment of emergence of the modern environmental movement,” but it also established a “new form of environmental writing”
(Lockwood 124). However, while Carson succeeded in making ecology, “which
was an unfamiliar word” in her day, “one of the greatest causes of our time,”
critics have not addressed the circumstances which brought about Carson’s
failed attempt to depoliticize environmental issues (Waddell 17). They have not
addressed the factors that have caused her work and environmentalism as a
whole to appear secular. In other words, critics have completely disregarded any
notions that resonate with Christianity that Carson’s work may have.
The true secularization of the environmental movement was born from the
religious and societal upheaval of the ’60s, which has cast a bleak shadow over
environmentalism in the eyes of conservative Christians and which persists to
this day. Once individuals begin to see nature as a gift to all mankind, rather
than a resource to be mined and subdued, people will begin to see the abuse of
nature as a threat not only to themselves, but also their fellowman. Once man
begins to view the environment through a Christian lens, he will begin to see
himself not as a dominating force over nature, but as a steward entrusted with
its care. He will not see climate change as a political issue, but as a human issue,
repenting of the harm he has caused the earth.
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The secularization of ecology is not a consequence of Carson’s Silent
Spring: rather, the secular perception of ecology is a product of the age in which
it matured and garnered wide-spread awareness—the 1960s. Carson’s work
was the springboard from which environmentalism sprang into mainstream
consciousness. Her portrayal of man’s effect on the earth entered the public’s
subconscious, where it resonated with another major group of ’60s—the hippies. Timothy Leary, an unofficial leader of the hippie movement, famously
stated, “Hippies started the ecology movement” (Timothy). This notion still
persists today. Although Silent Spring is widely credited in academic spheres
with spurring the ecological revolution, the image of environmentalism is still
closely tied to hippie origins in much of the public’s view. It is easy to see why
her ideas resonated with hippies when Carson writes that “there are ways to .
. . preserve the forests and to save the fishes, too” (Carson 177). Although this
is a simplistic reading, these are the sorts of preservations for which hippies
passionately fought. And at the time, conservation of forest and oceans were
new ideas not yet clichéd by sitcoms and movies. Frustrated with the lack of
government initiative towards cleaning up the environment, hippies organized
protests against corporate polluters. Hippies “were the first to promote biodegradable products and the use of natural ingredients in everything from fabrics
to shampoo . . . [They] boycotted companies: [sic] whose products polluted
the environment, used animals for testing, were prowar [sic] or very reactionary; [sic] or manufactured dangerous chemicals or weapons” (Stone). When
the National Environmental Policy Act was enacted in 1970, the first Earth Day
was declared. This landmark event, involving twenty million people, raised
awareness about how humans were treating the planet and ways to mitigate
the impending dangers to the environment. This aligned hippies with the environmental movement and ecology. As a result, the environmental conversation
Carson began was both augmented and overshadowed by the noise of the hippie movement.
Because Carson’s ecology was inadvertently absorbed by the counterculture
hippie movement and its promotion of drugs and promiscuity (in addition to
conservation of the environment), a division between Christianity and environmentalism formed. Hippies took an overall more radical approach than Carson.
They, like Carson, believed in an “intricate web of life whose interwoven strands
lead from microbes to man”; however, in order to truly be connected to that “web
of life,” hippies promoted especially unchristian lifestyles (Carson 98). Timothy
Leary, a well-known and highly controversial psychologist-turned-hippie
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leader at the time, was once labeled “the most dangerous man in America” for
fiercely advocating psychedelic drugs in the ’60s (Mansnerus). He was the ultimate challenger of authority: terminated from his professorship at Harvard for
controversial drug experiments, arrested so often he saw the inside of twentynine different prisons world-wide, stood as an ally of the remnants of the Black
Panther Party exiled in Algeria. He and the thousands upon thousands of hippies who worshipped him championed drug culture and the sexual revolution.
Whereas Christianity teaches self-control, chastity, and adherence to God’s
commandments, hippie’s had a different slogan: “If it feels good, do it!” (Stone).
This meant loving “whomever you pleased, whenever you pleased, however you
pleased” (Stone). In turn, this free love philosophy “encouraged spontaneous
sexual activity and experimentation,”—including group sex, public sex, and
homosexuality—all “under the influence of drugs” (Stone). It was hard to conceive a system of beliefs that more directly opposed the teachings of traditional
Christianity. Because hippies promoted environmental reform in addition to
recreational drug use and sexual promiscuity, their radical voices polluted the
sphere in which Carson’s ecology operated. Her voice became guilty by association in the eyes of conservative Christians, and environmentalism became
outlandish in the eyes of conservatives.
Carson further secularizes nature by drawing on the rhetoric of World
War II and the Cold War era in an attempt to unite individuals and convey the
immediacy of the biocides’ dangers. Carson repeatedly refers to insecticides as
“artillery” or “weapons” and their usage as a display of “brute force,” an “assault,”
even a “holocaust” (303, 330, 26, 310). Spawned from the post–World War, Cold
War era in which she lived, Carson’s word choice succeeds in giving gravity
to her argument. The image of the holocaust, the mass genocide horror that
nearly annihilated an entire race of human beings, is especially powerful in
portraying the seriousness of biocide’s effect on living organisms. It suggests
we are unwittingly committing genocide not only against ourselves, but also
against nature itself. Additionally, Carson “deliberately employ[s] the rhetoric
of the Cold War . . . to persuade her readers” that the effects of the biocide
crisis on the environment are “analogous to the threat of radioactive fallout”
(Lear 428). Such imagery reminds readers that “we are dealing with life,” not
only plant and animal life, but human life as well. (Carson 354). By pairing
the imagery of World War II, the holocaust, and nuclear fallout with the biocides, Carson raises awareness to the battle taking place directly on American
soil—a battle of which the general public at the time was not even conscious.
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The battle was escalating and claiming many American lives. By drawing on
the rhetoric of World War II and the Cold War, Carson imbues readers with a
sense of patriotic duty, the responsibility to defend life and freedom. Her use
of war rhetoric serves not only to resonate with the conservatives who made up
much of the rural areas affected by biocides, but also liberals and everyone inbetween on the political spectrum. However, while war can unite citizens to set
aside political differences and support the cause of defending life and liberty, it
is also extremely divisive. Shortly after Silent Spring was published, the United
States saw an anti-war movement never before seen. The nation nearly tore
itself apart and the intended unification of Carson’s war rhetoric was lost in the
commotion.
The Vietnam war delivered the final blow to Carson’s attempt to depoliticize ecology and unite Americans in the cause to fight for the environment; the
war pitted liberal and conservative ideologies against each other in a vehement
tone, which still persists today. Believing the economic cost too high, many
Americans—conservative and liberal, Christian and non-Christian—pragmatically opposed amplifying the United State’s role in Vietnam. However, as the
war persisted, with no end in sight and countless American boys being sent
home in body bags, still more “admitted that involvement was a mistake, but
military defeat was unthinkable” (UShistory). Simultaneously, “most disapproved of the counterculture that had arisen alongside the antiwar movement”:
the “clean cut, well-dressed” individuals “who had tied their hopes to McCarthy”
and his promise of ending the war were “subordinated” by hippies as leaders
of the antiwar movement (Barringer 3). Part of the decree under which the
hippies protested was that “American planes wrought environmental damage
by dropping their defoliating chemicals” (UShistory). Soon, the once peaceful protests turned violent. No one likes war. As a consequence, conservative
Christians further distanced and distinguished themselves from any ideology
claimed by the hippies. Christians tended to see the struggle as regrettably
necessary in order preserve freedom. Those Christians who did openly oppose
the war took an approach similar to Gandhi, organizing a nationwide “fast for
peace” (History). But Carson’s ecology and the environmental movement to
which it gave birth had already fallen victim to the labeling of liberal ideology,
being largely rejected by Christian Conservatives. The Vietnam War polarized
liberals and democrats like never before, and “man’s assault upon the environment” with “lethal materials” continued to take on new shapes while politicians
bickered for votes, refusing to consider the opposing party’s views and efforts.
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Despite the many historical factors that have caused environmentalism to
remain a hotly contested political issue, much of what Carson writes resonates
deeply with Christian doctrine concerning the sanctity of life and our responsibility to our fellowman. Carson writes that “life is a miracle beyond our comprehension, and we should reverence it even where we have to struggle against it”
(331). Carson’s word choice, defining life as a miracle, paints a deeply religious
image. The notion of reverence is also innately imbued with religious connotations. Reverence is more than respect. To truly reverence the miracle that is
life implies acknowledging God and expressing appreciation for His creations.
Carson contests that humanity has forgotten the wondrous divinity that is inherent in life itself. People have desecrated life in their craving for shortcuts to solve
problems. Humans have tainted the very source of life on which they depend:
they have violated the earth. It is in this vein that Pope Francis echoed Carson,
saying: “We have forgotten that we ourselves are dust of the earth (cf. Gen 2:7);
our very bodies are made up of her elements, we breathe her air and we receive
life and refreshment from her waters” (Bergoglio). Viewing man’s relationship
to the earth and the life it supports through a Christian lens will not resonate
with all. But there can be no doubt that we as human beings depend upon the
earth’s elements: her air, water, and soil to sustain ourselves, to sustain life. The
notion of life’s sacred relationship with the earth resonates with individuals of
faith outside of the Christian sphere—Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists. Even
the atheist and agnostic recognize the wonder that is life. And life hinges on the
state of a wondrous planet. When individuals contaminate the earth, they also
inflict harm on their fellowman. Although Christianity teaches that men are to
love their neighbors as themselves and care for the poor, Pope Francis acknowledges that “the gravest effects of all attacks on the environment are suffered by
the poor” (Pope). If it is a Christian’s duty to succor the poor, in order to protect
the impoverished, it therefore becomes every Christian’s obligation to prevent
further environmental harm. Christians must broaden their view, learn to look
outside their immediate sphere of living, and recognize the far-reaching effects
of pollution and environmental damage. To reverence life is to recognize the
responsibility to not only persevere the earth for the benefit of oneself, but for
others as well—for friends and family, for future generations, for the poor, and
even for strangers.
To reverence life and the earth, Carson contests that one must shift his or
her perspective away from seeing oneself as a ruler over nature to recognizing
and fulfilling his or her role as a steward over the earth. Carson writes that “the
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‘control of nature’ is a phrase conceived in arrogance”—a sense of entitlement
born from the notion “that nature exists for the convenience of man” (355). By
acknowledging that nature was not created solely to serve mankind, Carson
connects ecology to Christianity. The question arises: for what purpose does
nature exist then, if it is not for man? The Bible teaches that man, God’s crowning creation, was given dominion over the earth. However, this does not imply
that nature was created for men to consume and use however they see fit. Man’s
dominion is the responsibility to govern. It is to look after the Earth as God
himself would—with love, patience, and wisdom. It is a righteous dominion.
Dominion is the responsibility of the Christian steward. Carson promotes “the
central concept of deep ecology, that humans are not central to the universe
of creatures; she preserved the concept of stewardship: what we as humans
brought about, we must correct as much as possible” (Waddell 122). God’s
design for human beings is for them to collaborate with Him in the work of creation, redemption, and sanctification. It is not too late for humanity to redeem
itself and the earth through its efforts. The fulfillment of this monumental
responsibility requires correcting the course, refocusing efforts on fulfilling the
mandate of stewardship.
Fulfilling one’s stewardship over the earth by viewing and responding to
environmental issues through the Christian lens of repentance offers more
hope for recovery than Carson conveys in Silent Spring. Carson believes that
the build-up of pollution in the environment “is for the most part irrecoverable”
and that “the chain of evil it initiates” in living organisms “is for the most part
irreversible” (26). But if the environmental damage has permanently been done
and the effects of our fathers’ sin will be passed on from generation to generation, then what is the point of trying to correct the course? The outlook seems
bleak. In Carson’s view, the compounded destruction of adding additional pollutants to the environment, and the effect that doing so would have on life, can
only be lessened. Conversely, Pope Francis calls on individuals all across the
globe to “repent of the ways we harmed the planet” (Bergoglio). The notion
of repentance is far more powerful than Carson’s prescription. Repentance is
more than simply ceasing to commit an act of sin. In the Bible, the concept of
repentance is derived from multiple words—the Hebrew verb “shuv, meaning
to return, and nacham, meaning to feel sorrow,” in combination with “the Greek
word, metanoia, connoting a ‘change of mind and heart’” (Taylor 54). With
these definitions, compounded together and applied to the earth, repentance
connotes a new way of thinking of man’s relationship to the environment. It
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connotes sincere attempts to repair the damage that has been done. It connotes
a struggle to return the earth to its former glory. True repentance requires the
examination of one’s life, the complete abandonment of prior practices, and
replacing them with good works. And once the mote is removed from one’s eye,
it is possible to see clearly how to help one’s fellowman, preaching with love and
patience what is practiced. Naysayers have always protested that the seemingly
impossible cannot be accomplished, only to be proven wrong by hardworking
men and women. To approach environmentalism through Christianity is to not
only abandon current harmful practices, but to truly regret and repair the damages done. By adopting a truly Christian view of the earth and the sacred life it
supports, striving to care for the poor affected by pollutions, and practicing the
principles of repentance, political barriers preventing progress and healing can
be overcome.
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The Pastor’s Theology
of Uncertainty in Lila
Ben Lehnardt

In Lila, Marilynne Robinson characterizes
preacher John Ames with hesitation and uncertainty, traits that seem contrary
to his profession. Throughout the novel, rather than dispelling doubt, he frequently acknowledges the mysteries of God, life, and the universe. He says “I
don’t know” more than any other phrase. While this apprehensive approach to
theology may initially seem to be rooted in weakness or ignorance, it is actually the product of a deliberate theological decision and in fact, what may seem
to be Ames’s greatest weakness is actually his greatest strength; his ability to
embrace ambiguity and act in spite of insecurity allows him to better serve his
parishioners and family. While Ames develops this theology of uncertainty in
his teaching, Robinson reinforces the same ideology in the structure of the novel
through her ambivalent representation of Ames’s relationship with Lila. Robinson further reinforces the theme by blending past and present in Lila’s narrative and creating a mysterious and slippery atmosphere. Such a perspective on
the validity of uncertainty offers a fresh theological and theoretical perspective
within the context of the ongoing debate between scientific positivism and
humanistic philosophy and argues for a more merciful approach to religious
philosophy.
Let’s pause for a moment to understand the greater philosophical context
and try to understand what is meant by “scientific positivism” and “humanistic philosophy.” Although the debate between the sciences and the humanities
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over intellectual superiority is not new, it is far from resolved and perhaps more
pertinent than ever. Since the early 19th century, the two have become increasingly different in their approaches to knowledge and equally competitive. Each
claims superiority over the other in defining and solving the important questions of human life. A simple and current example can be found in the defense
against terrorism where science concerns itself with the development of new
technologies to thwart attacks, while the humanities is occupied with understanding the philosophical, religious, and social forces that would cause such
attacks. Both are genuine efforts to solve the same problem, but they are very
different. The debate becomes especially intense when one side accuses the
other of wasting time and resources as is often the case. The fundamental difference Wendell Berry draws between the two philosophical perspectives is the
attitude towards ignorance. The humanities, Berry argues, live with uncertainty
and make paramount “the question of how to act in ignorance” (11). Another
approach to the humanistic notion of humanity is the idea that each individual
is the accumulation of personal, familial, and cultural history—an infinitude of
experiences and thoughts—and yet the compilation of each of those thoughts
fails to amount to a complete explanation of a person. No matter how much
data we gather, humans can still be unpredictable, we continue to produce the
unexpected. There is, in humanity, an inherent element of the unknowable.
According to the humanistic approach there is and always will be a bit of mystery in humanity. Ambiguity is an unavoidable part of the human experience,
Berry argues, and a fundamentally unavoidable element of thinking, creative
human individuals (11).
In contrast to the humanistic approach, science (as described by Berry)
possesses a certainty that all will be explained and that all ignorance will eventually be snuffed out in the wake of scientific progress and discovery. For him,
this scientific positivism leaves little to no room for the individual, reducing
humans to machines and eliminating the possibility of original thought. Berry
is not alone in criticizing scientific positivism. Robinson echoes and expands
upon Berry’s critique of the scientific reductionist approach to humans in an
essay discussing American education. She writes that, “we have been told and
told again that our educators are not preparing American youth to be efficient
workers. Workers. That language is so common among us now that an extraterrestrial might think we had actually lost the Cold War” (Imagination 24).
This, of course, is in reference to the thought that individuals are frequently
viewed as a simple piece in the grand mechanism that is the economy, and that
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individuals should be prepared and primed to fit specific roles of production.
This, clearly, is the result that Berry and Robinson alike fear: a culture guided by
scientific positivism that reduces humans to workers and expects production
rather than individuality and favors efficiency above all else. Contrasted with
the humanistic approach, the scientific approach (at least according to Berry
and Robinson) seems feeble and even foolish in understanding human life.
John Ames initially appears to be remarkably uncertain about his own profession. His responses are studded with uncertainty and hesitation, and he is
more likely to confess ignorance than offer definitive answers. These characteristics stand in contrast to Boughton, who appears confident in his answers
and bold in his declarations, while Ames seems wary of giving straightforward
answers. In many of his answers to Lila, he refers to the great “mystery” surrounding life and God and judgment (31). When it comes to Lila’s baptism, he
seems terribly uncertain about the proceedings, the appropriateness, and even
the preparation of it. How is it that a lifelong preacher, and furthermore, a third
generation preacher, can be so uncertain, so hesitant in the work that fills his
days and nights? This attitude is not the result of ignorance or laziness, as it is
central to his life’s work, although at first glance it could seem to be linked to
either timidity or fear.
In reality, Ames’s uncertainty does not spring from any inexperience or
insufficient study. To the contrary, his theological approach is deliberate and
well considered, and in contrast to what readers might expect, the vagueness
of his preaching style is a deliberate and well-pondered theological approach,
which he demonstrates in his conversations with his wife. In one particular
instance the pair is discussing the final judgment. After overhearing Boughton
and Ames discuss the subject, Lila is clearly concerned for Doll, the woman who
raised her, as she was never baptized. Ames’s response to Lila is filled with fervor
as he explains that imagining others in hell feels like “evil” and “a very grave sin”
(101). He refuses to imagine people going to hell and firmly removes himself
from any position of authoritative judgment on the matter. Instead, he insists
that mortals should not and cannot imagine others in hell and instead they
must live with the uncertainty, leaving the subject unexplored. Paradoxically,
Ames is certain of uncertainty and although this may seem contradictory, the
preacher frequently places this uncertainty at the very center of his theology.
This same cautiousness is demonstrated throughout the novel, particularly
in his conversations with Lila, who continually challenges his notions with
her unconventional questions. Ames frequently responds to her questions by
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simply acknowledging his uncertainty. In fact, “I don’t know” almost becomes a
mantra for Ames as he struggles to respond to his wife’s queries. In one passage,
he demonstrates particular caution about speaking beyond his understanding.
He tells Lila, “If I tried to explain I wouldn’t believe what I was saying to you.
That’s lying isn’t it? I’m probably more afraid of that than anything else. I really
don’t think preachers ought to lie. Especially about religion” (99). Rather than
being motivated by ignorance, Ames’s hesitation spawns from a keen awareness of ignorance and a supreme allegiance to presenting truth and pure truth
only. His caution stems from a reverence, rather than fear, of theology, and in
his own gentle way, he shows perhaps greater conviction and certainty than any
other character in the novel through firm belief in uncertainty.
A staunch belief in uncertainty seems counterproductive, though, especially in religion’s usual paradigm, wherein faith squelches doubt, and certainty
stands as the fruit of progression and enlightenment. Belief in uncertainty,
however, is far from being an ill-founded concept. As Wendell Berry has argued,
“The mystery surrounding our life is probably not significantly reducible” (11).
And while this outlook may seem pessimistic or ignorant, it is neither, according to Berry’s observations. In response to the notion that this statement is
ignorant, Berry argued that each new discovery opens up more questions than
existed before. In hydra-like manner, each answer produces two more questions. Therefore, rather than reducing the mystery surrounding life, exploration and study increase uncertainty in the universe. In response to the thought
that Berry’s statement is pessimistic, he argues against the negative connotation of ignorance and, in fact, seems to revel in the thought of it. Ignorance
and uncertainty, Berry argues, are not a result of stupidity or laziness, but are
instead an inherent part of the human experience, which scientific positivism
has not and will not accept (27).
At the crossroads of two forceful paradigms, Ames’s theology of uncertainty takes on ever-greater importance. And while he shies away from certainty, Ames does so for exactly the reasons Berry outlines in his work, namely
fear of corruption and the value of the individual. With regards to the former,
Ames clearly acknowledges the possibility for preachers to leverage their position for power and personal benefit. His statement that preachers ought not
lie, especially about religion, seems flavored by the dark history of corruption
that religion often bears (99). With regards to the latter, Ames seems to be a
relative newcomer. Although he seems to have always valued the individual,
the introduction of Lila into his life seems to have further pushed the question
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in his mind. Ames repeatedly tells Lila that she asks important questions that
make him reconsider things he had thought already settled. As a character so
foreign to Ames’s experience, Lila pushes the preacher’s beliefs about grace and
redemption to new limits by forcing him to apply, what may have previously
been merely theoretical ideals, in very real and practical ways to individuals
whose experience he could hardly have even imagined. Lila, in many ways, represents the lost and ignorant – those who are never taught a shred of religion
and never have a real chance at conversion or baptism. As Lila remarks, the
people she grew up with hardly had any concept of days of the week, let alone
Sunday or going to church (21). Lila forces Ames to consider the eternal destiny
of individuals like her and to reconcile their reality with his belief in a just and
loving God. And although some, like Boughton the other preacher, quote, with
little hesitation, scriptures clearly explaining the damnation of the unbaptized,
Ames instead hesitates and insists on ignorance.
Such a commitment to ambiguity, however, seems counter-productive to
the occupation of a preacher. Shouldn’t Ames be dispelling doubt, proclaiming
the will of God, and extolling the justice of His decrees? Isn’t it counter-intuitive
for a preacher to be questioning the necessity of baptism to salvation, the very
ordinance that marks entrance into his flock? Such questions highlight the tension between the humanistic and scientific paradigms as one tries to provide
definitive answers about spiritual destiny, while the other strains to leave room
to adjust for each unique individual. As Robinson notes, the humanistic elements of language and culture are hardly concerned with scientific efficiency.
She writes, “Some students in France drew my attention to the enormous number of English words that describe the behavior of light. Glimmer, glitter, glister,
gleam, glow, glare, shimmer, sparkle, shine and so on. These old words are not
utilitarian” (Imagination 22). The linguistic behavior described by Robinson
seems almost intentionally contrary to the efficient ideals of science, but that
is exactly her point. Language and the humanities are not concerned with
efficiency, but with human experience, individuality, and originality. This is
not to say that language is unconcerned with progressing and expanding its
borders, but to the contrary – the mystery and the indescribable continually
urge and inspire writers to “make inroads on the vast terrain of what cannot be
said” (Imagination 20). In this example Robinson demonstrates the humanistic
attempt to capture and understand that bit of mystery in humanity. Each new
word captures a new nuance of meaning. According to Robinson these repetitions are in many instances no more efficient or effective in communication
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except that they somehow come closer to the inherent mystery of humanity.
Science and the humanities share the motivation of discovering the unknown,
but they fundamentally differ in their idea of the end goal – science aims to discover ultimate answers, and the humanities aims to discover ultimate questions.
Offering a theological perspective on the matter, James Smith writes that
“gathering as an answer to the call to worship is a displacement of any human
self-confidence or presumption.” (165). For Smith, engaging in Christian worship is embarking on a monumental task and requires the acknowledgement
of human weakness and dependence on grace. In pedestrian terms, he writes,
“we have a sense that we’re in over our head.” Such renunciation of confidence
indeed seems parallel with John Ames’s insistence on ignorance. The notion
that true worship requires an acceptance, if not hearty embracing, of ignorance
seems contrary to conventional religious pursuit, but is in fact an essential part
of coming to know God. And as Smith points out, approaching the all-knowing,
in many respects, demands acknowledging our own abundant un-knowing. In
parallel fashion, as T.S. Eliot has written, “In order to arrive at what you do not
know/ You must go by a way which is the way of ignorance” (201). The path
to knowing is, in fact, through the territories of unknowing, which may echo
Ames’s embracing of ignorance and privileging patience and charity over certainty. As Berry argues, the two perspectives of humanism and science are irreconcilable, but in a world where scientific positivism seems so heartily accepted,
how might readers more clearly define and imagine the humanistic paradigm?
Robinson provides a stunning example with the relationship between Ames
and Lila.
While Ames is certainly conscious in his decision to embrace a theology of
uncertainty, Robinson also seems to use his relationship with Lila to metaphorically embody the ambiguity and ignorance that he so heartily asserts. Ames
and Lila pursue their relationship in spite of an abundance of uncertainty. Just
as Berry argues, “we have to act on the basis of what we know, and what we
know is incomplete” (10) The possibility that Lila might spontaneously leave
and return to her life as a vagrant challenges all trust that exists between the
two. Interestingly, both spouses are supremely aware of this. Ames even goes
so far as to tell Lila that if she ever changes her mind about staying that he
wants her “to leave by daylight. I want you to have a train ticket in your hand
that will take you where you where you want to go” (25), he tells her. Lila frets
about the possibility of losing his trust. “If a day came when he stopped trusting her. When that day came. She was sure it would” (25). How could a pair
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function under such uncertainty? In many ways, Robinson is only highlighting
the uncertainty that all couples live with. In spite of promises and vows, all
relationships operate under the possibility of dissolution – and yet we act anyway. Robinson is merely exaggerating and highlighting the fact that humans
live with no steadfast guarantees, and yet they still live and love in spite of it all.
Furthermore, it is this very uncertainty that makes us human.
Throughout her essays, Robinson also reaffirms the importance of love
over understanding, again placing definitive knowledge secondary to less easily
defined human elements. Speaking of ideology she writes, “In my Bible, Jesus
does not say, ‘I was hungry and you fed me, though not in such a way as to
interfere with free-market principles…’ Until there is evidence that ideology
mattered to Jesus, it will be of no interest to me” (Wondrous 139). Robinson
clearly places charity as an absolute priority over intellectual or ideological
understanding. In many instances, love is made conditional upon understanding, a belief that Robinson turns upon its head. In fact, understanding seems
to be much more a fruit of love. Smith, in fact, advocates replacing a hermeneutics of suspicion with a hermeneutics of love, arguing that operating solely
under suspicion closes critics to understanding as it precludes the discovery of
new truth. Instead, reading under a charitable lens allows scholars to approach
texts in a discerning way.
The charitable approach is once again represented in the book, as the
majority of the text is narrated by Lila’s unspoken thoughts. Moments with
Ames repeatedly remind Lila of stories, whether they be of Doll, St. Louis, or her
childhood, and although she says she’d like to tell Ames, only the reader hears
them, and Ames is left wondering and trusting. Lila is governed and shaped
in many ways by these untold narratives. Rather than probing her for explanations, however, Ames demonstrates incredible patience and gently encourages,
but never forces, “I think you are asking these questions because of some hard
things that have happened, the things you won’t talk about,” he says. “If you
did tell me about them, I could probably not say more than that life is a very
deep mystery, and that finally the grace of God is all that can resolve it.” (31). In
this statement, Ames demonstrates both his patience and faith in Lila, by not
demanding an explanation and allowing her to give an explanation in her own
time. Simultaneously, he acknowledges the importance of believing in God in
spite of the mystery that surrounds belief itself and demonstrates his own comfort in the face of uncertainty.
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Lila’s wandering inner narratives are also arranged in a way as to denote a
vagueness and uncertainty. Woven throughout the narrative, the text is a blend
of present and past often leaving the reader with a wispy sense of time and place
and creating a somewhat ethereal mindset. In spite of the seemingly irrational
flow of thought and memory, Robinson blends the plot into a stunningly realistic narrative. The construction of the novel therefore reflects the theology of
uncertainty as it seems to follow an irrational flow and yet thereby achieves a
fantastically realistic feeling.
In a particularly moving passage, Ames draws an interesting distinction
between fact and hope, contrasting prayer as a hope with baptism as a fact and
ultimately acknowledging the uncertainty of everything within the human
realm. “Family is a prayer,” he says, “Wife is a prayer. Marriage is a prayer” (237).
As if to say that each of these things is only a hope, based on faith, bound by
charity, Ames acknowledges the uncertainty of all relationships and the necessity for action under uncertainty. He continues, however, to say that baptism,
however, is a certainty: “[W]hat I’d call a fact” (237).
After exploring the theology of uncertainty, readers revisiting the baptism
scene will see it in a completely different light. Rather than serving as a point
of uncertainty and doubt for Ames, the baptism is a locus of certainty. It could
be argued that Ames’s discovery is a true certitude in ambiguity. Although the
slipshod nature of the ceremony once gave Ames reason to doubt, he now finds
newborn certainty in the validity of uncertainty. While baptism is a certainty,
however, the intention is what matters more than the particulars of the ceremony. Robinson, through Ames, seems to be making a profoundly new statement on the assumed reality of human existence and the role of uncertainty in
it.
Why is it, though, that Ames decides to make such a distinction about
baptism? And how might this be an argument for increased mercy in religion?
What is the distinction between baptism as a “fact” and marriage, family, wife,
and everything as a prayer? What makes baptism such a crucial moment of separation in his logic? One early critic marked the distinction as a means of highlighting the tension between “faith as sensibility and faith as doctrine” (Ulin).
Such a distinction seems to interpret the difference as one between attitude
and intellectual principle which in some ways seems to fall short of a satisfying
response. Eve Tushnet offers just that. She writes, “The most compelling element of Lila’s religious vision is its tacit opposition between two ways of living
in the world, the way of work and the way of baptism” (53). She continues,
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Lila likes work and takes pride in it…. Work produces pride, but poverty corrodes that pride and leaves only shame behind. You can never work hard enough
to escape shame; you can never earn the certainty that you deserve. Baptism,
[however], is unearned; it’s complete in a moment, unlike work, which must be
slogged through. Work is time; baptism is the inbreaking of eternity. You can
be judged on the quality of your work but the quality of your baptism – including the quality of your faith at baptism – is not relevant. Baptism is done to you,
not by you, and so you can never be proud of it.

Surrendering responsibility to God, as in baptism, is an entry into uncertainty,
as individuals place their fate in the hands of God rather than taking it upon
themselves. According to this argument, baptism is, in fact, a distinctly different way of life – a completely new paradigm independent from Lila’s former ideology of work and also separate from Ames’s theology of uncertainty.
This contrast runs perfectly parallel with the debate between the sciences
and humanities and is a direct treatment of uncertainty and positivism. Ignorance, like grace, is offered to and totally necessary for mortals in their struggle
through existence, but this need is not shared with God. He, instead, is the
giver, not the recipient, of grace and the omniscient, not the uncertain. This
highlights the difference between God and men and seems to resonate with
the words, “For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are my ways your
ways” (Isaiah 55:8). Communion, in this case, is not an emphasis on the similarity between man and God, but their difference, namely the contrast between
lack and possession, God as giver and mortal as recipient. Baptism is the crossroads between the rightly and inherently ignorant human position and the certitude of deity, and therefore, marks a distinct difference between baptism as a
fact and all else as prayer. Again, this situation beautifully recasts the contrast
between certainty and doubt and allows for the humanistic uncertainty in individuals and added mercy in religion.
John Ames may certainly be characterized as a preacher filled with hesitancy
and steeped in uncertainty, but rather than plaguing his life with weakness,
these characteristics become his greatest virtue. This virtue is not accidental,
but deliberate, presenting a different, gentler approach towards belief and
humanity: a humanistic approach. Throughout the novel, Robinson develops,
through Ames, a theology of uncertainty, in which the greatest power comes
to the characters because of their acceptance and appreciation of uncertainty.
Lila and Ames represent a living relationship in which ambiguity is accepted
and allowed and where trust takes priority over possession. Even the loose
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chronology of the novel itself reflects an awareness of the same principles, forcing readers to exercise the very theology of uncertainty promoted in the book.
Placed within the context of a philosophical debate between scientific positivism and humanistic ambiguity, Ames’s philosophy gains ever-greater significance as a manifesto for the inherent mystery of each individual’s experience.
In an age filled with perhaps more information than any other, the acceptance
of mystery and uncertainty becomes ever more relevant in shaping perceptions
of the world and perspectives on what it means to be human. And paradoxically,
perhaps the most powerful and satisfying response to the incessant hunger for
knowledge is the acceptance of the unknown.
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